Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: 23STCV20310, Date: 2024-03-18 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for breach of implied warranty of habitability, tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, private nuisance, violation of civil code, section 1942.4, violation of LAMC section 45.33, and violation of business and professions code, section 17200. Plaintiffs, all tenants residing in an apartment located in Los Angeles, allege that Defendants failed to repair and maintain the apartment. Plaintiffs allege the apartment suffers from pest infestations, water leaks, mold, and other physical defects.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 (internal citations omitted).)

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 430.41(a).) “The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 430.41(a)(2).) A failure to meet and confer does not constitute grounds to sustain or overrule a demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., sections 430.41 (a)(4).)

Beach Front’s counsel testifies that he met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel in November 2023 and could not resolve their dispute over Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Stone Decl., ¶¶3-4.) Beach Front satisfies meet and confer requirements.

Beach Front demurs to Plaintiff’s’ Complaint on the grounds that (1) it is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as an agent of a receiver and (2) Plaintiffs were required to seek permission from the receiver court to sue Beach Front.

California courts have extended quasi-judicial immunity to persons acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity from civil suits for acts performed in the exercise of their duties. (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 853.) Quasi-judicial immunity is extended to (1) persons who perform functions normally performed by a judge or who act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, (2) persons who function apart from the courts but are engaged in neutral dispute resolution, and (3) persons who are (a) appointed by the courts for their expertise, such as mediators, guardians ad litem, therapists, and receivers, or (b) not appointed by the courts but whose work product comes into the judicial process to be used by the courts. (Id. at 855-857.)

Defendant Beach Front Management, Inc., a property management company, contends that as an agent hired by a receiver in a family law case it qualifies for quasi-judicial immunity as its work product was used by the courts in the judicial process.

In May 2019, the court in case 17STFL08070, a family law matter, ordered a receiver to use, operate, manage, and control the property. (RJN, Exh. 1.) The receiver was authorized to maintain and repair the property, defend actions against the property, and employ property managers for the property, among other things. (Id.)

In July 2019, the receiver entered into a real property management agreement with Beach Front to manage the property. (Id., Exh. 2, p.2.) In December 2019, Blake Alsbrook succeeded as receiver. (Id., Exh. 3.) Although the receivership was terminated in March 2023, the property was ordered back into receivership in July 2023. (Id., Exhs. 4-5.)

The issue here is whether Defendant Beach Front Management, Inc. is an entity “whose work product comes into the judicial process to be used by the courts, such as probation officers who prepare presentencing reports and social workers and psychiatrists involved in terminating parental rights.” (Holt v. Brock (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 611, 622.)

The ”touchstone” for the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity is that the individuals to whom the immunity is extended perform tasks that are functionally comparable to the tasks performed by judges, i.e. they exercise discretionary judgment as part of their function. (Id. at 623.)

In Holt v. Brock, the trial court appointed a real estate broker to carry out the court’s order to sell a property. The Court of Appeal found that the broker was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because “[i]n the unique situation before us, the court’s listing orders did more than merely appoint Brock to sell the property. They vested an element of discretionary authority in Brock to assist the court in resolving the dispute” between the parties in the matter. (Id.) Specifically, Brock was given the authority to determine the sales price for the property, which was the primary dispute among the parties to the litigation. (Id. at 623-624.) The Court of Appeal further noted that the trial court ordered Brock to report his marketing activities to the court on a monthly basis, the trial court set Brock’s commission rate, Brock could adjust the listing terms with the trial court’s approval, and final approval of any sale negotiated by Brock rested with the trial court. (Id. at 624.)

Defendant Beach Front’s situation is not like Brock’s. Beach Front was hired by the receiver to simply manage the apartment complex while the parties carried on their divorce litigation. The demurrer is overruled as to this ground.

Code Civ. Proc., section 568 provides that a receiver has the power to bring and defend actions in the receiver’s own name, as receiver. The section is uniformly interpreted as requiring a claimant suing a receiver to seek court permission. (Vitug v. Griffin (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 488, 493.)

The purpose of this rule is to promote judicial economy and accommodate all claims in the receivership action under the supervision of the appointing court. (Id at 493.) For example, the appointing court may allow a claimant to obtain relief in the receivership action or require a claimant to intervene in the receivership proceedings to assert his claim to protect the receiver from a proliferation of lawsuits. (Id.) However, the rule is not jurisdictional and failure to obtain permission may be cured at any stage of proceedings. (Id.)

The Court disagrees. The Barton doctrine requires a plaintiff to obtain leave from a bankruptcy court prior to filing a lawsuit against officers appointed or approved by the bankruptcy court. (Akhlagpour v. Orantes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 232, 244.)