Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 20GDCV01099, Date: 2024-02-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20GDCV01099 Hearing Date: February 1, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: February 1, 2024 TRIAL DATE: April 23, 2024
CASE: WORLD OIL
MARKETING COMPANY, INC., v. #1 AUTO SERVICE, INC., a California corporation;
HUI LI, an individual; TOM VAN CHAU, an individual; NATHAN HERNANDEZ, an
individual; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 20GDCV01099
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MOTION
TO QUASH
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Nathan Hernandez
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
World Oil Marketing Company, Inc.
SERVICE: Filed December 4, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed January 19, 2024
REPLY: Filed January 25, 2024
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant moves for an order
quashing the service of summons, vacating the default and default judgment, and
recalling and quashing the writ of execution.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff World Oil
Marketing Company, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) claim that Defendant #1 Auto Service,
Inc. breached a lease agreement for property located at 3 East Duarte Road,
Arcadia, California. Plaintiff filed this complaint on December 16, 2020,
alleging two causes of action for (1) breach of lease and (2) breach of lease
guaranty.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
motion to quash service of summons is GRANTED.
Defendant’s
motion to set aside default and default judgment is GRANTED pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 472, subdivision (d).
Defendant’s
motion to quash the writ of execution and abstract of judgment is DENIED
without prejudice.
LEGAL STANDARD
“(a) A
defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any
further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a
notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: [¶] (1) To quash service of
summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. [¶] (2) To stay or dismiss the
action on the ground of inconvenient forum. [¶]
(3) To dismiss the action pursuant to the applicable provisions of Chapter 1.5
(commencing with Section 583.110) of Title 8.”
(Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subd. (a).)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
initially filed this case on December 16, 2020. On October 27, 2021, default
was entered against Defendant. Default judgment was entered against Defendant
on January 19, 2022. Defendant moves to quash the service of summons based on
improper summons.
Previously,
Plaintiff filed a proof of substituted service that provided that Defendant was
served at 1134 E. 6th Street, Apartment C in Ontario, California on September
13, 2021. The proof of service provides that the documents were left with a
Maribel “Doe”, who is listed as a co-occupant.” In support of this motion,
Defendant provides that he moved out of the apartment in April of 2021 when he
purchased a home at 17794 Lemon Street, Hesperia, California 92345. (Hernandez
Decl. ¶ 4-5.) He provides he was not
living at the 6th Street address at the time of purported service, and he does
not know who Maribel “Doe” could be. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Defendant also
provides an insurance premium notice for the Lemon Street address starting in
April of 2021. (Id. ¶ 6, Exhibit A.)
“When a defendant challenges the
court's personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process ‘the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving,
inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.’ ” (Summers v.
McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.)
“If a copy of the summons and
complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the
person to be served, as specified in Section
416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons
and complaint at the person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place
of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service
post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a
person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual
mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at
least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by
thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class
mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of
the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is
deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.” (Code Civ. Proc. section
415.20, subd. (b).)
Defendant asserts that the service
of summons should be quashed based on improper service. Code of Civil Procedure
section 415.20, subdivision (b), provides that substituted service may be
effectuated by leaving the appropriate documents at the “dwelling house, usual
place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address”. Here, it
appears that the subsisted service was left at a location that was not
Defendant’s “dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or
usual mailing address”. Further, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
effective service. In opposition, Plaintiff only provides that “several months”
after service of entry of default, Defendant contacted Plaintiff’s counsel.
(Stelzer Decl. ¶ 6.) However, that
does not establish effective service.
Defendant’s motion to quash for lack
of valid service is granted. The default and default judgment entered against
Defendant are therefore void. “ ‘ “[A] default judgment entered against a
defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute
is void. [Citation.]” [Citation.] Under section 473, subdivision (d),
the court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but
void, as a matter of law, due to improper service. [Citations.]’ ” (Hearn v.
Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200.) Defendant’s motion to set aside
default and default judgment is granted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (d).
Defendant
also moves to set aside writ of execution and the abstract of judgment entered
in this case. However, Defendant does not differentiate or specify which orders
he seeks quashed or set aside. It would be imprudent to grant a sweeping order
quashing all post-judgment orders when the default judgment still stand to
other Defendants. Defendant’s motion to quash the writ of execution is denied
at this time without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
motion to quash service of summons is GRANTED.
Defendant’s
motion to set aside default and default judgment is GRANTED pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 472, subdivision (d).
Defendant’s
motion to quash the writ of execution and abstract of judgment is DENIED
without prejudice.
Dated: February 1,
2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court
indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org