Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: 24STCV03184, Date: 2024-04-24 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for violations of the FEHA, violations of the labor code, wrongful termination, and failure to reimburse business expenses. Plaintiff Terric Townsend alleges that during his employment as a recruiter with Defendants, Defendants denied his request for leave and denied his request for a transfer due to his race. Plaintiff also felt targeted by managers due to his race. In July 2022, a white colleague was given credit for recruiting a candidate Plaintiff had originally recruited. Plaintiff also received a lower rate of pay than non-black employees. Defendants’ harassing and discriminatory treatment resulted in Plaintiff developing anxiety and OCD. While Plaintiff was on disability leave, Defendant’s manager issued a retaliatory performance improvement plan. When Plaintiff returned to work, he requested additional disability leave. Shortly after requesting leave, Plaintiff was terminated.

Movants move to quash service of summons on the grounds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. The Court notes that Movants improperly filed a single omnibus motion as to all five Movants. Movants must pay four additional filing fees.

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).) “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at 1441-1442.) When a defendant moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868.)

California’s long-arm statute authorizes California courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of California. (Code Civ. Proc., section 410.10.) Accordingly, a California court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has not been served with process within the State comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the State that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 434, 444-45; International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)

California recognizes two ways in which the constitutional “minimum contacts” requirement may be satisfied. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are so systematic and so continuous as to make it consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum, even if the cause of action is unrelated to the contacts. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at 445 – 446; International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310; Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 291.) For corporations, forums where a corporation is considered “at home” and therefore subject to general jurisdiction include (1) its place of incorporation and (2) its principal place of business. (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 134.)

If a nonresident defendant’s contacts with California are insufficient for general jurisdiction, the nonresident may be subject to specific jurisdiction if: (1) the nonresident has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the state’s laws; (2) the controversy arises out of the nonresident’s contacts with the state; and (3) it would be fair and just to assert jurisdiction. (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472; Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268.)

Where personal jurisdiction is challenged, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all necessary jurisdictional criteria are met. (Thomas J. Palmer, Inc. v. Turkiye Is Bankasi A.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at p. 148.) The burden is established by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documentary evidence.” (Ziller Electronics Lab Gmbh v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 1222, 1232-1233; Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439–1440.)

The Complaint alleges a single cause of action for failure to reimburse business expenses under Labor Code, §2802 against Movants. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff incurred business expenses on behalf of Defendants when he was required to use his cellular phone for work. (Compl., ¶189.) The expenses were necessary for Defendants’ business. (Compl., ¶190.) Defendants knew or should have known that he incurred these expenses on their behalf. (Compl., ¶191.) Plaintiff was never reimbursed for these expenses. (Compl., ¶193.)

Movants filed identical declarations stating they worked for either Maryland TEKsystems, Inc. or Allegis Group, Inc. (Movants’ declarations, ¶2.) Movants had no authority to change or establish corporate policy of either company, reside in different states outside of California, do not file taxes in California, have never had a bank account in California, do not own real estate in California, do not lease property in California, and do not do or own any business in California. (Id., ¶¶3-10.) Movants are not required to travel to California to conduct business for either company. (Id., ¶12.) Movants’ job duties did not relate in any way to Plaintiff’s expense reports or expense reimbursements. (Id., ¶¶13-14.) Movants were not involved in Plaintiff’s requests for reimbursement. (Id., ¶15.) Morris and Lynds work in Human Resources at TEKsystems. (Morris, Lynds Decl., ¶2.) Mullen is a Team Lead for a group of recruiters with TEKsystems. (Morris Decl., ¶2.) Brower is a Leave Services Representative with the Allegis Group. (Brower Decl., ¶2.) Alexaki is a Director of Operations with TEKsystems. (Alexaki Decl., ¶2.)

Employees’ contacts with a forum state are not to be judged according to their employer’s activities there. (Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 790.) However, an individual’s status as an employee acting on behalf of his or her employer does not insulate the individual from personal jurisdiction based on his or her forum contacts. (Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 969, 981.)

Here, Movants do not have contacts with California because they each reside outside of California and were not involved in Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement of business expenses. TEKsystems and Allegis Group certainly have minimum contacts with California because they employed Plaintiff, a resident of California. However, Movants, employees of these companies, are not to be judged by the contacts their employers have with California. Plaintiff only alleges one cause of action for failure to reimburse him for business expenses. Movants each testify that they were not involved in Plaintiff’s reimbursement request. Because the reimbursement request was the only controversy which would have arisen from Movants’ contact with Plaintiff, a California resident, evidence that Movants were not involved in the reimbursement request demonstrates they had no contacts with California related to the controversy. Under these circumstances, it would not be fair and just to assert jurisdiction over Movants.

Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that all necessary jurisdictional criteria are met. Plaintiff first argues that Movants purposefully availed themselves of California’s benefits and protections because Plaintiff’s employment and work took place in California. However, the individual Defendants’ contacts are not to be evaluated using the contacts of their employers, TEKsystems and Allegis Group. These companies, not Movants, employed Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Movants were involved in Plaintiff’s reimbursement request. Thus, there is no evidence Movants had any contact with California. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional criteria are met.

Plaintiff also argues that his claims for discrimination and violations of the labor code occurred within California. However, Plaintiff only alleged these causes of action against TEKsystems and Allegis Group. Plaintiff only alleged a cause of action for failure to reimburse business expenses against Movants.