Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV00098, Date: 2022-09-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV00098 Hearing Date: September 12, 2022 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: September
12, 2022 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: SERENA ANN BELL v.
VIOLET Z. SCHMID, as Trustee for the GERALD and VIOLET SCHMID TRUST; VIOLET Z.
SCHMID; RODEO REALTY, INC. – BEVERLY HILLS; and DOES 1-20 inclusive.
CASE NO.: 22AHCV00098
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MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Violet Z. Schmid,
individually and as trustee of the Gerald and Violet Schmid Trust (“Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Serena Ann Bell
SERVICE: Filed
August 11, 2022
OPPOSITION: Filed
August 29, 2022
REPLY: Filed September 1, 2022
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant moves for this
Court to reconsider its previous order regarding Defendant’s motion to expunge
lis pendens.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a dispute
regarding the purchase of real property located at 1968 El Molino Avenue,
Altadena, California 91001 (“Subject Property”). Plaintiff Serena Ann Bell
(“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants Violet Z. Schmid (“Schmid”), individually
and as Trustee for the Gerald and Violet Schmid Trust, and Rodeo Realty, Inc. -
Beverly Hills (“Defendants”) failed to comply with the terms of the purchase
agreement. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to obtain the necessary
permits for an Accessory Dwelling Unit (“ADU”) and failed to provide $150,000
in agreed-upon, short-term financing to cover the shortfall between the
purchase price and appraisal value.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
attempted to enforce the purchase agreement. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
are also attempting to relist and market the Subject Property for sale.
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on April 25, 2022, alleging
two causes of action for (1) breach of contract and (2) fraud.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
motion for reconsideration is granted.
Defendant’s
motion to expunge lis pendens is denied as moot.
Defendant
is determined to be the prevailing party under her motion to expunge lis
pendens.
Defendant’s
request for attorney’s fees is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
“When an application for an order has
been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or
granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order
may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of
the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make
application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the
matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the
application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and
to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different
facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code of Civil Procedure
section 1008, subd. (a).)
DISCUSSION
Motion for Reconsideration
Defendant moves for reconsideration of this Court’s prior order denying
her motion to expunge lis pendens. On August 1, 2022, this Court denied Defendant’s
motion to expunge lis pendens based on the Court’s July 13, 2022, order to stay
the proceedings. The motion was denied without prejudice. On August 11, 2022,
this Court granted Defendant’s ex parte application to vacate and set aside the
July 13, 2022, stay order.
Defendant provides that the new
facts include the Court’s order to set aside the July 13, 2022, stay order.
Defendant requests that the Court rule on the substantive matters addressed by
her motion to expunge lis pendens.
Defendant filed this motion within
10 days of the Court’s denial and properly set forth new facts. Defendant’s
motion for reconsideration is granted.
Whether the Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens is Moot
Plaintiff argues that this present
motion is moot because she voluntarily withdrew the lis pendens. In reply, Defendant
argues that a ruling on the substantive issues is necessary because it would
prevent Plaintiff from recording an additional lis pendens. Defendant also
argues that a decision on the merits of the motions is necessary to resolve the
issue of attorney’s fees.
Code of
Civil Procedure section 405.38 provides: “The court shall direct that the party
prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court
finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs unjust.” “Because section 405.38 does not define prevailing party or
expressly authorize or bar recovery of attorney fees in the event the lis
pendens is withdrawn before a ruling on a motion to expunge, we adopt the
practical approach to determine the prevailing party for purposes of awarding
attorney fees. Under the practical approach, a trial court must
determine whether the moving party is the prevailing party under section 405.38 by analyzing the extent to which each
party has realized its litigation objectives.” (Castro v. Superior Court (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022-23.)
Because the
lis pendens at issue have been withdrawn, there is nothing for the Court to
order expunged. However, the Court will review the merits of the prior motion
to determine the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees.
Merits of the Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens
In ruling on the substantive issues
presented by Defendant’s motion to expunge lis pendens, the Court considers the
parties’ papers for this present motion in addition to the parties’ papers
filed regarding Defendant’s motion to expunge lis pendens.
“A party who
asserts a claim to real property can record a notice of lis pendens, which
serves as notice to prospective purchasers, encumbrancers and transferees that
there is litigation pending that affects the property.” (J & A Mash
& Barrel, LLC v. Superior Court of Fresno County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
1, 15 (“J & A Mash”.) “ ‘A party to an action who asserts a real
property claim may record a notice of pendency of action in which that real
property claim is alleged,’ commonly known as a lis pendens. (§ 405.20.) Such a party is a “ ‘[c]laimant’ ” for purposes
of the lis pendens statute. (§ 405.1.) Once recorded,
any party with an interest in the property can move to expunge the lis pendens
pursuant to the procedure set forth in section 405.30.” (Id.
at p. 16.)
“A comment to section 405.30 identifies four bases upon which
expungement may be sought: (1) the lis pendens is void and invalid (§ 405.23), (2) the action as pleaded does not contain a
real property claim (§ 405.31), (3) the claimant fails to
establish the probable validity of the claim (§ 405.32), and (4)
monetary relief provides an adequate remedy (§ 405.33).” (J &
A Mash, supra, 74 Cal.Ap.5th at p. 16.)
In her original motion, Defendant
asserted that Plaintiff’s lis pendens should be expunged because (1) Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not contain a real property claim, (2) the claim fails to
establish the probable validity of the claim, and (3) the claim was void and
invalid.
Procedural History for Lis Pendens
Plaintiff filed her original
complaint on February 25, 2022. On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice
of lis pendens in the present case. (RJN, Exhibit A.) On March 7, 2022, and
March 8, 2022, Plaintiff recorded two separate notices of lis pendens. (RJN
Exhibits B and C.) On April 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). On May 11, 2022, Plaintiff files a notice of withdrawal of lis pendens
in the present case. On July 8, 2022, Defendant filed her motion to expunge lis
pendens. On July 20, 2022, both withdrawals of lis pendens were recorded with
the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office. On July 26, 2022, Plaintiff files the
withdrawals of the lis pendens.
Whether Plaintiff’s Complaint Plead
a Real Property Claim
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s
claim for specific performance is inadequately pled, and therefore, Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not allege a real property claim.
“Unlike most motions, the party
opposing a motion to expunge bears the burden to show the existence of a real
property claim. [Citation.] In considering whether the burden has been met, the
court engages in ‘a demurrer-like analysis.’ [Citation.]” (Shoker v.
Superior Court of Alameda County (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 271, 277.) “A
buyer's suit seeking specific performance of a real property purchase and sale agreement
is obviously a real property claim.” (Id. at p. 278.)
Plaintiff’s prayer for specific
performance is clearly covered within the ambit of real property claims, so the
only issue is whether Plaintiff adequately pled such a claim.
“To obtain specific
performance after a breach of contract, a plaintiff must generally show: ‘(1)
the inadequacy of his legal remedy; (2) an underlying contract that is both
reasonable and supported by adequate consideration; (3) the existence of a
mutuality of remedies; (4) contractual terms which are sufficiently definite to
enable the court to know what it is to enforce; and (5) a substantial
similarity of the requested performance to that promised in the contract.
[Citations.]’ ” (Real Estate Analytics, LLC v. Vallas (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 463, 472.)
In
Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract, she fails to specifically reference
any of the required elements to plead specific performance. While some
elements, such as an underlying contract with definitive terms, can be inferred
based on Plaintiff’s allegations and inclusion of the purchase agreement, Plaintiff
has failed to allege a claim for specific performance other than stating she
seeks specific performance.
Further, Plaintiff
fails to address the issue in either her opposition to Defendant’s motion to
expunge lis pendens or Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. Instead,
Plaintiff repeatedly claims she has voluntarily decided to not pursue her
request for specific performance. Plaintiff’s assertion, on its own, is
unpersuasive because both her Complaint and FAC still request a claim for
specific performance. Plaintiff has thus failed to meet her burden to show the
existence of a real property claim.
Additionally,
because Plaintiff fails to address the insufficient allegations for a claim for
specific performance in her moving papers, she has also failed to establish a probable
validity of her claim for specific performance.
Whether
the Lis Pendens was Void and Invalid
Defendant
also asserts that the lis pendens were void and invalid because Plaintiff
failed to mail a copy to her.
“Section 405.22 provides that, prior to
recordation, the claimant must cause a copy of the lis pendens ‘to be mailed,
by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, [1] to all known
addresses of the parties to whom the real property claim is adverse and [2] to
all owners of record of the real property affected by the real property claim
as shown by the latest county assessment roll.’ ” ( J & A Mash,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.)
Code of
Civil Procedure section 405.23 provides: “Any notice of pendency of action
shall be void and invalid as to any adverse party or owner of record unless the
requirements of Section 405.22 are met for that
party or owner and a proof of service in the form and content specified
in Section 1013a has been recorded with the notice of
pendency of action.”
In the
exhibits submitted by Defendant in her requests for judicial notice, the notices
of lis pendens did not include a proof of service stating that the notices of
lis pendens were mailed. Defendant personally states that the notices of lis
pendens have not been served on her. (Schmid Decl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff’s notices of lis pendens were
thus void and invalid.
Attorney’s Fees
Here, Defendant was the
prevailing party in the underlying motion to expunge lis pendens. Defendant
seeks $4,960.00 in attorney’s fees.
“[W]hen a lis pendens is withdrawn while a motion
to expunge is pending, the moving party is not automatically entitled to
attorney fees, nor automatically denied attorney fees, under section 405.38. Instead, based on the practical approach we
adopt here, the trial court has the discretion to award attorney fees based on
a determination of which party would have prevailed on the motion, and whether
the lis pendens claimant acted with substantial justification in
withdrawing the lis pendens, or whether, in light of all of the circumstances,
the imposition of fees would otherwise be unjust.” (Castro v. Superior
Court, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1024-25.)
The Court finds that although
Plaintiff’s notice of lis pendens suffered from various defects at the time of
recording, Plaintiff acted with substantial justification in seeking the
withdrawal of the lis pendens. Notably, the Court in Castro discusses a
situation where “a lis pendens is withdrawn while a motion to expunge is
pending” (Castro v. Superior Court, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1024),
which implies a situation where a party waited until after the motion to
expunge was filed to seek to withdraw the lis pendens.
In the present case, Plaintiff
sought to withdraw the motion before Defendant filed a motion to expunge. Although
the recording of the withdrawal of the lis pendens was not effectuated until
after the motion was filed, Plaintiff still acted expeditiously to withdraw the
lis pendens. However, a notice of Lis
Pendens may only be recorded after all the affected parties have been served with
a copy of the notice. See CCP 405.22. Due
to the havoc these types of notices tend to have on real property titles the
court finds that a reduced amount of attorney’s fees are appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
motion for reconsideration is granted.
Defendant’s
motion to expunge lis pendens is denied as moot.
Defendant
is determined to be the prevailing party under her motion to expunge lis
pendens.
Defendant’s
request for attorney’s fees is granted in the amount $900. This amount is to be paid within 30 days.
The case
management conference is vacated, and the court sets a status conference re: arbitration
in May 11, 2023 at 8:30 am.
Moving party
to give notice.
Dated: September 12,
2022 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court
indicating their
intention to submit.
Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely. alhdeptx@lacourt.org