Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

 

CHRASHA WN JACKSON, et al. 

Plaintiffs,

vs. 

AUDREY WEBB, 

Defendant. Case No.: 23STCV06883

DEFENDANT AUDREY WEBB’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 

 

Defendant Audrey Webb’s motion for attorney fees and costs is GRANTED.

The fees are payable within 15 days after the date of this order.

The case is dismissed with prejudice as the decision on the Anti-Slapp Motion was dispositive.

Moving party to provide notice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On March 29, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant.

On October 31, 2023, the Court granted Defendant’s special motion to strike.

On November 27, 2023, Defendant filed this motion for attorney fees.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Audrey Webb moves for attorney fees and costs arising from her special motion to strike which was granted on June 8, 2023.

C.C.P. §425.16(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.”   

 

“[O]nly those attorney fees and costs related to the special motion to strike, not the entire action, may be recovered under section 425.16, subdivision (c).”  (Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 92.)  The limitation of C.C.P. §425.16(c) to an award of costs and attorney fees incurred “in connection with the special motion to strike” has been interpreted to include, “expenses incurred in litigating an award of attorney fees after the trial court has granted the motion to strike. It also includes fees incurred in responding to an appeal of an order granting a special motion to strike or an order awarding attorney fees in connection with such motion.” (Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 21.)  “Where costs and attorney fees are authorized for responding to an appeal of an order awarding costs and attorney fees under [C.C.P. §425.16(c)], there is no reason why this should not also encompass costs and attorney fees incurred in challenging the undertaking submitted by the plaintiff to stay enforcement of the award pending appeal.” (Ibid.)  C.C.P. §425.16(c), “is broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extricating herself from a baseless lawsuit. (Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 362.) 

 

“The California Supreme Court has upheld the lodestar method for determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees for a prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion. Under this method, a court assesses attorney fees by first determining the time spent and the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. The court next determines whether that lodestar figure should be adjusted based on various relevant factors, including a plaintiff’s limited success in the litigation.  In determining the lodestar amount, a prevailing party generally may not recover for work on causes of action on which the party was unsuccessful.”  (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 342 (Citations Omitted).) 

 

Here, Webb is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under C.C.P. §425.16(c) because she prevailed on her special motion to strike.

Webb’s counsel, Roger Rosen, testifies that his hourly rate is $600 for the work he performed in this case and that he reduced the charges for his fees by 10%. (Rosen Decl., ¶¶3,5.) Rosen also provides a detailed invoice showing he spent 21.6 hours on this matter. (Id., Exh. 3.) Rosen graduated from the UCLA School of Law in 1985 and has been a member of the California state Bar since 1985. (Id., ¶4.) 

The proposed fees appear reasonable. Given Rosen’s experience, his discounting of fees, the difficulty of this matter, and the fact that he does not appear to be seeking the cost of any support staff, Rosen’s proposed hourly rate is reasonable. The time spent on this matter appears reasonable. Plaintiff argues in opposition that the fees are excessive because the issues in this matter were not overly complicated, and the amount of time Rosen spent on the motion should be taxed. Plaintiff requests a reduction of 50%. However, Plaintiff does not explain how the time billed is excessive. The special motion to strike was a dispositive motion that was fully opposed. The Court has reviewed Rosen’s invoice and finds that the 21.6 hours spent on the motion is reasonable under the circumstances.

The Court finds that the proposed fees are reasonable. The motion for attorney fees and costs is granted. The Court awards a total of $12,114.55 in attorney fees and costs. 

DATED: March 22, 2024 

________________________

Hon. Jill Feeney 

Judge of the Superior Court