Judge: Jill Feeney, Case: 23STCV23476, Date: 2023-12-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23476    Hearing Date: February 2, 2024    Dept: 78

Superior Court of California 
County of Los Angeles 
Department 78 
 
TRACI HINDEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs, 
vs.
DELILAH ANTOLINI, et al.,
Defendants. 
 
 
  Case No.: 23STCV23476
Hearing Date: February 2, 2024
 
 
[TENTATIVE] RULING RE: 
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

The motion to compel arbitration filed by Defendants Delilah Antolini and The Tower Group, LLC is GRANTED.
The remaining Defendants who are not covered by this motion are: (1) Defendant Jesus Mendoza Trujillo (served 11/1/23); (2) Defendant Edward James Edwards III (named); and (3) Defendant Mid-Cities Engineering, Inc. 
Movants’ motion to stay is GRANTED. All further proceedings are stayed pending arbitration.
The Court sets a status conference re: progress of arbitration for December 4, 2023 at 8:30 a.m.
Moving parties to provide notice and to file proof of service of such notice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND  
This is an action for breach of contract, fraud in inducement, negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, and negligence. Plaintiffs allege that in December 2020, Plaintiffs bought a house recently renovated by Defendants. Defendant The Tower Group, LLC (“Tower”) is solely managed by Defendant Delila Antolini. In 2017, Antolini caused Tower to purchase the subject property to renovate and sell it. Tower then sold the property to Plaintiffs. Defendant Darren Hubert represented Antolini and Tower as their real estate agent. Defendant Joseph Cloninger was their real estate salesman working for Defendant KW, a brokerage firm. Defendants Jesus Mendoza Trujillo and James Edwards are contractors who worked on renovations on the property. Defendant Mid-Cities Engineering, Inc. is an engineering consulting firm that also worked on the renovations. After Plaintiffs purchased the property, Plaintiffs discovered leaking from irrigation and drainage pipes, which caused the front yard to flood. The flooding caused water intrusion into the walls of the garage. The garage also suffered from structural defects, defects to the waterproofing of its walls, and drainage defects. Defendants represented to Plaintiffs that the garage was an accessible rooftop deck. However, the roof cannot be used as a deck because its use as a deck violates Los Angeles zoning and building laws. The property has a defective sump pump, defective front stairs, improper grading, poorly constructed drain lines, a defective irrigation system, improperly constructed waterproofing in the front of the house, improperly constructed walls, defective wood decking, and other defects.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendants Delilah Antolini, The Tower Group, LLC, Darren Hubert, Joseph Cloninger, LF Assoc, Inc. dba Keller Williams Realty Los Feliz, Jesus Mendoza Trujillo dba Quality Building Contractors’ Co., Edwards James Edwards III dba Edwards Builders and Developers, and Mid-Cities Engineering, Inc.
On January 26, 2024, Plaintiffs dismissed LF Assoc, Inc., Joseph Cloninger, and Darren Hubert from this action.
On December 11, 2023, Defendants Antolini and the Tower Group, LLC (“Movants”) filed this motion to compel arbitration. The motion is unopposed.
DISCUSSION
Movants move to compel arbitration on the grounds that an agreement to arbitrate Plaintiffs’ claims exists between Plaintiffs and Movants
California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving disputes. To further that policy, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies. Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues.” (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967 [citations omitted]; Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) 
In deciding a petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must decide first whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine the second gateway issue whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The party seeking arbitration has the “burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) The trial court “sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Id.) General principles of contract law govern whether parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236; see also Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) 
Whether there is a written agreement to arbitrate is a matter of contract, and courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms. (Banc of California, National Association v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 357, 366.) A party cannot be required to submit to arbitrate any dispute to which he has not agreed to arbitrate. (Id.) 
A contract is not formed without mutual assent.  (Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565.)  However, “[t]he existence of mutual assent is determined by objective criteria, not by one party’s subjective intent.  The test is whether a reasonable person would, from the conduct of the parties, conclude that there was a mutual agreement.”  (Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting and Engineering, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1050)   
Here, Movants allege that Plaintiffs signed a Residential Purchase Agreement that contained an arbitration agreement. The agreement reads in relevant part:
“The Parties agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement of any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration…Enforcement of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.”
(Movants’ Exh. A.)
Antolini testifies that she received the agreement already signed from Plaintiffs from her listing broker, Daren Hubert, in September 2020. (Antolini Decl., ¶2.) She countersigned the  agreement on behalf of The Tower Group, LLC in October 2020. (Id., ¶3.)
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the motion to compel arbitration because the parties’ agreement states enforcement of the agreement shall be governed by the FAA.  (See Victrola 89, LLC v. Jamon Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 346 [finding the FAA governs a motion to compel arbitration when an agreement provides its ‘enforcement’ shall be governed by the FAA].)  Therefore, the Court’s inquiry is limited to a determination of (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and (2) whether the arbitration agreement covers the dispute.  (9 U.S.C., § 4;¿Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostics Systems, Inc.¿(9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130;¿Howsam¿v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.¿(2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84;¿see¿Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.¿(9th Cir. 1999) 175 F.3d 716 [if the finding is affirmative on both counts the FAA requires the Court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms].) 

Here, Movants meet their burden of showing an arbitration agreement exists because they produced the Residential Purchase Agreement containing the arbitration agreement and it appears to have been signed by Plaintiffs. Additionally, this action falls within the scope of the agreement because this action arises out of the sale of the subject property. Plaintiffs did not oppose this motion. Because Movants meet their burden of showing an arbitration agreement exists which covers this dispute, the motion to compel arbitration is granted.
Movants also move to stay this action under Code Civ. Proc., section 1281.4. The motion is granted. All further proceedings are stayed pending arbitration.
DATED: February 2, 2024
________________________________ 
      Hon. Jill Feeney 
      Judge of the Superior Court