Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: BC680322, Date: 2023-10-04 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for fraud, defamation, and wrongful eviction arising out of a family dissolution matter. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows. Plaintiff Arthur Tsatryan (“Arthur”) filed a petition for divorce from his wife, Polina Tsatryan (“Polina”) in September 2009. (FAC ¶ 12.) During the dissolution proceedings, Polina testified that an interspousal transfer deed from their Santa Clarita residence executed in Arthur’s favor during their marriage had been a fraud perpetrated by Arthur against her. (FAC ¶ 16.) This testimony, however, was false, and Polina perjured herself. (FAC ¶ 16.) The court nonetheless ordered the property transferred from Arthur to Polina. (FAC ¶ 18.) Polina and other defendants then illegally evicted Arthur from the residence. (FAC ¶ 87.)

On July 27, 2023, the Court issued an order setting an OSC re: dismissal on the grounds that Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate a matter already adjudicated in Family Court. In the same order, the Court continued Plaintiff’s pending Motions to Deem Requests for Admissions (“RFAs”) Admitted, Continue Trial, and to Enter Default to October 26, 2023.

On July 27, 2023, the Court issued an order stating “Attached at Exhibit A is the January 14, 2019 decision of the Court of Appeal in B270784, B276299 setting forth the procedural history and the decisions of both the Family Court and the Court of Appeal relevant to Plaintiff’s claim here that he was wrongfully evicted as result of the lies told by Defendant Polina Tsatryan and others during the course of the family court proceeding…Here, Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate what occurred in Family Court with respect to the residence. He cannot do so.” Plaintiff submitted his brief on October 13, 2023.

Trial courts have inherent authority to fashion remedies as necessary to protect defendants’ rights to be free from frivolous claims. (Huang v. Hanks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, 182 (citing Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.155 Cal.App.736, 762.).) A court properly exercises its inherent power to dismiss an action if the action was clearly barred by res judicata. (Arizona v. California (2000) 530 U.S. 392, 413 [“ ‘[I]f a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the defense has not been raised. This result is fully consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.’ ”]; McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 551, 554 [trial court's inherent power to dismiss an action supported dismissal of complaint where action was clearly barred by res judicata].)

Here, the Court determined from the appellate decisions in cases B270784 and B276299 that Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate issues from those matters in the case at hand. Plaintiff had the opportunity to file any legal briefing addressing the issue of dismissal.

Res judicata precludes the re-litigation of matters which have been resolved in a prior proceeding to preserve the “integrity of the judicial system, promote judicial economy, and protect litigants from . . .vexatious litigation.” (Brinton v. Bankers Pension Services, Inc. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 550, 556.) It “prevents re-litigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) “Res judicata applies if (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.” (Fed'n of Hillside & Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202.)¿¿¿“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes re-litigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” (Mycogen Corp, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 896.)

When applying res judicata, “the key issue is whether the same cause of action is involved in both suits. California law approaches the issue by focusing on the ‘primary right’ at stake: if two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” (emphasis in original.) (Deleon v. Verizon Wireless (2008) 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 29, 35.) “As far as its content is concerned, the primary right is simply the plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered…” (Villacres v. ABM Indus. Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575–76.)

1. Defendants Block and Kozich remain in this case: Defendant Kozich was dismissed on May 1, 2019 after the Court sustained his demurrer and Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. Defendant Block was dismissed after the Court granted his Special Motion to Strike on May 15, 2019. These Defendants are no longer parties to this action.

2. Block’s Special Motion to Strike: Plaintiff argues that Block’s Special Motion to Strike made no sense. The Court granted this motion more than 4 years ago. It is well past any deadline for Plaintiff to move for reconsideration or to appeal this motion. Additionally, Plaintiff does not articulate any reason why this ruling should be disturbed.

3. There is no Defendant Richard B. Jacobs: Richard B. Jacobs is an attorney who formerly represented Defendant Block. During the May 15, 2019 hearing, another attorney, Dariush Alandari, appeared in his place for Defendant Block.

5. Defendant Block failed to give notice of the May 15, 2019 minute order: There is no record of whether Defendant Block gave notice of the May 15, 2019 minute order. Nevertheless, it is long past any deadline to set aside his dismissal. Additionally, this argument has no bearing on whether the action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

6. Kozich is still a party because he failed to answer the SAC and was thus in default: When a party is named as a defendant in a lawsuit, the defendant has the option to file a responsive pleading such as an answer or file a demurrer or other motion permitted in lieu of a responsive pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., section 430.40.) Here, Kozich filed a demurrer which was sustained. Kozich was not in default.

7. Plaintiff was wrongfully evicted: Plaintiff argues that he was wrongfully evicted because Defendant Polina Tsatryan told lies in the family court case at issue. Plaintiff may not relitigate that case here, and the Court cannot disturb the outcome of that case. It remains undisputed that the family court case concerned the same issues and parties as those in this action.

8. This action was not previously litigated: Plaintiff argues that this case has not already been tried. However, the minute orders from the cases B270784 and B276299 show that those cases concern the same issues as those Plaintiff alleged in this action, that he was wrongfully evicted after Polina Tsatryan lied in family court. Because these matters involved the same issues and parties, this action is barred under res judicata.

9. The Appellate Justices were running a smear campaign against Plaintiff: There is simply no basis for this argument. There is no evidence that there was any irregularity with the proceedings in B270784 and B276299. Although Plaintiff argues Justice Gail Feuer previously presided over Department 78, Justice Feuer was never assigned this case.

10. Plaintiff argues that this action is not barred because his SAC alleges different causes of action that were not relevant to family court. However, it is well-settled that if two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery. (Deleon v. Verizon Wireless (2008) 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 29, 35.) Here, Plaintiff’s action alleges the same injury, the wrongful eviction, and the same wrong, Polina Tsatryan lying in family court. Therefore, the cases involve the same primary right. The matter is barred by res judicata.

11. Plaintiff argues that the Court does not have the inherent power to dismiss a case. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant has not requested dismissal. To the contrary, the Court does have the inherent power to dismiss a case. Specifically, the Court may dismiss a case if it is on notice that it is barred under res judicata even if the defense has not been raised. (Arizona v. California (2000) 530 U.S. 392, 413.)

12. Plaintiff argues that dismissing this action without prejudice does not make sense. However, whether a case is dismissed with or without prejudice has no bearing on whether the case is barred under res judicata.