Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 21AHCV00100, Date: 2023-02-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21AHCV00100 Hearing Date: February 21, 2023 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X
HEARING DATE: February 21, 2023 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: STACEY RIVERA, individually, and on behalf of other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California Private Attorney’s General Act, v. AHMC HEALTHCARE INC., a California corporation; AHMC MONTEREY PARK HOSPITAL LP, a California limited partnership; MONTEREY PARK HOSPITAL, an unknown business entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 21AHCV00100
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
MOVING PARTY: Defendants AHMC Healthcare, Inc. AHMC Monterey Park Hospital LP, and Monterey Park Hospital (“Defendants”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Stacey Rivera
SERVICE: Filed December 23, 2022
OPPOSITION: Filed February 6, 2023
REPLY: Filed February 10, 2023
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendants move to compel Plaintiff to submit her claims to binding arbitration and to dismiss Plaintiff’s non-individual Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) claims, including failure to compensate for meal or rest periods, failure to pay overtime, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to furnish wage statements, failure to reimburse, and failure to timely pay wages. Both parties reference a first amended complaint (“FAC”) which is not presently before this court. The timing of the filing of FAC falls within the time after the case was removed but prior to remand.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally filed a complaint in this case on November 16, 2021, alleging one PAGA cause of action alleging various Labor Code section violations,
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants’ motion to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims is granted.
Pursuant to Lewis, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th 983, the scope of the arbitration is to be determined by the arbitrator.
OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE
Plaintiff’s objections are overruled.
The court does not rule on Defendants’ objections to Melissa R. Rinehart because the court did not rely on the documents in reaching its decision.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).
LEGAL STANDARD
“California and federal law both favor enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.” (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 889.) “A party who files a motion to compel arbitration ‘bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.’’ (Cisnero Alverez v. Altamed Health Services Corporation (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 572, 580.)
DISCUSSION
Whether a Valid Arbitration Agreement Exists
Defendants provide the declaration of Gretchen Lindeman (“Lindeman”), who is the Human Resources Director and custodian of personnel files for AHMC Monterey Park Hospital LP. (Lindeman Decl. ¶ 2.) The document submitted by Defendants contains a signature from “Stacy Rivera” dated “11/4/10”. (Id. ¶ 4, Exhibit 1.) Lindeman provides that Plaintiff signed a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” on November 4, 2010, and the signed copy was kept in Plaintiff’s personnel file. (Id. ¶ 4.) The arbitration agreement provides, in part:
I acknowledge that I have received a copy of the AHMC Employee Handbook, and have reviewed the Fair Treatment Process policy contained in the Employee Handbook. I understand that it is my obligation to make use of the Fair Treatment Process ("FTP") and to submit to final and binding arbitration any and all claims and disputes that arise out of or are related in any way to my employment or the termination of my employment with AHMC. I understand that final and binding arbitration will be the sole and exclusive remedy for any such claim or ,dispute against AHMC Healthcare Inc. or any of its affiliated hospitals, facilities, companies or entities, and any of their employees, officers, directors, Medical Staff, physicians or agents ("the Company").
(Lindeman Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit 1.)
The party moving to compel arbitration “bears the burden of producing ‘prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.’ ” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 (“Gamboa”).) The moving party “can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent's signature.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-44.) “If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
Defendants have submitted an arbitration agreement with a handwritten signature purported to be Plaintiff’s, satisfying their prima facie burden. In opposition, Plaintiff relies on Gamboa to argue that she has sufficiently challenged the agreement’s authenticity.
In Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 163, the defendant moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement purporting to bear the plaintiff’s name. In opposition, the plaintiff filed a declaration stating that she does not remember the documents at all, no one had told her about the arbitration agreement or explained what it was, and she would not have signed the documents if she had known about the arbitration agreement. (Ibid.) The Court held that the plaintiff had met her burden of challenging the agreement’s authenticity “by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it". (Id. at p. 168.)
Similarly, here, Plaintiff provides a declaration where she states that the contents of the documents provided to her were not reviewed or explained to her. (Rivera Decl. ¶ 3.) She states she was told to immediately sign numerous documents. (Id. ¶ 4.) She further states that she was never told about the arbitration agreement. (Id. ¶ 5.) She provides that once she signed the documents, she was never provided a copy. (Id. ¶ 6.) She also states that she does not recall signing the agreement to arbitrate and that she would not have signed the documents if they had been explained to her. (Id. ¶ 9.)
In reply, Defendants argue that this court should be guided by the reasoning in Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747 (“Iyere”) a subsequent case with similar facts that discusses the holding of Gamboa. In Iyere, the plaintiffs had attempted to challenge an arbitration agreement’s authenticity by providing declarations that they were provided a large stack of documents, not given time to review the documents, never given a copy of the documents, did not recall signing the documents, and would not have agreed to sign the arbitration agreement if it had been explained. (Id. at p. 841.) The Court in Iyere disagreed with the Gamboa Court’s holding that such a declaration was sufficient to challenge a handwritten signature’s authenticity. (Id. at p. 845.)
“If a party confronted with his or her handwritten signature on an arbitration agreement is unable to allege that the signature is inauthentic or forged, the fact that that person does not recall signing the agreement neither creates a factual dispute as to the signature's authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 845.) The Court also noted that the plaintiffs had declared that they had signed the large stack of documents. (Id. at p. 846.) “It is hornbook law that failing to read an agreement before signing it does not prevent formation of a contract.” (Ibid.)
In the present case, the court finds the reasoning in Iyere to be instructive. Plaintiff submitted a declaration similar to the declarations submitted in Gamboa and Iyere, where she states that no one explained the nature of the documents to her before she signed them and that she does not recall signing the documents. (Rivera Decl. ¶¶ 3-9.) However, at no point does Plaintiff state that the signature on the arbitration is not her signature nor does she declare that she did not sign the agreement at issue. In fact, Plaintiff affirmatively states she signed numerous documents. (Id. ¶ 4.) Thus, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence satisfying her burden to dispute the authenticity of her signature.
Plaintiff’s arguments that Lindeman lacks personal knowledge necessary to demonstrate the authenticity of the arbitration agreement is unavailing. Plaintiff’s argument, in part, is that Lindeman does not have personal knowledge regarding Plaintiff’s signature because he was not present when Plaintiff was provided the document. However, a similar argument was rejected by the court in Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 845, where the Court stated that “the custodian of a document need not have been present or employed when the document was created or signed to authenticate a document in a company's files”.
Here, Lindeman provides she is the custodian of personnel files. (Lindeman Decl. ¶ 2.) She provides that a true and correct copy of the arbitration agreement bearing Plaintiff’s signature is attached as Exhibit 1. (Id. ¶ 4.) She also provides that the agreement was kept in Plaintiff’s personnel file in the ordinary course of business. (Ibid.)
Thus, Defendants have met their burden of establishing a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, but Plaintiff has not met her burden of challenging the authenticity of the agreement.
Whether the FAA Applies
The next issue is whether the FAA applies to the present agreement.
The FAA applies “applies when a contract involves interstate commerce.” (Nixon v. AmeriHome Mortgage Company, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 934, 945.) “The party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement also bears the burden of establishing the FAA applies and preempts otherwise governing provisions of state law or the parties’ agreement.” (Id. at p. 946.) “ ‘[T]he phrase “ ‘involving commerce’ ” in the FAA is the functional equivalent of the term “ ‘affecting commerce,’ ” which is a term of art that ordinarily signals the broadest permissible exercise of Congress's commerce clause power.’ ” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238.)
Defendants submit the declaration of Philip Cohen, the Chief Executive Officer of AHMC Monterey Park Hospital LP. (Cohen Decl. ¶ 2.) Cohen provides that in 2022, the hospital purchased over $500,000 in supplies and equipment from vendors outside of California, treated 223 patients who have provided residence addresses outside of California, and received over $7,000,000 in federal Medicare reimbursement. (Id. ¶ 3.) The agreement also provides that arbitration “will be conducted before an experienced arbitrator … and will be governed solely by the Federal Arbitration Act”. (Lindeman Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit 1.)
Thus, the FAA applies to the present arbitration agreement. The court now turns to Plaintiff’s arguments that the arbitration agreement should be found unenforceable.
Equitable Estoppel
Plaintiff argues that Defendants should be judicially estopped from arguing the arbitration agreement applies because Plaintiff previously argued that a collective bargaining agreement preempted Plaintiff’s claim and should be removed to federal court.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel “applies when ‘(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.’ ” (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986-87.) “Judicial estoppel is an ‘equitable doctrine,’ so its application, even where all elements of the doctrine are met, is ‘discretionary.’ [Citation.] The doctrine must be ‘applied with caution’ and is ‘limited to egregious circumstances.’ ” (Filtzer v. Ernst (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 579, 588.)
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant’s assertion of the collective bargaining agreement was totally inconsistent with claiming that the FAA applies to compel arbitration of the present matter. Additionally, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant was successful in asserting the first position, evinced by the fact that the case was remanded to this court where the present motion is being heard. The court declines to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prohibit Defendants from asserting the arbitration agreement applies.
California Contract Law
Plaintiff makes a variety of arguments that her case should be compelled to be submitted to arbitration because the language of the agreement precludes her from being compelled to arbitrate. Plaintiff’s arguments rest on her attempt to characterize her claims as solely a non-individual PAGA claim. Some background is necessary here to explain why Plaintiff’s arguments fail.
“Although the FAA preempts any state law that stands as an obstacle to its objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms . . . we apply general California contract law to determine whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate their dispute”. (Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59-60.)
“PAGA ‘authorizes an employee to bring an action for civil penalties on behalf of the state against his or her employer for Labor Code violations committed against the employee and fellow employees, with most of the proceeds of that litigation going to the state.’ ” (Vaughn v. Tesla, Inc. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 208, 477.) “The relationship between the State and the PAGA plaintiff is defined exclusively by the PAGA statute. The statute and the rights it creates are ‘unique.’ [Citation.] Unlike the typical agent, the PAGA plaintiff must have been personally affected by the same wrong that it complains about on behalf of its principal. (§ 2699, subd. (c).)” (Lewis v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 983, 998.)
In Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct 1906 (“Viking River”) the Supreme Court addressed two issues raised by the intersection of PAGA and the FAA. The plaintiff in Viking River “executed an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising out of her employment.” (Id. at p. 1916.) The agreement contained a clause waiving, among other things, a representative PAGA action and a severability clause providing that “if any ‘portion’ of the waiver remained valid, it would be ‘enforced in arbitration.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court held that the California Supreme Court’s previous “prohibition on wholesale waivers of PAGA claims is not preempted by the FAA.” (Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct at p. 1913.) However, the Court abrogated the rule that “PAGA actions cannot be divided into individual and non-individual claims” and that the plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims were subject to a motion to compel arbitration. (Ibid.) The Court also stated that “[w]hen an employee's own dispute is pared away from a PAGA action, the employee is no different from a member of the general public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit.” (Id. at p. 1925, citing Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 90.)
Plaintiff’s arguments here are varied but rely on a common theme where she seeks to characterize Defendants as seeking to compel Plaintiff to submit her non-individual PAGA claims to arbitration. However, Defendants file this instant motion to compel Plaintiff to submit her individual claims to arbitration pursuant to the agreement. (See Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct. at pp. 1916-17 [“But when the word ‘representative’ is used in the second way, it makes sense to distinguish ‘individual’ PAGA claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the plaintiff, from ‘representative’ (or perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees.”].)
With that background in mind, the court now turns to Plaintiff’s specific arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are unable to demonstrate the parties intended to compel enforcement of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims. Defendants do not need to because they are seeking to compel Plaintiff to submit her individual claims to arbitration. Second, Plaintiff argues that the court should not read a PAGA waiver into the arbitration agreement. The court has no inclination to do so because the issue presented is whether Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims should be submitted to arbitration.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement should be found unenforceable because excludes administrative claims. The arbitration agreement provides that the Fair Treatment Provision (“FTP”) “does not cover any administrative claim that [Plaintiff] may file with appropriate administrative agencies under applicable wage and hour laws or regulations.” (Lindeman Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit 1.) Plaintiff conflates this language to argue that enforcement of the arbitration agreement is akin to compelling the state to arbitration. However, again, Defendants are merely seeking to compel Plaintiff to submit her personal PAGA claims to arbitration.
Unconscionability
Plaintiff next argues that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable.
“ ‘[U]nconscionability has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element,’ the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on “overly harsh” or “one-sided” results. [citation.] ‘The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.’ ” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)
“Procedural unconscionability ‘addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power.’ ” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 243.) “ ‘It is well settled that adhesion contracts in the employment context, that is, those contracts offered to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, typically contain some aspects of procedural unconscionability.’ ” (Id. at p. 243.) “When . . . there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, ‘the degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low, and the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high.’ ” (Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.)
Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because she was presented with many documents, including a 122-page handbook, the agreement was a condition of employment, and Defendant failed to provide her a copy of the AAA procedural rules with the arbitration agreement.
Plaintiff has demonstrated some level of procedural unconscionability. Plaintiff has stated that she was pressured into signing the contract “immediately” with little to no explanation. (Rivera Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) Further, the employee handbook provides that the Fair Treatment Process, which includes final and binding arbitration in step 4, applies to all employees, evincing arbitration was a condition of employment. (Lindeman Decl. 7, Exhibit 2.)
However, Plaintiff’s claim that the FTP was hidden within a large quantity of documents is undermined by the fact that she signed the arbitration agreement, which was submitted to the court as a separate document. Additionally, Plaintiff stated that documents “were identified by post-it sticky notes.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Lastly, Plaintiff’s arguments that the AAA rules were not provided, while potentially supportive of a finding of unconscionability, are often analyzed in the context of substantive unconscionability when a party seeks to hide terms rather than attaching them. (See Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1246.)
Therefore, Plaintiff has demonstrated some level of procedural unconscionability. The next issue is whether Plaintiff has established substantive unconscionability.
“Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided.” (The McCaffrey Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1348.) “A contractual provision is not substantively unconscionable simply because it provides one side a greater benefit.” (Carbajal, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 248.)
Plaintiff first argues that the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable because it requires her to submit her claim to a pre-arbitration, internal grievance procedure pursuant to the FTP, relying on Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267 (“Nyulassy”). In Nyulassy, the Court did note that “requiring plaintiff to submit to an employer-controlled dispute resolution mechanism (i.e., one without a neutral mediator) suggests that defendant would receive a ‘free peek’ at plaintiff's case”. (Id. at p. 1283.) However, in Nyulassy, the Court expressly found that the arbitration agreement applied unilaterally to require only the plaintiff to arbitrate his claims. (Id. at p. 1282.)
Here, the arbitration agreement states that “both the Company and I agree to forgo and waive any right either of us may have to a judicial forum or a jury trial on claims covered by the FTP”. (Lindeman Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit 1.) The arbitration agreement applies to both parties, unlike the unilateral arbitration agreement in Nyulassy. Plaintiff cites no other authority for the proposition that a bilateral agreement with a pre-dispute process is overly harsh or one-sided, and the court is not persuaded that the FTP is substantively unconscionable because it has steps to attempt to resolve the dispute prior to arbitration.
Plaintiff also argues that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because Defendants may modify the FTP without notice or consent of the employees. However, the language of the arbitration agreement provides: “I further acknowledge that this mutual obligation to arbitrate may not be modified or rescinded except by the mutual consent of both me and the Company.” (Lindeman Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit 1.) The language of the arbitration agreement counters Plaintiff’s arguments here.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the FTP unconscionably limits her ability to bring a claim by limiting the timeframe within which she may bring a claim. However, the section immediately after the section cited by Plaintiff provides: “However, if a longer limitation period is provided by a statute governing your claim, then your claim will be subject to the longer limitation period provided by the statute.”
Plaintiff has failed to establish the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable.
Waiver
Plaintiff lastly argues Defendants waived the right to invoke the arbitration agreement because they failed to raise any standing issues and knew about the arbitration agreement even prior to the commencement of this case.
“ ‘ “The waiver may be either express, based on the words of the waiving party, or implied, based on conduct indicating an intent to relinquish the right. [Citation.]” [Citation.] Thus, “ ‘California courts will find waiver when a party intentionally relinquishes a right or when that party's acts are so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Waiver is ordinarily a question of fact unless ‘there are no disputed facts and only one reasonable inference may be drawn.’ ” (Wind Dancer Production Group v. Walt Disney Pictures (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 56, 78.)
Here, the case was initially filed on November 16, 2021. Defendants’ counsel notified Plaintiff of his intent to file a motion to compel arbitration eight days after the decision was issued in Viking River. (Fuchsman Decl. ¶ 5.) The parties stipulated that Defendant would be able to file a motion to compel arbitration until 30 days after the completion of the arbitration. (Ibid.) The facts do not support Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants waived their right to compel arbitration. Further, Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendants should have asserted the same arguments as the defendant in Viking River to prevent waiving their arbitration right is rejected.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate waiver.
Plaintiff’s Representative PAGA Claims
Defendants argue that because Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims should be compelled to arbitrate, Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims should be dismissed for lack of standing. The court recognizes that this issue is not as settled as the other issues presented.
In Viking River, supra, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen an employee's own dispute is pared away from a PAGA action, the employee is no different from a member of the general public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit.” (142 S.Ct. at p. 1925.) The case cited in Viking River held that to establish standing pursuant to Labor Code section 2699 “[1] [t]he plaintiff must be an aggrieved employee, that is, someone ‘who was employed by the alleged violator’ and [2] ‘against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.’ ” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc., (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83-84.)
In Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1064, the Court did not rule on whether non-representative PAGA claims survived on their own, but noted that “as Justice Sonia Sotomayor suggested in her concurrence, whether an employee has standing to bring a representative PAGA claim in state court once the employee's individual PAGA claim is sent to arbitration is a question for the California courts to resolve.”
A federal district court, in analyzing the differences between Viking River and Kim, noted that “[i]n Kim, the California Supreme Court held that employees do not lose standing to pursue a PAGA claim if they settle and dismiss their individual claims.” (Shams v. Revature LLC (N.D.Cal. 2022) 2022 WL 3453068 at p.*3.) The Court in Shams granted the motion to compel arbitration but declined to dismiss the non-individual PAGA claims. (Id. at pp. *3-*4.)
In Lewis v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 983, 1000-01, the Court stated that the incorporation of AAA’s rules and procedures provided that the arbitrator would have the discretion to determine whether the agreement to arbitrate extended to the plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claim. In Lewis, the Court emphasized that AAA rule that stated that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement” provided the arbitrator with the latitude to determine whether non-individual claims were subject to arbitration. (Id. at p. 1001.)
The AAA rules and procedures are similarly incorporated here. (Lindeman Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit 1.) Thus, pursuant to Lewis, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th 983, the scope of the arbitration is to be determined by the arbitrator.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims is granted.
The court orders a stay on the proceedings as to the non-individual claims pending that determination.
Matter is set for status hearing re: arbitration on November 20, 2023 at 8:30am
Moving Party to give notice.
Dated: February 21, 2023 ___________________________________
Joel L. Lofton
Judge of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their
intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely. alhdeptx@lacourt.org