Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 20GDCV01099, Date: 2022-12-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20GDCV01099 Hearing Date: December 7, 2022 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: December
7, 2022 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: WORLD OIL
MARKETING COMPANY, INC. v. #1 AUTO SERVICE, INC., a California corporation; HUI
LI, an individual; TOM VAN CHAU, an individual; NATHAN HERNANDEZ, an
individual; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 20GDCV01099
MOTION
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Hui Li
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
World Oil Marketing Company, Inc.
SERVICE: Filed November 4, 2022
OPPOSITION: Filed November 22, 2022
REPLY: Filed November 29, 2022
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant Hui Li moves
to set aside the default and default judgment.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff World Oil
Marketing Company, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that Defendants #1 Auto Service,
Inc., Hui Li (“Li”), Tom Van Chau, and Nathan Hernandez failed to perform under
the lease or guarantee of the lease for property located at 3 East Duarte Road,
Arcadia California. Plaintiff filed this complaint on December 16, 2020,
alleging two causes of action for (1) breach of lease and (2) breach of lease
guaranty.
TENTATIVE RULING
Li’s motion
to set aside the default and default judgment is granted.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Li’s
requests for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452,
subdivision (d).)
LEGAL STANDARD
“When service of a summons has not
resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default
or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve
and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or
default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within
a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years
after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days
after service on him or her of a written notice
that the default or default judgment has been entered.”
(Code Civ. Proc. section 473.5, subd. (a).)
DISCUSSION
On August 16, 2021, Plaintiff
filed a proof of substituted service of summons for Li at 8031 Orchid Drive,
Corona, California, 92880. The proof of service provides that the documents
were served on a Jane Doe who refused to provide her name. On January 11, 2022,
Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default and judgment against each
defendant in the present action. On January 19, 2022, this Court awarded
judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff sought to serve notice
of the entry of judgment on Li at the Orchid Drive address. On November 4, 2022, Li filed this present
motion to set aside default and default judgment.
The parties
present separate representations of the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s attempts
to serve Li. Li provides that she suffered an accident in 2016 and resided with
her daughter for 2021 and 2022. (Li Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Li provides that her daughter resides on Cone Street in
Rowland Heights. (Id. ¶ 3.) Li also provides that she was served
in a separate case at the Cone Street address. (Id. ¶ 4.) Li provides
that she had no actual notice of this case until her attorney for the separate
action informed her there was a default judgment in the present case in October
of 2022. (Id. ¶ 5.) Li also states that she never evaded service of
process in any matter. (Id. ¶ 4.)
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Li has been
attempting to avoid service. Plaintiff also provides that service on Defendant
Nathan Hernandez at the Cone Street address and Defendant #1 Auto Service, Inc.
should have altered Li to this action because Li s the CEO of #1 Auto Service,
Inc.
Li argues that the judgment is void on its face pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). However, Li fails to
establish how or why the judgment is facially void. Li’s arguments are more
relevant to the issue of whether Li had actual notice of the case, as discussed
below.
Li also argues that the service of summons did not result
in actual notice to her. In Rosenthal v. Garner (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d
891, 895, the Court rejected the respondent’s argument that constructive notice
was sufficient to defeat a motion to set aside a default. The Court held “that the
reference in Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 to
‘actual notice’ means genuine knowledge of the party litigant and does not contemplate
notice imputed to a principal from an attorney's actual notice.” (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiff’s argument is essentially that Li had constructive notice of
the case. However, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence to contest Li’s
claim that she never received actual notice of this case until her attorney
informed her in October 2022.
Li has represented that she has
been residing at the Cone Street address and received no actual notice in the
present case until October 2022. Further, because Plaintiff sought to serve Li
solely at the Orchid Drive address and has not submitted evidence contesting
Li’s claim that she received no actual notice, Li’s motion to set aside the
default and default judgment is granted.
CONCLUSION
Li’s motion
to set aside the default and default judgment is granted.
Dated: December 7,
2022 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court