Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: 22STCV35468, Date: 2023-10-17 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for breach of implied warranty of habitability, breach of covenant of quiet use and enjoyment, negligence, and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that he leased a property from Defendant located at 8420 South Avalon Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90003. (Compl., ¶1.) On July 7, 2022, an electrical fire caused by an air conditioner started by the front door inside the property while Plaintiff was sleeping. (Compl., ¶2.) Plaintiff became trapped in the home because the front door was the only exit, Defendant locked another exit door in Plaintiff’s room, and Defendant had installed iron bars on all the windows. (Compl., ¶3.) Plaintiff was rescued and treated by firemen who transported him to the hospital, where he was treated for extreme smoke inhalation. (Compl., ¶3.)

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication on the issue of duty. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, the owner and landlord of the subject property, owed Plaintiff a duty of ordinary care to detect and protect against fire hazards on the property.

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) On a plaintiff’s motion, the plaintiff must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any underlying material fact more likely than not. (Id at p.845.) The plaintiff meets his burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if he has proved each element on that cause of action. (Id at p.849.) The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense. (Id.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., section 437c(c).)

"The 'fundamental element' for every negligence cause of action is the 'the existence of a legal duty of care running from the defendant to the plaintiff… A duty may arise through statute, contract, or the relationship of the parties…California also recognizes a common law duty in certain circumstances based on the theory of negligent undertaking." (Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 914, 920.)

Plaintiff provides Defendant’s deposition testimony in support of his motion. Defendant testified that he owned the subject property and that he leased it to a someone using an identification card belonging to Arturo Macias to use as a warehouse for $1,200 per month. (Hernandez Depo., 11:4-7, 29:4-30:14.) Macias would use the warehouse to store his belongings and park his car. (Id.) Defendant knew Macias would be in the property to put his things inside. (Id.) Defendant placed bars on the windows because the property is a commercial shop or storage space, which are commonly protected by window bars in South Central. (Id., 160:6-22.) The key that opens the front of the property is the same key that opens the rear gate. (Id., 160:23-25.) Defendant also testified that there were smoke detectors, a fire extinguisher, and an alarm on the premises at the time he rented the space to Macias. (Id., 188:8-18.)

Plaintiff also provides Defendant’s Cross-Complaint, which alleges that Plaintiff was using the identity of Arturo Lares Macias to lease the property. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶7, 29.) Defendant was unaware that Defendant was using the premises as a residential property. (Id., ¶8.) Plaintiff had also illegally built and installed a bathroom in the unit and lived there in violation of the parties’ agreement, local building codes, and zoning. (Id., ¶10.)

Code Civ. Proc., section 437c subdivision(q) states in relevant part: “In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.”

Here, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections are not material to the disposition of the motion. Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s separate statement also fail to comply with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1354 because they were not filed separately from the other papers in opposition to the motion. Thus, the Court declines to rule on these objections.

Plaintiff performs an analysis of the factors from Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 113. However, Rowland only applies in situations that justify a departure from Civ. Code, section 1714. In Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, the Supreme Court summarized the so-called Rowland factors: “In the Rowland decision, this court identified several considerations that, when balanced together, may justify a departure from the fundamental principle embodied in Civil Code section 1714.” Here, Defendant had a duty under Civ. Code, section 1714, subd. (a) to exercise ordinary care or skill in the management of his property. The Rowland factors are not applicable here because there is no reason to depart from Civ. Code, section 1714.

“The comparative fault doctrine ‘is designed to permit the trier of fact to consider all relevant criteria in apportioning liability.’ The doctrine ‘is a flexible, commonsense concept, under which a jury properly may consider and evaluate the relative responsibility of various parties for an injury (whether their responsibility for the injury rests on negligence, strict liability, or other theories of responsibility), in order to arrive at an “equitable apportionment or allocation of loss.’” (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1285.)

Here, Defendant does not dispute that he owed a duty of reasonable care not to cause unreasonable risk of harm to others. Plaintiff’s own negligence does not affect whether Defendant had a duty to protect Plaintiff from fire hazards on the property. This motion does not concern the apportionment of liability. Thus, summary adjudication is denied on this ground.

Plaintiff cites California Code of Regulations, Title 19, Division 1, section 504.2. However, the California Code of Regulations contains no such section. Rather, the section appears in the 2022 California Fire Code, Title 24, Part 9, Chapter 5, section 504.2. The section provides that “exterior doors and their function shall not be eliminated without prior approval. Exterior doors that have been rendered nonfunctional and that retain a functional door exterior appearance shall have a sign affixed to the exterior side of the door with the words ‘THIS DOOR IS BLOCKED.’” Chapter 1, Division I, section 112.1 provides that “it shall be unlawful for a person, firm, or corporation erect, construct, alter, repair, remove, demolish, or utilize a building, occupancy, premises, or system regulated by this code…in conflict with or in violation of any of the provisions of the code.” Section 112.2 provides that “correction and abatement violations of this code shall be the responsibility of the owner…Where an occupant creates or allows to be created hazardous conditions in violations of this code, the occupant shall be held responsible for the abatement of such hazardous conditions.”

Here, Plaintiff is seeking a determination that Defendant owed a duty of ordinary care in detecting and protecting against fire hazards. However, section 504.2, read together with other provisions of the California Fire Code, states that it is unlawful to render exterior doors nonfunctional without prior approval and without the proper signs. Additionally, correction of the violation rests with the person who created the hazard. Thus, Defendant at most had a duty not to render an exterior door nonfunctional without authorization or proper signs and to correct such a hazard if he created it. This does not amount to a duty to detect and protect against fire hazards.

Plaintiff also cites Los Angeles Municipal Code, section 1030.1.1. However, the municipal code does not contain such a section, nor does this code use this numbering convention. Although the section number appears in the 2023 City of Los Angeles Building Code, Chapter 10, section 1030.1.1, this section concerns the safety of bleachers and grandstands. Section 1031.2.1 provides that bars, grills, grates, or similar devices on windows serving as emergency escape routes must have operable release mechanisms. However, this section would at most require Defendant to ensure windows designated as emergency escape routes had operable release mechanisms. Again, this does not amount to a duty to detect and protect against fire hazards on the property.

Therefore, the statutes Plaintiff cited do not appear to impose a statutory duty on Defendant to detect and protect against fire hazards on the property separate and apart from the general duty of care owed by a landlord. Additionally, as will be explained below, Defendant’s liability as a landlord is limited to conditions he had actual knowledge of and which he had the right and ability to cure.

Plaintiff next argues that Defendant voluntarily undertook fire safety improvements to the premises and therefore assumed a duty to do so with reasonable care. Plaintiff cites Janofsky v. Garland (1941) 42 CA2d 655, 657 and McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App. 3d 1 in support of this argument. However, both Janofsky and McDaniel involve landlords who undertook to make repairs to dwellings during the occupants’ tenancy and made the repairs negligently. Here, unlike Janofsky and McDaniel, there is no evidence or allegation that Defendant made repairs to the property after surrendering possession of the property. Therefore, Janofsky and McDaniel do not apply to this case.

“Historically, the public policy of this state generally has precluded a landlord's liability for injuries to his tenant or his tenant's invitees from a dangerous condition on the premises which comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession. This is true even though by the exercise of reasonable diligence the landlord might have discovered the condition.” (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510; Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 778.) This policy is based on the principle that the landlord has surrendered possession and control of the land to the tenant and has no right to enter without permission. (Id. at 511.) “[B]efore liability may be thrust on a landlord for a third party's injury due to a dangerous condition on the land, the plaintiff must show that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition.’” (Stone v. Center Trost Retail Properties, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608, 612.)

“The burden of reducing or avoiding the risk and the likelihood of injury will affect the determination of what constitutes a reasonable inspection. The landlord’s obligation is only to do what is reasonable under the circumstances. The landlord need not take extraordinary measures or make unreasonable expenditures of time and money in trying to discover hazards unless the circumstances so warrant. When there is a potential serious danger, which is foreseeable, a landlord should anticipate the danger and conduct a reasonable inspection before passing possession to the tenant. However, if no such inspection is warranted, the landlord has no such obligation.” (Id. at p. 782.)

“[A] commercial landowner cannot totally abrogate its landowner responsibilities merely by signing a lease… At the time the lease is executed and upon renewal…a landlord has a right to reenter the property, has control of the property, and must inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous conditions.” (Mora, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 771 at p. 781.) “[T]he landlord’s responsibility to inspect is limited. Like a residential landlord, the duty to inspect charges the lessor only with those matters would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection.” (Id. at p. 782.) “Even if the commercial landlord executes a contract which requires the tenant to maintain the property in a certain condition, the landlord is obligated at the time the lease is executed to take reasonable precautions to avoid unnecessary danger.” (Id at p.781.)

Here, Defendant’s testimony shows that he installed fire alarms, smoke detectors, and a fire extinguisher at the time he leased the premises to Macias. Additionally, he gave Macias a key to the front of the property, the same key which opened the rear gate. Defendant, as the owner of the property, had a duty at the time the lease was executed to inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous conditions. After he entered into an oral lease with Macias, Defendant surrendered possession of the property and thus had no right to reenter. Plaintiff provides no evidence that Defendant had notice that there were no smoke detectors, fire alarms, or fire extinguishers inside the property at the time of the fire. Plaintiff also fails to provide evidence that Defendant knew the rear gate was inaccessible or that the barred windows were dangerous under the circumstances. Additionally, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Defendant had the right to enter and correct the alleged fire hazards.

There is also a dispute as to whether the property was leased as a residential or commercial property. Although Plaintiff argues this detail is not relevant, landlords have a duty to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous conditions at the time a lease is executed. What is reasonably safe could vary depending on the intended use of the building. Thus, this information would be relevant to whether Defendant had a duty to install fire alarms, smoke detectors, and fire extinguishers. Thus, a triable issue of material fact remains on this issue.

Plaintiff essentially argues that Defendant had a duty to detect and protect against fire hazards on the property for the duration of his tenancy. Defendant did owe a duty to inspect the premises and make is reasonably safe from dangerous conditions at the time the parties entered into the lease. Defendant also owed a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent injuries caused by dangerous conditions that he had notice of and the right and ability to cure. These duties fall under the general duty to exercise ordinary care or skill in the management of one’s property under Civ. Code, section 1714. However, to require Defendant to detect and protect against fire hazards without limitation to whether Defendant had surrendered possession of the property, whether Defendant had notice of any dangerous condition, or whether Defendant had the right and ability to cure the condition is contrary to law. Plaintiff provides no evidence or authority to support his assertion that Defendant had a duty to detect and protect against fire hazards on the property. Plaintiff thus fails to meet his burden of showing no triable issue of material fact remains on the issue of duty.

Plaintiff argues on reply that summary adjudication must be granted because Defendant did not dispute any of the material facts in Plaintiff’s separate statement. However, even if these facts are undisputed, there is no authority or evidence which supports Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant owes a duty to detect and protect against fire hazards on the property.

Plaintiff also argues on reply that Defendant had notice of an unsafe condition because he installed window bars on the property. Plaintiff's evidence shows that Defendant leased the property to Macias with the understanding that it was a commercial building being used as a warehouse to store Macias’s belongings. Even though Defendant knew Macias would have entered the warehouse to store his possessions, Defendant only had a duty to make the warehouse reasonably safe from dangerous conditions at the time he leased the property to Macias. Because there is a factual dispute over whether the property was leased as a residential or commercial property, there is a factual dispute over what is reasonably safe. With the evidence available, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Defendant had a duty to ensure the windows had no bars to make the property reasonably safe.

The parties dispute who Defendant leased the premises to, whether it was Mosqueda posing as Macias or someone else entirely. There is also a dispute over whether there were fire alarms, smoke detectors, or a fire extinguisher on the property. However, these issues are not relevant to the issue of duty.