Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV00582, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00582    Hearing Date: October 5, 2023    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:      October 5, 2023                                  TRIAL DATE: April, 23, 2024

CASE:                         CATIUSCIA TOPPI, v. SAN GABRIEL VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER

CASE NO.:                 22AHCV00582

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant San Gabriel Valley Medical Center

RESPONDING PARTY:      No response filed.

SERVICE:                              Filed July 21, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

             Defendant moves for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises out of Plaintiff Catiuscia Toppi’s (“Plaintiff”) claim for medical malpractice against Defendant San Gabriel Valley Medical Center (“Defendant” or “SGVMC”). Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on August 15, 2022.

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “A party may move for summary judgement in an action or proceeding if it is contented that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code of Civil Procedure section 473c subd. (a)(1).) “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code of Civil Procedures section 473c subd. (c).)

A three-step analysis is employed in ruling on motions for summary judgment. First, the court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, the court determines, when the moving party is the defendant, whether it has produced evidence showing one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to that cause of action or defense. (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373.) The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”  (Ibid.; see also Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 384, 389 [Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”].) 

“A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. The defendant can satisfy its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the cause of action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to establish an essential element. (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC, (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 914.)

DISCUSSION

            Defendant moves for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s claim for medical malpractice. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff is unable to establish an element of her claim for medical malpractice.

To bring a medical malpractice action, Plaintiff must establish: “ ‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.’ ” (Borrayo v. Avery, (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 304, 310.)

            Plaintiff alleges she was diagnosed with peripheral artery disease in November of 2020. (Complaint ¶ 4.) She was referred to Defendant in May of 2021 for outpatient treatment. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that prior to presenting to Defendant for treatment, she received a call with instructions. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that the staff failed to mention that she should stop taking a blood thinner or aspirin. (Id. ¶ 9.)

            On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by Andrew Hurwitz, M.D. (“Dr. Hurwitz”) who created a plan to proceed with an angiogram. (SSUF I-2, Nos. 9-10.) On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by Ngoc Nguyen, M.D. after she experienced palpitations and shortness of breath. (SSUF I-11, No. 11.) On May 7, 2021, Dr. Hurwitz advised Plaintiff to undergo an angiogram with intervention. (SSUF I-2, No. 12.) On May 13, 2021, Plaintiff was informed a nurse at SGVMC of her appointment time and that Plaintiff should not before the procedure. (SSUF I-2, No. 13.) Plaintiff called Defendant between May 10 and May 14 seeking instructions related to her medication. (SSUF I-2, No. 14.) A nurse left a message on Plaintiff’s answering machine telling Plaintiff she needed to stay on her medication. (SSUF I-2, No. 15.)

            Plaintiff was admitted to SGVMC on May 14, 2021, and Dennis H. Son, M.D. performed various procedures on Plaintiff. (SSUF I-2, No. 17.) Dr. Son performed further procedures on Plaintiff on the same day. (SSUF I-20, No. 20.) On May 15, 2021, Plaintiff was observed by other doctors and discharged. (SSUF I-2, Nos. 23-26.) On May 16, 2021, Plaintiff was admitted to Methodist Hospital of Southern California’s Emergency Department for pain post angiogram. (SSUF I-2, No. 27.) Magdi Alexander, M.D., saw Plaintiff and performed a left lower leg fasciotomy. (SSUF I-2, No. 29.) Atia Shah, M.D., recommended Plaintiff be transferred to SGVMC for close monitoring, but Plaintiff refused to be transferred to SGVMC. (SSUF I-2, Nos. 32-35.)

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 provides, in part: “In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” “A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must satisfy the requirements of both the one-year and the three-year limitations periods.” (Drexler v. Petersen (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1190. “The one-year limitations period, however, does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers both his or her injury and its negligent cause.” (Ibid.) “The word ‘injury’ in section 340.5 ‘refer[s] to the damaging effect of the alleged wrongful act and not to the act itself.’ ” (Id. at p. 1189.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff discovered her harm, including the actual injury and its purported negligent cause on May 16, 2021. On May 16, 2021, Plaintiff sought and obtained medical treatment after her procedure at SGVMC. (SSUF I-2, Nos. 27-29.) Plaintiff also testified that on May 16, 2021, she was informed at Methodist Hospital that her injuries were attributed to her failure to cease the use of blood thinners prior to the surgery. (SSUF I-1, No 2.) Further, Plaintiff refused to be transferred to SGVMC. (SSUF I-2, Nos. 35.) In this case, Plaintiff experienced both the purported injury of her operation at SGVMC and learned of its alleged  negligent cause on May 16, 2021. Thus, Plaintiff had until May 16, 2022, to bring her claim.

Code of Civil Procedure section 364, subdivision (a), provides: “No action based upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be commenced unless the defendant has been given at least 90 days' prior notice of the intention to commence the action.” Code of Civil Procedure section 364, subdivision (d), provides: “If the notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action shall be extended 90 days from the service of the notice.”

Plaintiff served her intent to sue letter on SGVMC on May 12, 2022. (SSUF I-1, No. 3.) Thus, Plaintiff’s deadline was extended by 90 days until August 10, 2022. However, Plaintiff’s complaint was not filed until August 15, 2022. Plaintiff’s claim is thus barred by the statute of limitations.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish that it breached the standard of care or caused her harm.

“California courts have incorporated the expert evidence requirement into their standard for summary judgment in medical malpractice cases. When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Munro v. Regents of University of California, (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-85.)

“In a medical malpractice action the element of causation is satisfied when a plaintiff produces sufficient evidence ‘to allow the jury to infer that in the absence of the defendant's negligence, there was a reasonable medical probability the plaintiff would have obtained a better result.’” (Espinosa V. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1314-15.) “[C]ausation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” (Dumas v. Cooney, (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) The summary judgment standard “is not satisfied by laconic expert declarations which provide only an ultimate opinion, unsupported by reasoned explanation.” (Kelley v. Trunk, (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519, 525.)

            Defendant submits the declaration of Kenneth W. Chin, MD, FACR, FSIR, a licensed physician who is board certified in interventional radiology and diagnostic radiology. (SSUF I-2 No. 36.) Dr. Chin opines that SGVMC’s medical care and treatment of Plaintiff complied with the applicable standard of care. (SSUF I-2, No. 37.) Dr. Chin opines that the nurse properly communicated with Plaintiff and that it is ultimately Dr. Son’s role to be aware of Plaintiff’s medication. (SSUF 1-2, Nos. 38-41.) Dr. Chin opines that Dr. Son complied with the standard of care in his treatment of Plaintiff. (SSUF I-2, No. 44.) Dr. Chin opines that allowing a patient taking Plaintiff’s prescribed amount of blood thinner to undergo surgery is within the standard of care. (SSUF I-2, No. 45.)

            Dr. Chin also opines that Dr. Son’s action did not, to a reasonable medical probability, cause or contribute to Plaintiff’s injury. (SSUF I-3, Nos. 37-40.)

            Defendant has met its burden of showing that Plaintiff is unable to establish that Defendant breached the standard of care or caused Plaintiff’s harm. Plaintiff failed to oppose this motion and has failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

            Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  October 5, 2023                                              ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org