Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 21GDCV00765, Date: 2022-10-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21GDCV00765    Hearing Date: October 11, 2022    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:     October 11, 2022                                TRIAL DATE:  No date set.

CASE:                         JORGE LUIS COLORADO-SOTO, an individual, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.  

CASE NO.:                 21GDCV00765

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

MOVING PARTY:              Plaintiff Luis Colorado-Soto

RESPONDING PARTY:      Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

SERVICE:                              Filed September 14, 2022

OPPOSITION:                       Filed September 28, 2022

REPLY:                                   Filed October 4, 2022

RELIEF REQUESTED

            Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees totaling $146,668.73.

BACKGROUND

            This case arises out of Plaintiff’s lemon law claim involving the lease of a 2018 Volkswagen Tiguan (“Subject Vehicle”) that Plaintiff leased on or about June 9, 2018. Plaintiff filed this complaint on May 26, 2021.

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is granted in the amount of $59,091.32 ($50,917.1 lodestar, $5,000 in fees for the present motion, $2,749.22 in costs, and $425 in additional costs.)

LEGAL STANDARD

            “The Song-Beverly Act is commonly known as the automobile “lemon law.” [citation] Under the Act, “[i]f the manufacturer ... is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle ... to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the new motor vehicle ... or promptly make restitution to the buyer” at the buyer's election. (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2).)” (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691.) A buyer who prevails under the Act “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code section 1794, subd. (d).)

“The ‘plain wording’ of section 1794, subdivision (d) requires the trial court to ‘base’ the prevailing buyer's attorney fee award ‘upon actual time expended on the case, as long as such fees are reasonably incurred—both from the standpoint of time spent and the amount charged.’ “ (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 35 (“Warren”).)  “A prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘showing that the fees incurred were “allowable,” were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,” and were “reasonable in amount.” ’ ” (Hanna v. Mercedez-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 493, 507.)

DISCUSSION

            The parties in the present motion do not disagree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and therefore entitled to attorney’s fees. Plaintiff seeks a lodestar amount of $50,917.10 with a 1.72 multiplier, plus $5,000 for the present motion, $2,749.22 in costs, and an additional $425 in costs. Plaintiff is requesting a total amount of $146,668.73. Defendant asserts that reasonable attorney’s fees would total $42,500.

            Lodestar Calculation

California courts apply the lodestar method, which is calculated by “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App. 1084, 1095.) “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided.” (Warren., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 36.)

            Plaintiff provides that two attorneys, Nancy Zhang and Joseph Liu, billed hours for the present case. (Liu Decl. ¶ 24.) Nancy Zhang is a partner at Consumer Law Experts, P.C. and billed $410 and $450 per hour. (Id. ¶ 25.) Joseph Liu is an associate attorney at Consumer Law Experts, P.C., and billed $415 and $445 per hour. (Id. ¶ 26.)

            Plaintiff seeks recovery of 124.44 hours spent by his attorneys in the present case. (Lie Decl. ¶ 45, Exhibit 18.) Plaintiff provides his counsel propounded discovery requests, including conferring with opposing counsel and a motion to compel further responses. (Liu Decl. 9-16.) Plaintiff’s counsel also responded to Defendant’s discovery requests and engaged in settlement negotiations. (Id. ¶ 17-23.)

            In opposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s counsels’ hours should be reduced because they billed for secretarial tasks, engaged in inefficient and excessive billing, and used block billing.

            Defendant’s first argument that Plaintiff improperly billed for secretarial work is unavailing. A variety of the entries that Defendant objects to involve tasks an attorney would need to engage in to handle a case, such as reviewing documents and scheduling and planning necessary tasks. Plaintiff’s counsel did, in some instances, bill consecutive entries for calendaring upcoming tasks. However, Plaintiff’s counsel did not do so in an unreasonable amount or in a matter that demonstrates an attempt to inflate billable hours.

            Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s counsel billed excessive or inefficient hours is similarly unavailing. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel should not have taken a certain amount of time to complete certain tasks without any support other than claiming that Plaintiff’s attorneys are experienced enough to do the tasks more quickly. Defendant has not established that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hours are unreasonable. Although Defendant claims that Plaintiff engaged in block-billing, it does not point to any entries that it contends are inappropriate.

            Defendant also argues that the rates charged by Plaintiff’s counsel are too high. Defendant asserts that the rates should be reduced to $300 without an explanation of how that figure is relevant to the prevailing rate in the community. Plaintiff, on the other hand, submits various cases seeking to demonstrate that its lawyers charged a rate similar to the rates charged by similarly experienced lawyers in the community. (Liu Decl. ¶¶ 29-44.)

            Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ rates are reasonable and the hours expended are also reasonable. The Court determines that the proper lodestar amount is $50,917.10. (Liu Decl. ¶ 45, Exhibit 18.)

            Lodestar Multiplier

            Plaintiff also seeks a 1.72 multiplier.

“These case-specific, lodestar adjustment factors may include, without limitation: ‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.’ [Citation.] The ‘procedural demands’ of the case may also be considered.” (Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 36.) However, “ ‘[I]t is inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court's discretion to tie an attorney fee award to the amount of the prevailing buyer/plaintiff's damages or recovery in a Song-Beverly Act action.’ ” (Hanna v. Mercedez-Benz USA, LLC, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 510.)

However, the case did not present any novel or complex issues, involved preliminary discovery, had only one discovery motion and no substantive motions, and was settled before any expert depositions occurred. The Court finds that there are no grounds to use a lodestar multiplier.

Other Costs and Fees

             Plaintiff also seeks $2,749.22 in costs (Liu Decl. ¶ 47, Exhibit 19) and an additional $425.00 in expected costs (Id. ¶ 48, Exhibit 20.) Plaintiff also seeks $5,000 for the present motion.

            Plaintiff’s request for additional costs and expenses is granted in addition to its base lodestar amount.

CONCLUSION

            Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is granted in the amount of $59,091.32 ($50,917.1 lodestar, $5,000 in fees for the present motion, $2,749.22 in costs, and $425 in additional costs.)

Dated:   October 11, 2022                               ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org