Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 19STCV14782, Date: 2022-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV14782 Hearing Date: December 6, 2022 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: December
6, 2022 TRIAL DATE: December 6, 2022
CASE: KATHERINE M.
STRIDE, v. LANCE YANG, MELANIE YANG, AND DOES 1-100
CASE NO.: 19STCV14782
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EX
PARTE APPLICATION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Arroyo Oaks
Homeowners Association
RESPONDING PARTY: Cross-Defendant
Michael Messain
SERVICE: Filed November 28, 2022
OPPOSITION: Filed November 29, 2022
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant Arroyo Oaks
Homeowners Association files this ex parte application for determination of
good faith settlement.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a Plaintiff
Katherine M. Stride’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that her condominium unit suffered
extensive water damage caused by the owners of the condominium unit above hers.
Plaintiff filed this complaint on April 29, 2019, against Defendants Lance
Yang, Melanie Yang, Michael Messian (“Messian”), previously Doe 1, and Arroyo
Oaks Homeowners Association (the “HOA”), previously Doe 2, (collectively
“Defendants”) alleging three causes of action for (1) trespass, (2) nuisance,
and (3) negligence.
TENTATIVE RULING
The
HOA’s ex parte application for determination of good faith settlement is
GRANTED.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Any party to an
action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or
co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of
the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant
and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors”. (Code Civ. Proc. section
877.6, subd. (a)(1).) “A determination by the court that the settlement was
made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any
further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable
comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on
comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 877.6,
subd. (c).)
One consideration for whether a settlement was made in good faith is “whether the
amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling
tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's
injuries.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38
Cal.3d 488, 499.) The California Supreme Court, in Tech-Bilt, also
stated that relevant factors include “a rough approximation of plaintiffs'
total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in
settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a
recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he
were found liable after a trial.” (Ibid.)
“Accordingly,
a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the
plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor
vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury.
Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important
consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a
settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.” (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)
“If the good faith settlement is
contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable
ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good
faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of
the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the
non-settlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. (Fisher v. Superior Court (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d
47; § 877.6, subd. (d).) If contested, declarations by the
non-settlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party
to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the lack of good faith
asserted by the non-settling contesting party.” (City of Grand Terrace v.
Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.)
DISCUSSION
The HOA provides that it has reached a
settlement agreement with Plaintiff where Plaintiff dismisses the HOA in
exchange for a settlement amount totaling $10,001. (Dilts Decl. ¶ 4.) The HOA provides that the settlement
agreement was executed on October 31, 2022, and Plaintiff filed a dismissal of
the HOA on November 7, 2022. (Ibid.)
The HOA argues that the $10,001 settlement is roughly 20%
of the estimated maximum recovery of $50,000. The HOA also argues that there is
additionally no evidence supporting the HOA was at fault for the alleged
damages, such as a common area pipe or drain line failure.
In opposition, Messian argues that the HOA has not
demonstrated this ex parte application is warranted because the HOA has not
demonstrated irreparable harm or immediate danger. However, the HOA provides
that at the time of filing the ex parte application, the soonest its motion for
determination of good faith settlement could be heard was December 14, 2022,
after the then-set trial date of December 1, 2022. (Dilts Decl. ¶ 5.)
Further, Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6,
subdivision (a)(1), provides in part: “Upon a showing of good cause, the
court may shorten the time for giving the required notice to permit the
determination of the issue to be made before the commencement of the trial of
the action, or before the verdict or judgment if settlement is made after the
trial has commenced.” Here, the HOA has demonstrated good cause exists to
shorten the time to determine the merits of the settlement.
Messian next
argues that his claim for indemnity survives a determination of good faith
settlement.
“A settling
tortfeasor's section 877.6, subdivision (c) good
faith settlement determination discharges indemnity claims by other
tortfeasors, whether or not named as parties, so long as the other tortfeasors
were given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (Gackstetter v. Farawley (2006)
135 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1273.) “[A]n indemnity claim against a codefendant based
on express contract survives a good faith section 877.6 settlement.”
(C. L. Peck Contractors v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 828,
834.)
However,
Messian does not cite any express contract detailing a claim for indemnity but
rather points to the HOA’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions that pertain
to insurance subrogation claims. Messian also argues that he should be a
third-party beneficiary to the HOA’s insurance policy without citing any
authority or any basis for his claim. Both of Messian’s arguments are rejected.
Messian also
makes the claim that the settling parties must prove that Messian is a
tortfeasor under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. Messian incorrectly
states the standard applied under a motion for determination of good faith
settlement. In fact, the statute itself specifically provides that “[t]he party asserting the lack of good
faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code of Civil Procedure
section 877.6.) Messian has failed to do so here.
CONCLUSION
The HOA’s
ex parte application for determination of good faith settlement is GRANTED.
Dated: December 6,
2022 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court