Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV00130, Date: 2023-03-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV00130 Hearing Date: March 22, 2023 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: March
22, 2023 TRIAL DATE: October 31, 2023
CASE: GUSTAVO V. GARCIA,
v. GUSTAVO GARCIA, JR. and DOES 1-20, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 22AHCV00130
MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Gustavo Garcia Jr.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Gustavo V. Garcia
SERVICE: Filed January 11, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed March 9, 2023
REPLY: Filed March 2, 2023
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant move for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action
alleged in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff Gustavo V.
Garcia’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that he is the sole owner of property located at
8239 Bleeker Ave., Rosemead, California (“Subject Property”). Plaintiff alleges
his son, Defendant Gustavo Garcia Jr. (“Defendant”), is incorrectly claiming an
interest in the Subject Property. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on
September 7, 2022, alleging four causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2)
breach of oral contract, (3) accounting, and (4) fraud.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in its entirety with leave to
amend.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the
“complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against that defendant.”¿ (Code Civ Proc sections 438(b)(1) and
(c)(1)(B)(ii).)¿ The grounds for motion provided for in this section
shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of
which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. section
438(d).)¿ Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings.¿ (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.¿(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th¿
995,¿999.)¿¿¿ The standard for ruling
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that
applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings,
together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California
Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims rely on the same set of foundational allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about March of 1999, Plaintiff asked Defendant to
help him purchase the Subject Property because Plaintiff’s credit did not
qualify him to finance the Subject Property. (FAC ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that the parties
agreed to the arrangement with the knowledge that Plaintiff would be the sole
owner, pay the down payment, and make all related expenses for the purchase of
the Subject Property. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was
merely the mortgage holder and would transfer the title to Plaintiff. (Id.
¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that on April 9, 1999, escrow closed, and he moved
into the Subject Property. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that on June
11, 2006, Defendant refinanced the subject property. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff alleges that in April of 2016, Plaintiff’s
ex-wife told Plaintiff to pay $1,000 in rent or to move out. (FAC ¶ 13.) Plaintiff
alleges that on or about May 2017, Defendant filed an unlawful detainer action
against Plaintiff which was ultimately dismissed. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
and his mother, Plaintiff’s ex-wife, are renting the Subject Property and
collecting $2,400 per month. (Id. ¶ 17.)
First Cause of Action for Quiet Title
Defendant
contends that Plaintiff’s claim for quiet title is barred by the statute of
limitations.
“The Legislature
has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet
title. [Citation.] Therefore, courts refer to the underlying theory
of relief to determine the applicable period of limitations.” (Salazar
v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476 (“Salazar”).) “First, ‘
“as a general rule, the statute of limitations [for a quiet title action] does
not run against one in possession of land.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 477.) “Generally,
the most likely time limits for a quiet title action are the five-year
limitations period for adverse possession, the four-year
limitations period for the cancellation of an instrument, or the
three-year limitations period for claims based on fraud and mistake.” (Id.
at pp. 476-77, fns. omitted.)
Plaintiff’s
FAC alleges that he is the rightful title holder to the property based on an
oral contract. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that none of the statutes of
limitations apply because he was and continues to be in possession of the
property.
“[P]ossession
does not provide a plaintiff with an unlimited tolling period without
qualification. Rather, the statute of limitations commences on a quiet title
claim when the plaintiff is no longer in ‘undisturbed possession’ of the
land. [Citation.] To determine whether a
disturbance has arisen, courts consider the following questions: ‘(1) when were
plaintiffs no longer owners “in exclusive and undisputed possession” of the
land [citation]; (2) when was defendants’ adverse “claim ... pressed against”
plaintiffs [citation]; or (3) when was defendants’ hostile claim “asserted in
some manner to jeopardize the superior title’ held by plaintiffs [citation].’ ”
(Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110, 1122-23.)
Plaintiff’s
own allegations do not support his contention that he has maintained
undisturbed possession of the Subject Property. Plaintiff alleges that in 2016
his ex-wife demanded he pays rent or moves out. (FAC ¶ 13.) Plaintiff also alleges
that Defendant initiated an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff in May
of 2017. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on March 10,
2022. By his own allegations, Plaintiff’s possession was disputed by a court action
over four years prior to the commencement of this action. Under either the
four-year statute of limitations for the cancellation of an instrument or the
three-year limitations for fraud (see Salazar, supra, 236 at pp.
476-77), Plaintiff’s claim for quiet title is untimely.
Second
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract
Defendant
also argues that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of oral contract is untimely.
The essential elements of a breach of contract
are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to
the plaintiff. (Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th. 425, 433.) Code of Civil Procedure section 339 requires that
an action for an oral contract must be brought within two years.
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that his claim for breach of oral contract is
timely because Defendant is in continual breach because he is not sharing the rental
income with Plaintiff. In his FAC, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant breached
the oral contract by trying to evict Plaintiff by filing the unlawful detainer
claim, by renting the property, refusing to give the property to Plaintiff, and
refinancing the property and keeping half the proceeds.
“Traditionally, a
claim accrues ‘ “ ‘when [it] is complete with all of its elements’–those
elements being wrongdoing [or breach], harm, and causation.” ’ ” (Gilkyson
v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1341.) “Under the
continuous accrual doctrine each breach of a recurring obligation is
independently actionable.” (Ibid.) “The effect of the doctrine is that
‘a suit for relief may be partially time-barred as to older events but timely
as to those [acts of wrongdoing occurring] within the applicable limitations
period.’ ” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff’s
claims are all time-barred except for his claim that Defendant improperly
rented the Subject Property and continues to collect rent.
However,
Plaintiff’s claim still fails as a matter of law based on the Statute of
Frauds. Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “[a]n
agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof” is invalid unless in writing. Here, Plaintiff’s claim that the
oral agreement postulated that he would continue to make the payments on the
property cannot be performed within a year and is thus invalid pursuant to the
Statute of Frauds.
Fourth Cause of Action for Fraud
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fourth cause of
action for fraud fails to state a claim and is untimely. Plaintiff’s fourth
cause of action alleges that Defendant made false representations that he will
buy the subject property for the benefit of Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 28.)
“The elements of fraud, which give
rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false
representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or
‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable
reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060, citations omitted.
“Fraud is required to be pleaded
with specificity.” (People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 921, 947.) “Fraud allegations must be pled with more detail than
other causes of action. The facts constituting the fraud, including every
element of the cause of action, must be alleged factually and specifically. The
objectives are to give the defendant notice of definite charges which can be
intelligently met, and to permit the court to determine whether, on the facts
pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of
fraud.” (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 226, 240, internal quotation marks omitted.)
“ ‘It is hornbook law that an actionable
misrepresentation must be made about past or existing facts; statements regarding future events are merely
deemed opinions.’ ” (Neu-Visions Sports, Inc. v. Soren/McAdams/Bartells (2000)
86 Cal.App.4th 303, 309-310.) “An action for relief on the grounds of fraud or
mistake must be commenced within three years.” (Kline v. Turner (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373.)
Plaintiff’s fraud claim fails for a
variety of reasons. First, Plaintiff fails to plead his claim with any
specificity. Second, Plaintiff’s sole basis for his fraud claim is his claim
that Defendant represented that sometime in the future, Defendant would
transfer the property to his father, which is a statement regarding future
events. Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim is untimely. Even if Plaintiff’s allegations
were viewed to be sufficient to allege a fraud claim, Plaintiff was notified of
Defendant’s alleged wrongdoing when Defendant brought the unlawful detainer
case in 2017. Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for fraud fails as a matter of
law.
Third
Cause of Action for Accounting
Plaintiff’s third cause of action
for an accounting is dependent on his other claims. Because the court has found
that Plaintiff’s other causes of action fail, so too does Plaintiff’s third
cause of action.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in its entirety with 20 days leave
to amend.
Moving
Party to give notice.
Dated: March 22, 2023 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court