Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 19STCP00693, Date: 2024-03-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCP00693 Hearing Date: March 6, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: March
6, 2024 TRIAL DATE:
April 14, 2021
CASE: THE SALVATION
ARMY, a California non-profit religious corporation; EAST YARD COMMUNITIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, a non-profit corporation; GROWGOOD INC., a non-profit
corporation; and SHELTER PARTNERSHIP, a non-profit corporation.
CASE NO.: 19STCP00693
MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
MOVING PARTY: Petitioners The Salvation Army,
East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice, GrowGood Inc., and Shelter
Partnership (“Petitioners”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Respondent
City of Bell (“The City”)
SERVICE: Filed October 27, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed January 25, 2024
REPLY: Filed February 1, 2024
TENTATIVE RULING
Petitioners’ motion for attorney’s fees is granted for a total of
$291,283.92.
DISCUSSION
Whether
Petitioners Were the Prevailing Parties in this Claim
Petitioners bring this motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which provides, in part: “Upon motion, a
court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more
opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or
a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public
entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not
in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”
“In
determining whether a plaintiff is a successful party for purposes of section 1021.5, ‘[t]he critical fact is the impact of the
action, not the manner of its resolution.’ [Citation.] [¶] The trial court in
its discretion ‘must realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a
practical perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an
important right so as to justify an attorney fee award’ under section 1021.5. [Citation.]” (Karuk Tribe of Northern
California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast
Region, (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330, 362.) “ ‘Put another way, courts check
to see whether the lawsuit initiated by the plaintiff was “demonstrably
influential” in overturning, remedying, or prompting a change in the state of
affairs challenged by the lawsuit.’ ” (Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium
Assn. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1056.)
“Thus, a
trial court which grants an application for attorneys' fees under section 1021.5 has made a practical and realistic
assessment of the litigation and determined that (1) the applicant was a
successful party, (2) in an action that resulted in (a) enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest and (b) a significant benefit to
the general public or a large class of persons, and (3) the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement of the important right make an award of
fees appropriate.” (Karuk Tribe, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 363.)
The City
contends that Petitioners did not prevail in this case because they achieved
“none of their litigation objectives”. (Opposition at p. 13:9-10.) The City’s
position is incorrect. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to set aside
the Design Review Board’s substantial conformity determination. (The
Salvation Army et al., v. City of Bell et al. (August 18, 2023) B316271 at
p. 3 [nonpub. opn.] (“Court of Appeals Decision”).) This determination was the
relief granted to Petitioner’s first cause of action.
“ ‘
“The appropriate benchmarks in determining which party prevailed are (a) the
situation immediately prior to the commencement of suit, and (b) the situation
today, and the role, if any, played by the litigation in effecting any changes
between the two.” ’ ” (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292.)
Prior to the petition, the DRB had issued a resolution approving CEMEX’s
application and had found the application was in substantial conformity with
the Development Agreement. (Court of Appeals Decision at p. 8.) Now, and
because of the petition, the determination is set aside. In their petition,
Petitioners had alleged that “the CEMEX proposal that was before the [DRB] is
not consistent with the 2013 EIR or Development Agreement at issue.” (Petition ¶ 33.)
Although this change in circumstances does not achieve or
encapsulate much of Petitioners’ aims through the current proceedings, the
City’s position that “none of [Petitioners’] litigation objectives” were
achieved is unsupported.
Whether Petitioners Vindicated an Important Right
Conferring a Significant Benefit on a Large Class of Persons
The next issue is whether Petitioner’s vindicated an important
right conferring a significant benefit on a large class of persons.
“When
determining whether a litigant has vindicated an important right affecting the
public interest, ‘[t]he “judiciary [must] exercise judgment in attempting to
ascertain the ‘strength’ or ‘societal importance’ of the right involved.”
[Citation.] “The strength or societal importance of a particular right
generally is determined by realistically assessing the significance of that
right in terms of its relationship to the achievement of fundamental
legislative goals.” ’ ” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire
Retirement System (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 710.) “Courts have broadly
interpreted the important right concept and ‘frequently reject attempts to characterize
rights in their most narrow or personal light.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High
School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 970, 988.)
“Where . . .
the nonpecuniary benefit to the public is the proper enforcement of the law,
the successful party must show that the law being enforced furthers a
significant policy.” (La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v.
City of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1158.) “Our Supreme Court
has consistently recognized the importance of ‘preserv[ing] the integrity of’ a
‘locality's governing general plan’ for zoning[.]” (Id. at p. 1159.) In La
Mirada, the trial court concluded that several variances granted for a
project violated the Los Angeles County Municipal Code because they were not
supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 1153.) Subsequently, the
Court of Appeals held that the petition had conferred significant policy
benefits to persons living near the Project and “also all residents of the City
who benefit from the trial court's ruling that holds the City Council's zoning
decisions to the letter and spirit of the municipal code.” (Id. at p.
1159.)
Here, to a
lesser extent, Petitioners have similarly vindicated an important right and
conferred a significant benefit on a large class of persons by ensuring
compliance with the 2013 Development Agreement. Like in La Mirada,
Petitioners have successfully obtained an order compelling compliance with City’s
zoning-related decisions.
Necessity
and Financial Burden
The next
issue is whether Petitioners are able to meet the final prong of a fee award
determination. “[T]he necessity and financial burden requirement ‘ “really examines
two issues: whether the private enforcement was necessary and whether the
financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful
party’s attorneys.” ’ ” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th
1206, 1214.) The City does not present arguments in opposition on this issue.
Petitioners brought this petition to challenge the City’s approval of the
project, necessitating private enforcement because the opposing party is a
public entity. Further, Petitioners did not further this case based on their
own pecuniary interests, warranting subsidizing the cost of enforcement.
Award
of Costs
The
final issue is the specific determination of fees. Petitioners seek $615,491.25
in fees, which includes a proposed lodestar calculation of $410,327.50 with a
proposed 1.5 multiplier, plus an additional $5,178.92 in costs.
“[T]he fee setting inquiry in
California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar,” i.e., the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group
v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The reasonable hourly rate is
that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Ibid.) Once the
lodestar figure is calculated, a court may adjust the award based on factors
such as “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the
skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent
nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122,
1132.) “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value
for the particular action.” (Ibid.)
In
their proposed lodestar amount, Petitioners seek an award at 5 different rates:
$1000 per hour for David Pettit, $515 per hour for Cecilia Segal, $500 for
Heather Kryczka, $225 for paralegal services, and $195 for law clerk services.
Petitioners seek 87.3 hours, 293.5 hours, 293.8 hours, 14.8 hours, and 111
hours at the aforementioned rates, respectively. Plaintiff seeks 674.6 hours
for attorney services and 125.8 hours for non-attorney services.
“Once the trial
court has found . . . that the litigation conferred a public benefit warranting
an award of attorney fees, the amount of fees to be awarded under section 1021.5 is within the trial court's discretion.” (Save Our Uniquely Rural
Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th
1179, 1184.) “[A] trial court
may reduce attorney fees based on the plaintiff's degree of success.
[Citation.] Indeed, the extent of a party's success is a key factor in
determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded under section 1021.5.” (Id. at p. 1185.)
In the
current case, the court rejected the City’s contention that Petitioners
achieved “none of their litigation” objectives. However, the City’s contentions
are applicable to the present issue because although Petitioners’ gains in this
case were not insignificant, Petitioners degree of success was limited. “[T]he
court will ‘evaluate the “significance of the overall relief obtained by the
plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” ’
[Citations.] Full compensation may be appropriate where the plaintiff has
obtained ‘excellent results,’ but may be excessive if ‘a plaintiff has
achieved only partial or limited success.’ [Citation.] ‘The court may
appropriately reduce the lodestar calculation “if the relief, however significant,
is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” ’ ”
Here, Petitioners’ success is
limited both procedurally and substantively. While Petitioners did, in a
general sense, achieve success in challenging the project under the development
agreement, their contentions in the second and third causes of action were
found moot by the Court of Appeals. Further, whether Petitioner made sufficient
gains in “protect[ing] their residents and staff” and the “broader public from
the CEMEX’s facility’s damaging environmental and public-health impacts” is
unclear. (Motion at p. 11:24-26.) As the Court of Appeals noted “we do not know
what steps the parties will take given that the DRB resolution is now invalid”.
(Court of Appeals Decision at p. 43.)
In light of
Petitioners’ limited degree of success, the court finds that the reasonable
number of hours expended by Segal and Kryczka to be 400 hours
at a blended rate of $507.5 per hour. Additionally, the court finds the
reasonable number of hours worked by Pettit to be 60 hours at a rate of $1000.
The court finds that the reasonable number of hours worked by law clerks to be 75
hours at a rate of $195. Thus, the lodestar total is $280,955 ($203,000 plus
$60,000 plus $14,625 plus $3,330.)
Petitioners
also seek $53,451.17 for 105.7 hours worked on the present motion. This fee
request is excessive. Petitioners are granted $5,150 for the present motion (10
hours worked at a rate of $515 per hour). Petitioners are also awarded
$5,178.92 in costs.
Lastly,
the Court declines Petitioners’ request to add a lodestar multiplier to this
case given Petitioners’ relatively limited success and the relative lack of
complexity in the issues presented.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners’ motion for attorney’s fees is granted for a total of $291,283.92.
Moving
party to provide notice.
Dated: March 6, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court