Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 20GDCV00444, Date: 2023-11-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20GDCV00444 Hearing Date: November 8, 2023 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X
HEARING DATE:
November 8, 2023 TRIAL DATE: December
5, 2023
CASE: RAMON
MIRAMONTES, an individual, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT, and DOES 1-10, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 20GDCV00444
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Board of Trustees of the Los Angeles Community
College District (“Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY:
Plaintiff
Ramon Miramontes (“Plaintiff”)
SERVICE: Filed August 18, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed October 24, 2023
REPLY: Filed November 1, 2023
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant moves for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff Roman
Miramontes’ claim that he experienced unlawful treatment during his employment
with the Los Angeles Community College District. Plaintiff filed this complaint
on May 11, 2020, alleging eight causes of action for (1) disability
discrimination, (2) failure to prevent harassment, (3) failure to engage in
interactive process, (4) disparate impact, (5) work environment harassment, (6)
retaliation, (7) breach of contract, and (8) breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide
courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to
determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to
resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “A party may
move for summary judgement in an action or proceeding if it is contented that
the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or
proceeding.” (Code of Civil Procedure section 473c subd. (a)(1).) “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if
all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
(Code of Civil Procedures section 473c subd. (c).)
A three-step analysis is employed in
ruling on motions for summary judgment. First, the court identifies the issues
framed by the pleadings. Next, the court determines, when the moving party is
the defendant, whether it has produced evidence showing one or more of the
elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete
defense to that cause of action. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to
that cause of action or defense. (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
1369, 1373.) The court
must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and
accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Ibid.;
see also Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 384, 389 [Courts “liberally construe the evidence
in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.”].)
“A defendant moving for summary judgment
must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot
be established or that there is a complete defense. The defendant can satisfy
its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the cause of
action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot
reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to establish an essential element.
(Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC, (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 914.)
DISCUSSION
Factual Background
The pertinent facts of this present
motion are mostly undisputed. Plaintiff began his employment as a college
instructor for Los Angeles Southwest Community College (“LA Southwest”) in
2008. (SSUF No. 1.)
In Match of 2012, Plaintiff was
involved in a physical altercation with another faculty member, Felipe Payan.
(SSUF No. 4.) Plaintiff asserts that he was assaulted by Payan. Both Plaintiff
and Payan were placed on administrative leave due to the incident. (SSUF No.
5.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a
result of the altercation with Payan. (SSUF No. 9.) Plaintiff received workers’
compensation and was out on leave from 2013 through 2015. (SSUF No. 10.) A
worker’s compensation claim specialist reached out to Plaintiff in 2016 for an
interactive meeting, and Plaintiff had interactive process meetings regarding accommodations
and his return to work. (SSUF Nos. 12-14.)
In 2017, Plaintiff resumed teaching
at LA Southwest and taught one online class and possibly taught another
in-person class. (SSUF Nos. 15-16.) In November of 2017, Plaintiff was reviewed
for tenure but ultimately given an “unsatisfactory” rating by the tenure review
committee. (SSUF No. 24.) On January 10, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a grievance alleging
violations of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). (SSUF No. 28.) Although
a meeting was scheduled, Plaintiff did not attend the meeting to discuss his
grievances. (SSUF Nos. 29-30.) Plaintiff stated that he did not receive the
email because it was sent to his faculty email address. (SSUF Nos. 31-33.)
Plaintiff submitted three additional
grievances in March of 2018, all of which were denied as untimely. (SSUF Nos.
41-43, 50.) In October of 2018, Plaintiff was assigned five classes but failed
to teach his courses during December of 2018. (SSUF No. 63.) Plaintiff was
given another “unsatisfactory” rating during a tenure review evaluation. (SSUF
No. 64.) On January 30, 2019, Plaintiff stated he would be placed on medical
leave. (SSUF No. 66.) However, Plaintiff initially failed to submit supporting
medical paperwork, his required leave forms were incomplete, and he was deemed absent
without leave. (SSUF Nos. 66-72.) Plaintiff submitted a medical note stating he
was totally temporarily disabled and his expected return to work was October 1,
2019. (SSUF No. 73.) Plaintiff submitted another medical note with an expected
return to work date of November 15, 2019.
On October 11, 2019, Plaintiff was
informed he had exhausted all his half-pay illness days and provided options
available to him. (SSUF No. 76.) Plaintiff’s leave was extended. (SSUF No.
77-79.) Plaintiff was informed on June 26, 2020, that he was removed from his
assignment and placed on the reemployment list. (SSUF No. 80.)
First Cause of Action for Disability Discrimination
Defendant moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
first cause of action for disability discrimination.
California courts employ the three-stage
burden-shifting test known as the McDonnell Douglas test. (See Guz v.
Bechtel Nat. Inc (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) “In the context of
disability discrimination, the plaintiff initially has the burden to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff can meet this burden by
presenting evidence that demonstrates, even circumstantially or by inference,
that he or she (1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering
from a disability; (2) could perform the essential duties of the job with or
without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to an adverse
employment action because of the disability or perceived disability.” (Sandell
v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 310.)
“The prima facie burden is light; the evidence necessary to
sustain the burden is minimal. [Citation.] Generally, an employee need offer
only sufficient circumstantial evidence to give rise to a reasonable inference
of discrimination.” (Moore v. Regents of University of California (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 216, 235.) In the context of a motion for summary
judgment, “[i]f the employer presents admissible evidence either that one
or more of plaintiff's prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse
employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the
employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces
admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact material to the
defendant's showing.” (Id. at p. 236.)
Second Element – Whether Plaintiff Could Perform the
Essential Duties of the Job
Defendant first argues
that Plaintiff is unable to meet his burden of demonstrating he was able to
perform his duties with or without accommodations. “[I]n order to establish
that a defendant employer has discriminated on the basis of disability in
violation of the FEHA, the plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving he or
she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable accommodation.” (Zamora
v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 39.)
Here, Plaintiff met with worker’s compensation specialists for
interactive process meetings prior to returning to work in 2017. (SSUF Nos.
13-14.) However, Plaintiff was unable to finish teaching his classes in 2018 based
on a retriggering of his PTSD. (SSUF No. 63 and 65.) From that point on,
Plaintiff submitted various medical notes to continue his leave because he was totally
temporarily disabled. (SSUF Nos. 66, 72-73, 75, and 78.) Plaintiff was provided
the opportunity to engage in an interactive process meeting prior to his return
to work. However, after he resumed working, Plaintiff did not finish teaching a
term and submitted various documents that stated he was unable to return to
work for various periods of time. Defendant has met its initial burden of demonstrating
that Plaintiff is unable to show that he was able to do his job, with or
without reasonable accommodation.
In opposition, Plaintiff does not address the specifics
of his leave at all. Rather, Plaintiff argues that he has a strong professional
background and was qualified to be in his position. However, that is not the
pertinent issue. The issue is not whether Plaintiff’s resume is sufficient but
rather whether he could perform the duties of his position. Plaintiff does not
dispute that because of his condition he was not able to return to work. “By its terms, section 12940 makes it clear that drawing distinctions
on the basis of physical or mental disability is
not forbidden discrimination in itself. Rather,
drawing these distinctions is prohibited only if the
adverse employment action occurs because of a disability and the disability would not prevent the employee
from performing the essential duties of the job, at least not with reasonable
accommodation.” (Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 262.)
Plaintiff fails to address this issue and thus fails to raise a triable issue
of material fact.
Third Element – Whether Plaintiff was Subject to
Adverse Employment Actions Because of His Disability
Defendant also argues that
Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that he faced adverse employment action
because of his disability. “An employer ‘has
treated an employee differently “because of” a disability when the disability
is a substantial motivating reason for the employer's decision to subject the
employee to an adverse employment action.’ ” (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th
at p. 49.) Defendant specifically argues that Plaintiff is unable to meet his
prima facie burden of demonstrating any circumstance Plaintiff faced was
because of his disability.
Defendant argues that
Plaintiff stated that none of Defendant’s employes said anything to suggest
Plaintiff should not be employed at LA Southwest based on his disability. (SSUF
No. 22.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that any
of his unsatisfactory tenure evaluations were because of Plaintiff’s
disability. Defendant specifically points to the fact that Plaintiff stated
that he did not receive any expressly discriminatory remarks or view any
discriminatory conduct from individuals on the tenure evaluation committee.
(SSUF Nos. 19-21 and 87-88.) Defendant also argues that any issues with
Plaintiff’s room, keys, or pay were remedied or clerical errors. (SSUF No. 39,
40, 45, and 49.)
In opposition, Plaintiff
argues that the procedures surrounding his tenure evaluations were improper and
that he was overall qualified. However, Plaintiff’s arguments fail because he
relies solely on his own workers compensations claim filings, which are
hearsay. “
‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement
that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that
is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evidence Code section
1200.) Even
assuming that discriminatory intent may be inferred by errant procedures during
his tenure evaluations, Plaintiff fails to submit admissible evidence to
establish that the CBA procedures were violated during the evaluations. Plaintiff
neither submits nor points to any other evidence that would support his claims.
He merely concludes by stating Defendant’s arguments are false and that he is
qualified. Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to
whether he faced adverse employment action because of his disability.
Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, as to
Plaintiff’s first cause of action is granted.
Second Cause of Action for Failure
to Prevent Harassment
Defendant moves for summary
judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s
second cause of action for failure to prevent harassment.
“Section 12940, subdivision (k) states
in part that ‘[i]t is an unlawful employment practice ... : [¶] ... [¶] ...For
an employer ... to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination
and harassment from occurring.’ It creates a separate actionable tort
enforceable upon the establishment of the usual tort elements of duty of care,
breach of duty (a negligent act or omission), causation, and damages.” (Dickson
v. Burke Williams, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1313.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s second cause of action because
Plaintiff fails to meet his prima facie burden of establishing discrimination
occurred. In opposition Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to prevent
discriminatory action he faced from Payan. However, Plaintiff is alleging he
faced disability discrimination. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s disability
was a result of Payan’s action. (SSUF No. 9.) Thus, it does not logically follow that Defendant
failed to prevent discriminatory action against Plaintiff for failing to stop
the incident that caused the disability. Plaintiff also does not establish
or argue that Payan discriminated against Plaintiff in any other way.
Thus, Defendant has met its burden of establishing that
Plaintiff is unable to establish his claim for discrimination, and Plaintiff
has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. Defendant’s motion or
summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, as to
Plaintiff’s second cause of action is granted.
Third Cause of Action for Failure to
Engage in Interactive Process
Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the
alternative for summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for
failure to engage in interactive process.
“FEHA imposes an ‘affirmative duty’ [Citation]
on employers ‘to make [a] reasonable accommodation for the known disability of
an employee unless doing so would produce undue hardship to the employer's
operation.’ ” (Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District (2020)
59 Cal.App.5th 82, 88-89.) “To prevail on a claim under section 12940, subdivision (n) for failure to engage
in the interactive process, an employee must identify a reasonable
accommodation that would have been available at the time the interactive
process should have occurred.” (Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1019.)
Defendant argues that there is no
dispute of fact that it did engage in the interactive process with Plaintiff. As
previously stated, in 2017, workers’ compensation claim specialists contacted Plaintiff
to discuss his return to work and Plaintiff admits having interactive process
meetings. (SSUF Nos. 12 and 14.) In opposition, Plaintiff broadly claims that
Defendant failed to meaningfully engage in interactive process with no citations
to any evidence. Defendant has met its burden of showing that Plaintiff cannot
establish his claim for failure to engage in the interactive process, and
Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
or in the alternative for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of
action is GRANTED.
Fourth Cause of Action for Disparate
Impact
Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the
alternative for summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for
disparate impact. A preliminary issue is that Plaintiff titled his cause of
action, in both his complaint and his opposition, as a claim for “disparate impact”.
However, in the body of his opposition, Plaintiff includes the elements for
“disparate treatment”, which is not the same as disparate impact. (See McCaskey
v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 947, 978-980.)
“The gist of a disparate impact claim is that ‘a facially neutral employer practice or policy,
bearing no manifest relationship to job requirements, ... had a
disproportionate adverse effect on members of [a] protected class. [Citations.]’
” (McCaskey, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 978.) “ It is well
settled that valid statistical evidence is required to prove disparate impact
discrimination, that is, that a facially neutral policy has caused a protected
group to suffer adverse effects. ‘ “Once the employment practice at issue has been
identified, causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff must offer
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice
in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions
because of their membership in a protected group.... [S]tatistical disparities
must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of
causation.” ’ ” (Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
1390, 1405.)
“The elements of a
disparate treatment claim are ‘ “(1) the employee's membership in a
classification protected by the statute; (2) discriminatory animus on the part
of the employer toward members of that classification; (3) an action by the
employer adverse to the employee's interests; (4) a causal link between the
discriminatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damage to the employee; and
(6) a causal link between the adverse action and the damage.” ’ ” (Arnold v.
Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 425-25.)
Plaintiff’s claims under both legal
theories fail. As to disparate impact, Plaintiff has neither identified a
policy nor has he submitted any statistical evidence. Regarding his apparent
embrace of a claim for disparate treatment, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate
discriminatory animus or a causal link between any animus and the adverse
action. Plaintiff does not dispute that he admitted that Dr. Moore never made
any comments to Plaintiff to cause him to believe that she was racially discriminatory
towards him. (SSUF No. 20.) Plaintiff also does not dispute that Rasheed Saafir
did not make any comments regarding Plaintiff’s race. (SSUF No. 88.) Yet now,
in his argument and with no citation to evidence, Plaintiff asserts that
discriminatory animus is evident because all of the individuals that were his
supervisors or on the committee were African American.
Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of fact as to
his claim for disparate treatment and/or disparate impact. Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is granted.
Fifth Cause of Action for Work
Environment Harassment
Defendant moves for summary judgment as
to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for work environment harassment.
“The FEHA makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to harass an employee because of the
employee's ‘sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, ... [or]
sexual orientation.’ (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).)” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling
USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1235-36.) A claim for hostile work
environment harassment arises “when a workplace is ‘permeated with
“discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” [citation] that is
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment”....’ ” (Jones v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367,
1377.)
“The working environment must be
evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances: ‘[W]hether an
environment is “hostile” or “abusive” can be determined only by looking at all
the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.’ ” (Lewis v. City of Bencia (2014) “[T]he
conduct must be both objectively and subjectively offensive[.]” (Jones,
supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is
unable to establish any race-based harassment he faced or that the conduct was
sufficiently severe. Plaintiff accused Saafir of harassing behavior by being
very pushy, calling Plaintiff from an unlisted phone, interrupting classroom
sessions, and speaking to Plaintiff in an animated way. (SSUF No. 87.) However,
Plaintiff attributed Saafir’s conduct to Saafir being on a timeline regarding
the tenure evaluation process, and Plaintiff admits that Saafir did not make
any comments about Plaintiff’s race or PTSD. (SSUF No. 87-88.) Plaintiff also
admitted that Moore did not make any discriminatory comments toward him. (SSUF
no. 20.)
In opposition, Plaintiff, without
citation to evidence, argues that he faced harassment because he was assaulted
by Payan, placed on leave because of the assault, and received improperly
negative tenure evaluations. “[H]arassment consists of conduct outside the
scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal
gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.”
(Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 645-46.) The latter two references fall within the
scope of the job duties for Defendant’s employees. Although Plaintiff may assert
that the decisions to place him on leave and issue a negative evaluation were
incorrect, they are not conduct that establish a claim for harassment.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s claims in the
aggregate fail to establish sufficient severity or a pervasiveness. Even if the
work-related decisions are considered within the totality of the circumstances,
Plaintiff identifies three incidents occurring in 2012, 2017, and 2018, roughly
six years apart. Further, Plaintiff does not argue, allege, or cite any
evidence to establish that Payan’s assault, which is the most serious incident,
was caused by racial animus. “The requirement that the conduct be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a working environment a reasonable person would
find hostile or abusive is a crucial limitation that prevents sexual harassment
law from being expanded into a ‘general civility code.’ ” (Jones, supra, 152
Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.)
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
or in the alternative for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of
action is granted.
Sixth Cause of Action for
Retaliation
Defendant moves for summary judgment as
to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for retaliation.
The McDonnell Douglas three-stage
framework applies to a FEHA retaliation cause of action. [Citation.] Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) he engaged in ‘protected
activity’; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there
is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action.” (Glynn v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 47, 55.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is
unable to establish an adverse employment action and causation. Plaintiff
alleges that he engaged in protected activity when he submitted a complaint
regarding his tenure evaluation. (Complaint ¶ 80.) He alleges Defendant
retaliated by giving him another bad evaluation, denying him classes, and
terminating his employment. (Id. ¶ 82.)
Plaintiff was given an
unsatisfactory rating in November of 2017 by a tenure review committee. (SSUF
No. 24.) Plaintiff submitted various grievances in March of 2018. (SSUF Nos.
41-43.) Plaintiff submitted a discrimination-based complaint on April 19, 2018.
(SSUF No. 52.) Plaintiff was given another unsatisfactory rating during
November of 2018. (SSUF No. 64.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to
establish any causation to connect his second unsatisfactory rating with his
complaint. Plaintiff submits no evidence to demonstrate that members of the
second tenure review committee were aware of Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendant
also argues that only Dr. Bradford was aware of Plaintiff’s complaints, but he
was not a member of the committee and simply accepted the evaluation provided
by the committee. (SSUF No. 64.) Defendant has demonstrated that Plaintiff is
unable to establish causation.
In opposition, Plaintiff turns
his attention to other acts he argues establishes retaliation. Plaintiff
asserts that he was given one online class instead of two, faced payment
issues, and was denied access to a key. First, Plaintiff’s argument that he was
denied two online classes fails based on the sequence of events. Plaintiff
taught one online class during the time he was returning to campus in 2017.
(SSUF No. 16.) Even if Plaintiff was promised but denied two classes, this
incident occurred before Plaintiff submitted his complaint, and thus,
based on timing, Defendant could not have retaliated against Plaintiff in this
manner. Further in October of 2018, after Plaintiff submitted his complaint, he
was provided five classes. (SSUF No. 63.) There is no evidence to establish
that Defendant manipulated Plaintiff’s class assignments to retaliate against
him.
Further Plaintiff’s argument
that he was retaliated against on the basis of pay is similarly unavailing. On
April 13, 2018, during a meeting to discuss Plaintiff’s grievances, Defendant’s
employees took affirmative steps to address and ensure that Plaintiff was
properly paid. (SSUF No. 49.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. Plaintiff’s
pay issues predates his discrimination-based complaint and was addressed at a
meeting to discuss his grievances. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a triable
issue of fact as to whether he was retaliated against in this manner. Lastly, Plaintiff
does not dispute that Defendant’s employees repeatedly reached out to him to
inform him of the availability of a key as well as the steps to obtain one.
(SSUF Nos. 39-47.) Plaintiff also does not contest that he waited several
months before filing out the key authorization form. (SSUF No. 55.) Lastly,
Plaintiff does not dispute that he had reemployment rights. (SSUF No. 80.) He
also does not dispute that he admitted it was his understanding that it was
okay for him to return to work but did not contact Defendant to indicate he was
medically cleared to return to work. (SSUF Nos. 82-83)
Plaintiff has failed to raise a
triable issue of fact that he faced adverse employment action as a result of
his grievances or complaint. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is
granted.
Seventh Cause of Action for Breach
of Contract and Eighth Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealings
Defendant moves for
summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s seventh and eighth causes of action.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached a contract regarding his employment.
Plaintiff’s claims, however, fail as a matter of law.
“[I]t is well settled
in California that public employment is not held by contract but by statute and
that, insofar as the duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has
a vested contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or contrary
to the terms and conditions fixed by law.” (Miller v. State of California (1977)
18 Cal.3d 808, 813.) “[O]ur Supreme Court has made it clear that civil service
employees cannot state a cause of action for breach of contract or breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Kim v. Regents of
University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160, 164.)
Thus, Plaintiff’s
claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealings fail as a matter of law. Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s seventh and eighth causes of action is granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
Dated: November 8, 2023 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the
court indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org