Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV00390, Date: 2023-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00390    Hearing Date: November 7, 2023    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:      November 7, 2023                                          TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         IONA O’LEAR v. DIANE KRALL aka DIANE KOBETS; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.  

CASE NO.:                 22AHCV00390

DEMURRER

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Diane Krall

RESPONDING PARTY:      No response filed.

SERVICE:                              Filed July 26, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

             Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s first and third causes of action.

BACKGROUND

            This case arises out of Plaintiff Iona O’Lear’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that Defendant Diane Krall (“Defendant”) failed to maintain property located at 227 S. Madison Avenue, #105, Pasadena, California (“Subject Property”). Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on July 14, 2023, alleging five causes of action for (1) failure to provide habitable dwelling, (2) breach of covenant and right to quiet enjoyment, (3) unfair competition, (4) negligence, and (5) failure to return security deposit.

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

LEGAL STANDARD

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Additionally, a special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

DISCUSSION

            Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for failure to provide habitable dwelling on the grounds that it is duplicative to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for negligence.

            In Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290, the Court, citing Rodriguez v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501, stated that duplicative causes of action were grounds for sustaining a demurrer. In Rodriguez, supra, the Court sustained a demurrer for a cause of action that “combine[d] all the preceding causes, alleging they are joint and concurrent causes of plaintiffs' damages.” (877 Cal.App.3d at p. 498.) The Rodriguez Court held that the deficient cause of action “contain[ed], by necessary implication, all of the allegations of each of the preceding four alleged causes and thus adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery.” (Id. at p. 501.)

            “The California Supreme Court has held that because ‘under contemporary conditions, public policy compels landlords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and habitable housing in our state,’ there is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.)

            Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is brief and incorporates the previous allegations. (FAC ¶ 69.) Plaintiff’s first cause of action, in contrast, contains various allegations in an attempt to allege Defendant’s failure to comply with statutes and common law obligations. Yet, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s sixteen-paragraph first cause of action is duplicative of Plaintiff’s four-paragraph fourth cause of action that comes after Plaintiff’s claim for failure to provide habitable dwelling. Defendant’s arguments are rejected. Plaintiff’s first cause of action is not duplicative of her subsequent negligence claim.

            Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is overruled.

            Defendant also demurrers to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for unfair competition. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege reliance on misrepresentation and causation. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are too general.

            “Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. prohibits unfair competition, including unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts. The UCL covers a wide range of conduct. It embraces anything that can be properly called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143, footnote and internal citations omitted.)

            Defendant’s reliance on In re Tabacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, and Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, is misplaced. As noted by the Court in Kwikset, the case before them was, “like In re Tabacco II Cases, ‘. . . based on a fraud theory involving false advertising and misrepresentations to consumers.’ ” (Id. at p. 326.) Plaintiff’s case is not like claims in these two cases and it would be nonsensical to apply the same pleadings requirements to a different type of claim. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’ ” (Id. at p. 327.)

            Here, Plaintiff alleges she was harmed by Defendant’s violation of applicable laws and improper conduct. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED and Defendant is ordered to file an ANSWER within 15 days.

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:   November 7, 2023                                         ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court