Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV00421, Date: 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00421    Hearing Date: May 16, 2023    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:     May 16, 2023                          TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         BENANCIO DELGADO v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.  

CASE NO.:                 22AHCV00421

DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

DEMURRING PARTY:       Defendant General Motors, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiff Benancio Delgado

SERVICE:                              Filed January 26, 2023

OPPOSITION:                       Filed May 3, 2023

REPLY:                                   Filed May 9, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

            Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) and moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises from Plaintiff Benancio Delgado’s (“Plaintiff”) warranty claim for a 2013 GMC Sierra 2500 (“Subject Vehicle”) he purchased on June 2, 2015. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on November 1, 2022, alleging six causes of action for (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d), (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b), (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3), (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, (5) violation of consumer legal remedies act, and (6) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.

            Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is DENIED.

LEGAL STANDARD

Demurrer

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

            Motion to Strike

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike a pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)  The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)  An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., 431.10, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)   

DISCUSSION

            Demurrer

            Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for violation of the CLRA. Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

            “The CLRA declares unlawful a variety of ‘unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ used in the sale or lease of goods or services to a consumer.” (Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1556.)

             The statute of limitations for a claim under the CLRA is “three years from the date of the commission of such method, act, or practice.” (Civ. Code section 1783.) “[T]he law is unsettled whether [Civil Code section 1783] may be tolled for delayed discovery.” (Purdum v. Holmes (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 916, 924.) However, the statute of limitations under Civil Code section 1782 “will probably run from the time a reasonable person would have discovered the basis for a claim.” (Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1295.)

            Defendant argues that because Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the Subject Vehicle on June 2, 2015, (FAC ¶ 7) the statute of limitations should start on that date. However, Plaintiff’s allegations are based on his claims that Defendant failed to disclose the existence of transmission defects when he purchased the Subject Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also alleges that he took the Subject Vehicle in for repairs on several occasions and discovered the existence of the defect when Defendant failed to repair the defects. (Id. ¶¶24-33.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to maintain his cause of action for violation of the CLRA.

            Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim and lacks the required specificity. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to properly allege it had a duty to disclose information to Plaintiff.

            California courts have identified four situations “in which a failure to disclose a fact constitutes a deceptive practice actionable under the CLRA. [Citation.] Those situations arise when the defendant is the plaintiff's fiduciary, when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or reasonably accessible to the plaintiff, and when the defendant actively conceals a material fact. In addition, the duty to disclose exists ‘when the defendant makes partial representations that are misleading because some other material fact has not been disclosed.’ [Citation.] In the context of the CLRA, a fact is ‘material’ if a reasonable consumer would deem it important in determining how to act in the transaction at issue. . [Citation.]  In other words, a defendant has a duty to disclose when the fact is known to the defendant and the failure to disclose it is ‘ “misleading in light of other facts ... that [the defendant] did disclose.” ’ ” (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1258.)

            “[C]auses of action under the CLRA and UCL must be stated with reasonable particularity, which is a more lenient pleading standard than is applied to common law fraud claims.” (Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261.)

            Plaintiff alleges that he saw advertisements for the Subject Vehicle on television and online. (FAC ¶ 9.) He also alleges that he saw the window-sticker and spoke to dealership employees. (Ibid.) He alleges that Defendant knew about the defects in the Subject Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 62.) He alleges that Defendant had superior information and a reasonable person would have considered the information important in deciding whether to purchase the Subject Vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 66-67.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation of the CLRA.

            Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to serve a notice as required by statute for a CLRA claim.

            Civil Code section 1782, subdivision (b), provides: “no action for damages

may be maintained under Section 1780 if an appropriate correction, repair, replacement, or other remedy is given, or agreed to be given within a reasonable time, to the consumer within 30 days after receipt of the notice.”

            As currently alleged, Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action does not seek damages but “equitable and injunctive relief under the CLRA.” (Id. ¶ 71.) Defendant’s arguments are thus inapplicable here.

            Motion to Strike

            Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action fails.

            Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a). A plaintiff seeking punitive damages “must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages. [Citation.] Punitive damages my not be pleaded generally.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.)

            Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action survives Defendant’s present demurrer. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for violation of the CLRA based on fraudulent inducement and may seek punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.

            Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is DENIED.

Dated:   May 16, 2023                                                ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org