Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV00334, Date: 2023-11-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV00334 Hearing Date: November 28, 2023 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: November 28, 2023 TRIAL
DATE: No date set.
CASE: SANDRA CERVANTES
SOTO aka SANDRA SOTO and DORA CERVANTES v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. INC., a
California corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 22AHCV00334
DEMURRER
WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant American Honda Motors
Co., Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Sandra Cervantes Soto
SERVICE: Filed August 7, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed November 17, 2023
REPLY: Filed November 21, 2023
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s
third cause of action and moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive
damages.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiffs Sandra
Cervantes Soto and Dora Cervantes’s (“Plaintiffs’) lemon law claim. Plaintiffs
allege that on April 11, 2021, they purchased a new 2020 Honda Pilot (“Subject
Vehicle”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant American Honda Motors Co., Inc.
(“Defendant”) sold the vehicle while knowing about defects in their Honda
Sensing system and failed to disclose the existence of such defects.
Plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint on July 3, 2023, alleging three causes of action for (1) violation of
the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) violation of the
Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Fraudulent Inducement –
Concealment.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action
is SUSTAINED.
Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for
punitive damages is GRANTED.
The
issue of whether Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend will be determined by
Plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of curing the
defect.
LEGAL STANDARD
Demurrer
A general
demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn
v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc. section
430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or
other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is
whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters,
states a cause of action. (Hahn v.
Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Additionally, a special
demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain,
ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code
Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford
Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180,
1191.) A demurrer based
on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the
pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if
the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably
respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)
Motion to Strike
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading
may serve and file a notice of motion to strike a pleading or any part
thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The
court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms
it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in
any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may
also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with
California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is
not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to
nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for
judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the
complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for
moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for fraudulent
inducement based on concealment. Defendant’s two previous demurrer to
Plaintiffs’ fraudulent inducement cause of action were sustained with leave to
amend.
“The elements of fraud, which give
rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false
representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or
‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable
reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060, citations omitted.
“[F]raud may consist of a
suppression of a material fact in circumstances under which the defendant has a
legal duty of disclosure.” (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1186, internal citations omitted.) “[W]here material
facts are known to one party and not to the other, failure to disclose them is
not actionable fraud unless there is some relationship between
the parties which gives rise to a duty to disclose such known facts. A
relationship between the parties is present if there is ‘some sort of transaction between the parties.’ ” (Id.
at p. 1187.) “Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between
seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or
parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Ibid.)
“There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may
constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary
relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge
of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively
conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes
partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]’ ”
(LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)
“These
[latter] three circumstances, however, ‘presuppose[ ] the existence of some
other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to
disclose can arise.’ ” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
276, 311.) “Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings
between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant
and the public at large.” (Id. at p. 312.)
Plaintiff
argues that she has alleged a direct relationship because she has alleged that
Defendant’s authorized dealership are Defendant’s agents for the purpose of
selling vehicles to consumers. (SAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also relies on Dhital
v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844. The court
notes that Dhital is pending review before the California Supreme Court
and any citation to Dhital is for persuasive value rather than
precedential effect. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 81115.)
Plaintiff’s reliance on Dhital, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th 828, is unpersuasive. In Dhital the Court held that
Plaintiff’s allegations that the manufacturer’s dealerships were agents for the
purposes of sale was sufficient to allege a relationship between the parties. (Id.
at p. 844.) However, the Court noted that the manufacturer gave short treatment
to this issue in its brief. (Ibid.)
The Court also specifically noted that its decision was based in part on
the manufacturer’s failure to provide a more developed argument on this issue. (Ibid.)
Because Dhital is not currently binding authority, this court declines
to follow the conclusion in Dhital, especially given that the issue was
only briefly raised before the appellate court.
Plaintiff’s
allegations are insufficient to allege a relationship or transaction with
Defendant. Plaintiff’s sole claim that a transaction exists is her allegation
that all of Defendant’s dealerships are Defendant’s agents. (SAC ¶ 9.)“Material facts alleged in the
complaint are treated as true for the purpose ruling on the demurrer.
[Citation.] Also taken as true are facts that may be implied or inferred from
those expressly alleged. [Citation.] However, contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law alleged in the complaint are not considered in judging its
sufficiency.” (Kisesky v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California. (1983)
144 Cal.App.3d, 228.) Plaintiff’s allegation is a
conclusory statement unsupported by any other allegation. Plaintiff does not
allege claims against the specific dealership she transacted with. Plaintiff
also does not allege she had any direct dealings with Defendant.
Thus,
because Plaintiff fails to allege a transaction giving rise to a duty to
disclose, her cause of action
for fraudulent concealment fails to state a claim. Defendant’s demurrer to
Plaintiff’s third cause of action is sustained. “Leave to amend should
be granted if the plaintiff demonstrates that there is a reasonable possibility
a defect can be cured by amendment.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v.
Superior Corut (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1076.) At the hearing on this
demurrer, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a reasonable possibility of
curing this defect.
Motion to Strike
Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.
Defendant’s two previous motions to strike were granted with leave to amend.
Punitive
damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (a). A plaintiff seeking punitive damages “must include
specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive,
fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages. [Citation.]
Punitive damages my not be pleaded generally.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
1137, 1193.)
Because
Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action fails to allege facts sufficient to state a
claim, Plaintiff has no alleged no basis to plead a prayer for punitive damages.
Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is
granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action
is SUSTAINED.
Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for
punitive damages is GRANTED.
The
issue of whether Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend will be determined by
Plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of curing the
defect.
Dated: November 28,
2023 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court