Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV00525, Date: 2024-04-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00525    Hearing Date: April 16, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:      April 16, 2024                                     TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         JOHN DOE, an individual, v. DOE #1, a public entity; DOES #2, an individual; and DOES 3 through 60, inclusive.  

CASE NO.:                 22AHCV00525

DEMURRER

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Doe #1 (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiff John Doe

SERVICE:                              Filed September 5, 2023

OPPOSITION:                       Filed April 3, 2024

REPLY:                                   Filed April 9, 2024

RELIEF REQUESTED

             Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s complaint.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises out of Plaintiff John Doe’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that he was the victim of childhood sexual assault during 1972 and 1973. Plaintiff filed this complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 on July 29, 2022.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is OVERRULED.

LEGAL STANDARD

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Additionally, a special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

DISCUSSION

            Claim Presentation and Constitutional Challenge to Section 340.1

            Defendant argues that Paintiff’s claims fail because he has failed to make a claim as required by the Government Claims Act and any statutory exemption violates the California Constitution’s prohibition on unlawful gifts.

“Under the Government Claims Act, personal injury claims against public entities generally must be presented to the entity within six months of accrual of the injury. [Citation.] Absent an applicable exception, ‘failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.’ ” (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 420.)

            At the time Plaintiff filed this action, Code of Civil Procedure former section 340.1, subdivision (q), provided: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3, inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020.” Further, Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), provides an exception for the claim presentation requirements for “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.”

            Defendants, citing a slew of cases from the 19th century and early 20th century, contend that the statutory exception to the claim presentation requirement is an unlawful gift because Plaintiff, having failed to make a claim at the appropriate time, no longer has an enforceable claim. The issue then, is whether section 340.1, in conjunction with Government Code section 905, is an unlawful gift of public funds.

“ ‘Section 6 of article XVI of the California Constitution provides that the Legislature has no power “to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation ....” The term “gift” in the constitutional provision “includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,” even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.’ ” (In re William M.W. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 573, 594.)

In Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal.321, 326, a case cited by Defendant, the petitioner had sought to enforce an act of legislation that specifically stated he would personally be the recipient of funds. The Court held “[a] legislative appropriation made to an individual in payment of a claim for damages on account of personal injuries sustained by him while in its service, and for which the state is not responsible, either upon general principles of law or by reason of some previous statute creating such liability, is a gift, within the meaning of the constitution.” (Id. at p. 328.)

            In Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, 273, the legislature had sought to retroactively provide jurors who had served  on criminal trials access to payment. The Court held that such an act was an unlawful gift. (Ibid.) “It is for the purpose of giving to certain jurors who have served in criminal cases since March 28, 1895, money to which they were not entitled under the law. They do not sustain any contractual relation to the city and county. There is no legal liability in any manner upon the part of the city and county to pay them.” (Id. at p. 273-74.)

            Defendant correctly notes that “a claim presentation requirement constitutes an element of any cause of action subject to the act.” (California-American Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Dist.(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1287.) However, Defendant’s argument that section 340.1 violates the California Constitution is unavailing. In the cases cited by Defendant, the legislature had passed an act requiring issuance of funds in circumstances where there had previously been no grounds for enforceable claims. In Powell, supra, the Court noted that the funds were a result of neither a contract nor legal liability. (138 Cal. At pp. 273-74.)

However, here, there is a basis for liability. Section 340.1 does not create a new basis for liability but rather impacts parts of a preexisting basis for liability. Further, as stated by the Court in Coats, supra, “the Legislature made clear its intent to revive causes of action previously barred by government claims presentation requirements.” (46 Cal.App.5th 415, 428.) “The present case, of course, involves revival of a cause of action barred by a claim presentation requirement, not a statute of limitations. But we are aware of no reason the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it expressly did in Assembly Bill 218[.]” (Ibid.) Although the issue before the court in Coats was a different constitutional challenge, the Court upheld the legislature’s ability to revive claims barred by the claim presentation requirement, which is applicable here.

Defendant’s arguments that section 340.1 constitute an unlawful gift are rejected, and Defendant’s demurrer on those grounds are overruled.

Duplicative Cause of Action

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is duplicative.

            In Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290, the Court, citing Rodriguez v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501, stated that duplicative causes of action were grounds for sustaining a demurrer. In Rodriguez, supra, the Court sustained a demurrer for a cause of action that “combine[d] all the preceding causes, alleging they are joint and concurrent causes of plaintiffs' damages.” (877 Cal.App.3d at p. 498.) The Rodriguez Court held that the deficient cause of action “contain[ed], by necessary implication, all of the allegations of each of the preceding four alleged causes and thus adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery.” (Id. at p. 501.)

            Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants and their employees failed to comply with their requirements as mandated reporters. (Complaint ¶¶ 49-51.) Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action presents a factually distinct basis for his claims and is thus not so duplicative as to add “nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery.” (Rodriguez, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p. 501.)

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is OVERRULED.   Defendant is ordered to file an ANSWER within 10 days’ notice of this ruling.

            Plaintiff to give notice.

Dated:   April 16, 2024                                               ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org