Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 21GDCV00152, Date: 2022-08-09 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21GDCV00152    Hearing Date: August 9, 2022    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

 

 

HEARING DATE:     August 9, 2022                        TRIAL DATE:  June 1, 2022

                                                          

CASE:                         LONG Z. LIU v. WLW, LLC, a California limited liability company; CONCORD REALTY, INC., a California corporation; ANTHONY WONG, an individual; MI NOR CHAN LEY, an individual; and DOES 1-20, inclusive.

 

CASE NO.:                 21GDCV00152

 

           

 

MOTION TO VACATE

 

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff Long Z. Liu (“Plaintiff”)

 

RESPONDING PARTY:      Defendant WLW, LLC (“WLW”)

 

SERVICE:                              Filed July 11, 2022

 

OPPOSITION:                       Filed July 27, 2022

 

REPLY:                                   Filed August 2, 2022

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

 

            Plaintiff moves this Court to vacate the entry of judgment entered on June 21, 2022, in favor of Defendant and Cross-Complainant WLW.

 

BACKGROUND

 

            This case arose from Plaintiff Long Z. Liu’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that Defendants WLW, LLC (“WLW”), Anthony Wong, and Mi Nor Chan Ley, breached a lease agreement. Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 1, 2021. On October 29, 2021, WLW filed a cross-complaint for rent and damages. On June 1, 2022, the parties conducted a non-jury trial before this Court. On the same day, the Court awarded judgment to the defendant and cross-complainant. Judgment was entered on June 21, 2022, and the notice of entry of judgment was filed on July 1, 2022.

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

Plaintiff’s motion to vacate is DENIED.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

            A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment: [¶] 1. Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected. [¶] 2. A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 663.)

 

DISCUSSION

 

            Plaintiff makes this motion to vacate on the grounds that a lantern he used to illuminate the inside of the units he leased should have been considered a measure of damages.

 

The Court also notes that Plaintiff submitted a supplemental declaration on July 18, 2022. Although the additional document is nominally referred to as a “declaration”, Plaintiff is using the document to make additional legal arguments that the Los Angeles County Eviction Moratorium renders the present action invalid. However, “ ‘[i]n ruling on a motion to vacate the judgment the court cannot “ ‘in any way change any finding of fact.’ ” ’ ” (Glen Hill Farm, LLC v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302.)

 

Plaintiff concedes this issue was not raised during the trial. (Liu ¶ 12.) Because Plaintiff is effectively asking this Court to consider legal arguments for the first time and admit new evidence, which is disallowed by Code of Civil Procedure section 633, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to introduce the Los Angeles County Eviction Moratorium.

 

Next, Plaintiff argues that the lantern should be considered damages for him to prevail on his claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff is essentially arguing that the lantern establishes proof of a measure of incidental damages to the lease. Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. The fact that the lantern has a relatively ascertainable value does not in and of itself mean that it establishes that Plaintiff suffered incidental damages under the lease. Further, Plaintiff’s arguments do not demonstrate that the decision had an incorrect or erroneous legal basis not supported by the facts. (Code Civ. Proc. section 663.) Rather, Plaintiff is simply arguing that the Court should have reached a different conclusion.

  



MOTION
TO FIX ATTORNEY’S FEES





 



MOVING PARTY:              Defendant and
Cross-Complainant WLW, LLC (“WLW”)



 



RESPONDING PARTY:     Plaintiff Long Z. Liu (“Plaintiff”)



 



SERVICE:                             Filed
July 6, 2022



 



OPPOSITION:                      Filed
July 21, 2022



 



REPLY:                                  Filed July 27, 2022



 



RELIEF
REQUESTED



 



            Defendant WLW, LLC moves to fix the award of attorney’s fees in this case
at $20,651.00.



 



BACKGROUND



 



            This case arose from Plaintiff Long
Z. Liu’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that Defendants WLW, LLC (“WLW”), Anthony Wong,
and Mi Nor Chan Ley, breached a lease agreement. Plaintiff filed a complaint on
February 1, 2021. On October 29, 2021, WLW filed a cross-complaint for rent and
damages. On June 1, 2022, the parties conducted a non-jury trial before this
Court. On the same day, the Court awarded judgment to the defendant and
cross-complainant. Judgment was entered on June 21, 2022, and the notice of
entry of judgment was filed on July 1, 2022.



 



TENTATIVE RULING



 



            WLW’s
motion for attorney’s fees in the sum of $20,651.00 is granted.



 



LEGAL STANDARD



 



            “In any action on a contract, where
the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are
incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the
parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be
the party prevailing on the contract, whether
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ.
Code section 1717, subd. (a).)



 



DISCUSSION



 



            Overview



 



            The issue presented by the parties’ moving paper is the final calculation
of “reasonable attorney’s fees” that WLW is seeking. WLW seeks an award
totaling 20,651.00. Plaintiff seeks a reduced award of $18,345.89.



 



WLW seeks the fees pursuant to a lease agreement that contained a
provision allowing for the recovery of attorney’s fees. The lease agreement
allowed for an award of attorney’s fees for separate actions. Plaintiff does
not contest that WLW is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to the lease
agreement, nor does Plaintiff contest that WLW is entitled to recovery for the
two separate action.



 



            [T]he
fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar,” i.e.,
the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly
rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The
reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Ibid.) Once the lodestar figure is calculated, a court may adjust the
award based on factors such as “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which
the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4)
the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the
fair market value for the particular action.” (Ibid.)



 



            Lodestar Calculation



 



            Through the present motion, WLW is seeking attorney’s fees in the sum of
$20,651.00. The sum includes the costs incurred in two separate actions. One
action was an eviction action, WLW, LLC v. Long Z. Liu, LASC
21PDUD000450 (“Eviction Action”), and the other is the present case. WLW
provides it incurred legal fees totaling $6,007.77 for the Eviction Action (Prince
Decl. ¶¶ 7 and 8, Exhibit 1) and
$13,159.92 in the present case (Id. ¶¶ 8 and 9, Exhibit 2.) WLW seeks an
additional $1,485 for the present motion. The Court notes that WLW’s total
calculation is based on the sum of the fees for the two actions and the present
motion without including any of the cent values.



           



            Plaintiff’s Challenges



 



            Plaintiff contests various billings, arguing that the entries are “block
billed”, exceed the reasonable hours expended, or exceed the reasonable hourly
rate.



 



In
challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are
claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific
items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.
General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do
not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits
the claim on appeal.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v.
California Ins. Guarantee Assn.
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)



 



The Court
reviews each of the sections of challenged entries in turn.



 



Plaintiff
first argues that WLW’s counsel used block billing in their calculation.
Plaintiff provides that roughly half of the fees for the present case are block
billed and roughly one-third of the fees for the Eviction Action are block
billed. Plaintiff requests that this Court reduce the fees by 30 percent.



 



“Block billing occurs when ‘a block
of time [is assigned] to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on
each task.’ (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
266, 280.) Although Plaintiff contends the invoices are block billed, Plaintiff
does not identify which specific fees are block billed. Further, while the
Court notes that are some instances of block billing in the invoices, the multiple
tasks typically, although not always, involve related tasks or actions. Thus,
the combined charges are not so egregious as to warrant a 30 percent reduction
to all invoices that list more than one task. Plaintiff also has not
established that the invoices with multiple tasks present an inflated number of
hours worked.



 



Plaintiff next argues that WLW’s attorneys spent an excessive number of
hours on tasks that he claims should have been completed more expeditiously.
Plaintiff takes specific issue with the number of hours billed by Audrey Ali
(“Ali”), a law clerk for WLW’s counsel’s office.



 



Plaintiff challenges a charge on August 26, 2021, where Ali billed 4.58
hours to write a meet and confer letter and research objections to special
interrogatories. (Prince Decl. ¶ 9, Exhibit 2.) The potential dangers of block billing are
demonstrated by this charge because the actions are unrelated but combined,
making it difficult to ascertain whether a reasonable number of hours was
expended on each task. Nonetheless, the Court does not find that Ali’s hours
billed on August 26, 2021, are excessive. Ali is a law clerk with less
experience than a licensed and practicing attorney. Further, Plaintiff’s
contention that Ali should have completed the tasks more expeditiously is not
grounded in any evidence. Plaintiff simply asserts, without support, that two
hours would have been sufficient.



 



Plaintiff further contests a billing from Ali on July 8, 2021,
where Ali billed 4 hours to read Plaintiff’s complaint and draft special
interrogatories. Plaintiff also contests 1.29 hours billed on July 7, 2021, by
Ali for the preparation of general interrogatories. Plaintiff also challenges
billings related to a motion to file a Cross-Complaint between August 8, 2021,
and August 17, 2021, billings related to reviewing a tentative ruling on May 6,
2021, billings for a miscellaneous service titled “lockout” on April 21, 2021,
related to the Eviction Action, and billings for discovery requests on July 12,
2021. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence to support a finding that any of
the challenged billings are excessive nor does Plaintiff make persuasive
arguments to that effect. Plaintiff is simply making “
[g]eneral arguments that fees claimed are excessive”, which is
insufficient. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins.
Guarantee Assn, supra
, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 564.) Thus, the Court rejects
Plaintiff’s assertions that the hours attributed to each task are excessive.



 



 



Plaintiff
lastly challenges the rates charged by David Prince. David Prince charges a
rate of $415 an hour, $425 an hour, or $495 an hour.  Plaintiff does not provide any evidence
demonstrating that the rates are unreasonable. 
If fact in its opposition the Plaintiff argues that if the court awards
attorney fees, those total fees should be no more than $18,354.98.  That amount is only $2296.02 less than what
is being requested.  The closeness of the
sums offered by the opposing sides is additional evidence of the reasonableness
of the request.



 



Total Calculation



 



Because Plaintiff has not established any of the challenged entries are
excessive, the Court awards WLW attorney’s fees in their request total of
$20,651.00. The total is reached using WLW’s requested calculation of adding
the separate action without the cent values –$13,159.00 for the present motion
and $6,007 for the Eviction Action – and the additional cost of $1,485 for the present motion.



 



CONCLUSION



 



            WLW’s
motion for attorney’s fees in the sum of $20,651.00 is granted.



 



 



 



 



 



 



 



           



Dated:   August 9,
2022                                  ___________________________________



                                                                                    Joel
L. Lofton



                                                                                    Judge
of the Superior Court







Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court
indicating their



intention to submit. 
Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely