Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV00723, Date: 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22AHCV00723    Hearing Date: April 13, 2023    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

 

 

HEARING DATE:     April 13, 2023                         TRIAL DATE:  No date set.

                                                          

CASE:                         MIMI LIN, an individual, WEI ZHANG, an individual; CITEAUSA, a California corporation; CITEA DRINKS, an California corporation; CITEA RH, a California corporation; HIITORY CAFÉ LLC, a California limited liability company, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive. 

 

CASE NO.:                 22AHCV00723

 

           

 

DEMURRER

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendants Wei Zhang, CiTeaUSA, CiTea Drinks, CiTea RH, and Hiitory Café LLC.

 

RESPONDING PARTY:      No response filed.

 

SERVICE:                              Filed December 28, 2022

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

 

            Defendants demurrer to each cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint.

 

BACKGROUND

 

             This case arises out of Plaintiff Mimi Lin’s (“Plaintiff”) claims that she was improperly excluded from the business operations of Defendant CiTeaUSA (“CiTeaUSA”) by Defendant Wei Zhang (“Zhang”). Plaintiff alleges CiTeaUSA was formed and registered on or about May 20, 2019. Plaintiff alleges Zhang represented that Plaintiff would be a 50% shareholder of CiTeaUSA. Plaintiff alleges she contributed capital totaling $68,700. Plaintiff alleges she was initially the secretary of CiTeaUSA and a signatory to CiTeaUSA’s checking account. Plaintiff alleges that Zhang unilaterally removed Plaintiff as a signatory to CiTeaUSA’s checking account and removed Plaintiff as secretary. Plaintiff alleges that Zhang subsequently incorporated additional businesses using CiTeaUSA’s capital.

 

            Plaintiff filed this complaint on September 22, 2022, alleging nine causes of action for (1) accounting, (2) declaratory relief, (3) accounting and dissolution, (4) accounting and dissolution, (5) accounting and dissolution, (6) fraud, (7) breach of fiduciary duty, (8) conversion, and (9) violation of Corporations Code section 1150.

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

            Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s first, second, seventh, and eighth causes of action are OVERRULED.

 

            Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth causes of action are SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

 

DISCUSSION

 

             First Cause of Action for Accounting

 

            Defendants object to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for accounting on the grounds that the cause of action fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim.

 

            “An action for an accounting has two elements: (1) ‘that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting’ and (2) ‘that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting.’ [Citation.] The action carries with it an inherent limitation; an accounting action ‘is not available where the plaintiff alleges the right to recover a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by calculation.’ ” (Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 869.)

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are contradictory because she claims is a 79% shareholder (Complaint ¶ 18) but also alleges no shares were issued (id. ¶ 21). However, Plaintiff also alleges that Zhang represented that Plaintiff would be at least a 50% shareholder in CiTeaUSA. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff also alleges she was the secretary of CiTeaUSA (id. ¶ 19) but that Plaintiff breached a fiduciary duty owed to her. (Id. ¶¶ 114-120.)

 

            Defendants essentially argue that Plaintiff’s allegations should be read as stating a claim against her interest. The court declines to follow Defendants’ reasoning. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allege a cause of action for accounting. Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is overruled.

 

            Second Cause of Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief

 

            “To qualify for declaratory relief under section 1060, plaintiffs were required to show their action (as refined on appeal) presented two essential elements: ‘(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.’ ” (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.)

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege an actual controversy. However, Plaintiff alleges that she was promised to be a shareholder of CiTeaUSA and made financial contributions but did not receive the benefits promised. (Complaint ¶¶ 17-21.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient.

 

            Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action for Accounting and Dissolution

 
               Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. Plaintiff’s third cause of action seeks accounting for and dissolution of CiTea Drinks, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action seeks accounting for and dissolution of Hiitory Café, LLC, and Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action seeks accounting for and dissolution of CiTea RH.
 
               “(a) A verified complaint for involuntary dissolution of a corporation on any one or more of the grounds specified in subdivision (b) may be filed in the superior court of the proper

county by any of the following persons: [] (1) One-half or more of the directors in office. [] (2) A shareholder or shareholders who hold shares representing not less than 33 1/3 percent of (i) the total number of outstanding shares (assuming conversion of any preferred shares convertible into common shares) or (ii) the outstanding common shares or (iii) the equity of the corporation, exclusive in each case of shares owned by persons who have personally participated in any of the transactions enumerated in paragraph (4) of subdivision (b), or any shareholder or shareholders of a close corporation.” (Corp. Code section 1800, subd. (a).)

 

               Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are limited to her claim that she was promised at least 50% shareholder interest. (Complaint ¶ 17.) Corporations Code section 1800 specifically requires a claim for dissolution to be based on “outstanding shares” or “equity of the corporation”. Although Plaintiff claims she was promised to be a 50% shareholder, she also alleges no shares were issued. (Id. ¶ 21.) Further, she alleges no facts to establish that she has any ownership or equity in Hiitory Café, LLC and CiTea RH other than her initial capital contribution and Zhang’s representation regarding CiTeaUSA.

 

            Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to seek dissolution. Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s third, fourth, and fifth causes of action is sustained.

 

            Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud

 

            Defendants object to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for fraud on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to plead fraudulent conduct with specificity.

 

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060, citations omitted.

 

“[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248.)

 

“Fraud is required to be pleaded with specificity.” (People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 921, 947.) “Fraud allegations must be pled with more detail than other causes of action. The facts constituting the fraud, including every element of the cause of action, must be alleged factually and specifically. The objectives are to give the defendant notice of definite charges which can be intelligently met, and to permit the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.” (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 240, internal quotation marks omitted.)

 

Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud is partly a claim for misrepresentation and partly a claim for concealment. Plaintiff alleges Zhang falsely represented to Plaintiff that Plaintiff would be at least a 50% shareholder. Plaintiff also alleges Zhang concealed the fact that she took improper actions such as excluding Plaintiff from CiTeaUSA and transfer of assets from CiTeaUSA to other entities. (Id. ¶¶ 90-101.)

 

However, Plaintiff does not allege any of the misrepresentations or fraudulent acts with the required specificity. Plaintiff broadly allege that Zhang acted fraudulently without providing any context. Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action fails to state a claim.

 

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is sustained.

 

            Seventh Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a fiduciary duty.

 

“The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) the breach of that duty; (3) damage proximately caused by that breach.” (IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 646.)

 

            Defendants’ arguments are once again narrowly focused on Plaintiff’s claim that no shares were issued. (Complaint ¶ 21.) This allegation, in context of the entire pleadings, could be viewed as alleging that Defendants failed to follow proper corporate procedure. The court declines to follow Defendants’ reasoning that Plaintiff’s allegation in paragraph 21 are Plaintiff’s concession that she is not actually a shareholder. Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty could also be read as stemming from her role as an officer of CiTeaUSA. (Complaint ¶ 19.)

 

            Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is overruled.

 

            Eighth Cause of Action for Conversion

 

            Defendants object to Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for conversion.

 

“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.) “[A]ny act of dominion wrongfully exerted over the personal property of another inconsistent with the owner's rights thereto constitutes conversion.”  (Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 38, 50

 

            Plaintiff allege she owned 79% interest in CiTeaUSA. (Complaint ¶ 122.) She also alleges Defendant interfered with her interest by transferring that interest to other corporations. (Id. ¶ 123.) She allege damages as a result. (Id. ¶ 126.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s claims are sufficient.

 

            Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action is overruled.

 

            Ninth Cause of Action for Violation of Corporation Code section 1150.

 

            Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action is nominally one for violation of Corporations Code section 1150. However, that section contains definitions. It appears that Plaintiff is referring to Corporations Code section 1001 as alleged in her complaint. (Complaint ¶ 129.) Corporations Code section 1001, subdivision (a), pertains to the sale of all of a corporation’s assets. Corporations Code section 1001, subdivision (d), provides for the requirements if the acquiring party is in control of the disposing corporation.

 

“A single cause of action by a shareholder can give rise to derivative claims, individual claims, or both.” (Goles v. Sawhney (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1018, fn. 3.) “But where a cause of action seeks to recover for harms to the corporation, the shareholders have no direct cause of action ‘[b]ecause a corporation exists as a separate legal entity’ [citation] and ‘is the ultimate beneficiary of such a derivative suit’ ”. (Schrage v. Schrage (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 126, 149.)

 

            Plaintiff’s claim fails because she is alleging a derivative suit. This cause of action is based on statutes providing for the requirements to sell corporate assets. Plaintiff seeks to assert harm to the corporation based on Defendants’ failure to comply with the statute. However, Plaintiff has not established she has followed the requirements to bring a derivative suit.

 

            Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action is sustained.

 

CONCLUSION

 

            Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s first, second, seventh, and eighth causes of action are OVERRULED.

 

            Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth causes of action are SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

 

            Moving Party to give notice.

 

           

 

 

 

 

 

           

Dated:   April 13, 2023                                   ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court




Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org