Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

 

MAGNOLIA MARGARITA LOPEZ DE SOTO, et al.

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

EASTLAKE VILLA APARTMENTS A, LLC, et al.,

Defendant.  

 

 

  Case No.: 23STCV15781

 

MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES FILED BY DEFENDANTS EASTLAKE VILLA APARTMENTS, LLC, PARAGON PARTNERS INVESTMENT INC, AKBAR OMAR, AND RUKHSANA OMAR   

Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED.

Defendants are ordered to file and serve their answer within 10 days after the date of this order.

The court sets a nonappearance review date of Re: Status of Defendants’ Answer for December 21, 2023 at 8:30 a.m.

Moving party to provide notice and to file proof of service of such notice within five court days after the date of this order. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This is an action for tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability, negligence, constructive eviction, trespass, and private nuisance. Plaintiffs allege that they entered into leases with Defendant Paragon Partners in November 2011 and 2012. (Compl., ¶20.) Defendants violated the leases by failing to inspect the electrical wiring in the apartments, which caused a fire on October 24, 2022 which destroyed the Plaintiffs’ homes. (Id., ¶1.) 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On July 6, 2023, Plaintiffs Magnolia Lopez De Soto, Moises Jose-Justo, Jonathan Alfredo Soto Lopez, Jose Efrain Soto, Carolina Rivera Figueroa as Guardian ad litem for minors Tomy Bailon, Kevin Bailon, Melody Bailon, and Melissa Bailon, Tomas Bailon Martinez, and Melanie Aide Meza filed their Complaint against Defendants Eastlake Villa Apartments A, LLC, Paragon Partners Investment, Inc., Akbar Omar, and Rukhsana Omar. 

On September 29, 2023, Defendants filed this motion to strike punitive damages.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to strike the following allegations in support of Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages from the Complaint: 

1. Paragraph 28 on page 7 of the Complaint: "Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294."

2. Paragraph 34 on page 8 of the Complaint: "Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890."

3. Paragraph 39 on page 9 of the Complaint: "Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294."

4. Paragraph 47 on page 10 of the Complaint: "Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294."

5. Paragraph 5 on page 11 of the Complaint: "Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294."

6. Under "Prayer for Relief", paragraph 2, line 20, on page 11 of the Complaint (First Cause of Action): "For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof;"

7. Under "Prayer for Relief", paragraph 5, line 26, on page 11 of the Complaint (Second Cause of Action): "For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof;"

8. Under "Prayer for Relief", paragraph 8, line 4, on page 12 of the Complaint (Third Cause of Action): "For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof;"

9. Under "Prayer for Relief", paragraph 11, line 10, on page 12 of the Complaint (Fourth Cause of Action): "For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof;"

10. Under "Prayer for Relief", paragraph 14, line 16, on page 12 of the Complaint (Fifth Cause of Action): "For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof”

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., section 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. section 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) 

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages.  (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.)  The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity. Conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.) 

“As amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) 

As a point of comparison, gross negligence is defined as “the lack of any care or an extreme departure from what a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to oneself or to others.” (CACI No. 425.)

“Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the ‘officer[s], director[s], or managing agent[s].’” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [citation omitted].) As to ratification, “[a] corporation cannot confirm and accept that which it does not actually know about.’” (Ibid. [citing College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726 [for ratification sufficient to justify punitive damages against corporation, there must be proof that officers, directors, or managing agents had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct and its outrageous character]].) 

Under CCP § 3294(b), an employer may be liable for punitive damages due to the acts of an employee only under certain conditions. The employer may be liable for punitive damages if the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of an employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Alternatively, the employer may be liable if the employer authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Id.) In the context of a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Id.) 

To show employer ratification or authorization, a plaintiff must show the employer actually knew of the wrongdoing employee's conduct and its outrageous nature. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Crowell) (1994) 8 C4th 704, 725-726, 34 CR2d 898, 911-912.) Evidence of authorization need not be explicit but instead may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (Greenfield v. Spectrum Investment Corp. (1985) 174 CA3d 111, 118-119, 219 CR 805, 809 (disapproved on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 C4th 644, 25 CR2d 109).) Showing that management had evidence of the employee's misconduct but decided not to act to correct the situation can suffice to show authorization. (See Id.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to inspect and maintain the wiring in their homes, causing a fire in October 2022 that destroyed their homes. (Compl., ¶1.)

Eastlake Villa LLC owns and operates multiple multi-family properties in Los Angeles, including the subject property. (Id., ¶10.) Eastlake was at all times aware of the risk that can befall tenants if an owner fails to maintain a rental property. (Id.) Paragon Partners is the property manager for the subject property. (Id., ¶11.) Paragon Partners was at all times aware of the risk of harm that can befall tenants of a rental property if the owner fails to exercise due care when making repairs or conducting maintenance, including the risk of harm posed by a fire in a wood frame apartment building. (Id., ¶12.) The Complaint names Akbar and Rukhsana Omar, members and managers of Eastlake Villa LLC and Paragon Partners, and alleges that they ratified the entities’ wrongful acts and omissions. (Id., ¶¶13-14.) 

The facts allege that Defendants knew that failing to maintain the wiring would cause significant risk of fire and nevertheless failed to perform maintenance on the wiring in Plaintiffs’ homes. Thus, the facts show Defendants knew of the probable consequences of their conduct and failed to avoid those consequences. However, the facts do not allege conduct that arises to the level of despicable conduct required to support a demand for punitive damages. The Complaint merely alleges that Defendants failed to inspect and maintain the wiring despite knowing there was a risk of fire. Although the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs were thrown out into the streets with only a handful of possessions, it appears this was the result of the fire which destroyed the apartments and Plaintiffs’ possessions and not due to any additional action on Defendants’ part. (Compl., ¶3.) Failing to inspect the wires, without more, does not constitute conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants were fully aware of the dangers of failing to inspect and maintain the wiring at the property and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those dangers. Plaintiff cites Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 926, where a court found that exemplary damages may be awarded in a wrongful eviction case if the landlord’s conduct justifies the award, in support of this argument. Here, there are no allegations in the Complaint alleging that Defendants’ conduct was willful or deliberate. Rather, the Complaint states that Defendants failed to maintain or inspect the wiring. The Court cannot find that this conduct as alleged rises to a level of despicable conduct sufficient to support a demand for punitive damages. 

DATED: November 17, 2023

                                                                      ____________________________ 

Hon. Jill Feeney

Judge of the Superior Court