Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: 23STCV10920, Date: 2023-07-21 Tentative Ruling

At the hearing, the Court would like to discuss with the parties the potential application of the City of Los Angeles’ rental debt repayment protections to this action.

Plaintiff 5929 Sunset (Hollywood), LLC (“Plaintiff”) owns real property located at 1522 Gordon Street (the “Subject Property”). In January 2022, defendant Carmen Bryan (“Defendant”) entered a year-long lease with Plaintiff to occupy the Subject Property. Defendant has since defaulted on her rent payments.

Plaintiff served Defendant with the 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit (the “3-Day Notice”) on April 13, 2023. At the time the 3-Day Notice was served, Defendant owed rent in the amount of $34,617.54.

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Neither a moving nor responding party may rely on the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. A moving party must submit specific admissible evidence showing that the responding party cannot establish at least one element of his, her or its cause of action or defense. The responding party, to defeat the motion, must submit specific admissible evidence showing that a triable issue of material fact does exist as to that element of the cause of action or defense. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2) states, in relevant part, that a tenant of real property is guilty of unlawful detainer when the tenant continues in possession of the subject real property, without permission of the landlord, after defaulting in payment of rent pursuant to the lease, and after the landlord has provided the tenant with three court days’ notice of the tenant’s default.

Here, Plaintiff attests that it owns the Subject Property. (Lawson Decl. ¶ 2.) Next, Plaintiff attests that Defendant occupies the Subject Property pursuant to a written agreement. (Lawson Decl. ¶ 3; Exh. 1.) Plaintiff notes that under the lease, rent is due in the amount of $3,179.60 on the first of each month. (Id. ¶ 4; Exh. 1.) Plaintiff attests that Defendant has not paid the monthly rent under the lease since June 1, 2022. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff attests that it served Defendant with the Three-Day Notice on April 10, 2023, demanding past due rent for the period of June 1, 2022 to April 30, 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7; Exh. 2.) Plaintiff attests that Defendant has not remedied the default or vacated the Premises as of the filing of the instant motion. (Id. ¶ 8.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met its initial burden of demonstrating that no triable issue of material fact exists as to Defendant’s unlawful detainer of the Subject Property. The burden now shifts to Defendant to show the existence of such a triable issue of material fact.

In Opposition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has breached the implied warranty of habitability by failing to fix Defendant’s broken bedroom window. Defendant argues that Defendant is therefore entitled to withhold rent until the habitability defect is resolved.

To support this position, Defendant attaches a maintenance request order for the broken window dated September 6, 2022. (Exh. 1.) Defendant notes that in the last correspondence regarding the broken window, dated April 6, 2023, Plaintiff states that it was waiting on parts to repair the window. (Exh. 2.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s failure to fix the broken window is a violation of Fire Code, Title 24 Part 9, Section 1030.7, which requires that “emergency escape openings [] be maintained in accordance with the code in effect at the time of construction and . . . [remain] operational from inside of the room without the use of keys or tools.”

A breach of the implied warranty of habitability “may be raised as a defense in an unlawful detainer action.” (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 619.) The breach of warranty of habitability defense for unlawful detainer actions is codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1174.2. Subdivision (a) of Section 1174.2 provides in part:

“In an unlawful detainer proceeding involving residential premises after default in payment of rent and in which the tenant has raised as an affirmative defense a breach of the landlord's obligations under Section 1941 of the Civil Code or of any warranty of habitability, the court shall determine whether a substantial breach of these obligations has occurred.”

The term “substantial breach” is defined as “the failure of the landlord to comply with applicable building and housing code standards which materially affect health and safety.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174.2(c).) “If the tenant can prove such a breach by the landlord, he may demonstrate that his nonpayment of rent was justified and that no rent is in fact ‘due and owing’ to the landlord. Under such circumstances, of course, the landlord would not be entitled to possession of the premises.” (Green at 635.)

The Court finds that Defendant has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether he was excused from paying rent due to Plaintiff’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability.