Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV01025, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV01025    Hearing Date: October 5, 2023    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:      October 5, 2023                                  TRIAL DATE: January 30, 2024

CASE:                         MARIA A. SANTIS, an individual, v. INES L. CRUZ, an individual; INES L. CRUZ, as trustee of THE ALBERTO LUIS TRUST DATED APRIL 6, 2009, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive.  

CASE NO.:                 22AH01025

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Ines L. Cruz

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiff Maria A. Santis

SERVICE:                              Filed July 21, 2023

OPPOSITION:                       Filed September 21, 2023

REPLY:                                   Filed September 29, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

             Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises out of Plaintiff Maria A. Santis’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that she is owed money by the Alberto Luis Trust (“Trust”) and that Defendant Ines L. Cruz interfered with her inheritance from the Trust. Plaintiff filed this complaint on November 11, 202, alleging five causes of action for (1) breach of express contract, (2) breach of implied contract, (3) interference with expected inheritance, (4) equitable relief, and (5) declaratory relief.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action is DENIED.

            Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action and Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is GRANTED.

OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

            Defendant’s objections are overruled.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code of Civil Procedure section 473c subd. (a)(1).) “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code of Civil Procedures section 473c subd. (c).)

A three-step analysis is employed in ruling on motions for summary judgment. First, the court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, the court determines, when the moving party is the defendant, whether it has produced evidence showing one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to that cause of action or defense. (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373.) The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”  (Ibid.; see also Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 384, 389 [Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”].) 

“A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. The defendant can satisfy its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the cause of action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to establish an essential element. (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC, (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 914.)

DISCUSSION

            Defendant moves for summary judgment as to the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint.

            In 1980, Plaintiff and Alberto V. Luis (“Alberto”) moved in together. (SSUF No. 2.) Plaintiff and Alberto agreed that Plaintiff would pay for food and Alberto would pay for rent. (SSUF No. 3.) Around June of 1994, Plaintiff and Alberto moved into property located at 33194 Ocean Ridge, Dana Point, California (“Dana Point Property”). (SSUF No. 6, Complaint ¶ 10.) Plaintiff and Alberto had agreed prior to the purchase of the Dana Point Property that Plaintiff would quit her job to take care of the household full time. (SSUF No. 10.)

            On or about April 9, 2009, Alberto executed the declaration of the Alberto Luis Trust. (SSUF No. 17.) The Dana Point Property was placed into the Trust. (SSUF No. 19.) Plaintiff was named the beneficiary of the Dana Point Property and Defendant was named the beneficiary of all the other Trust assets. (SSUF No. 19.) The Dana Point Property was sold on September 19, 2016. Prior to selling the property, Plaintiff and Alberto had agreed to purchase a mobile home held jointly by the both of them and that Alberto would give Plaintiff $300,000. (SSUF Nos. 26-27.) Alberto did not provide Plaintiff with the $300,000. (SSUF No. 30.)

            Statute of Limitations

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, Defendant challenges the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claim that she is owed $300,000 based on the agreement preceding the sale of the Dana Point Property. Defendant does not contest the validity of the agreement but solely argues that Plaintiff’s claims are untimely, relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 339 and Civil Code section 1657.

            Code of Civil Procedure section 339 requires that an action based on an oral contract must be brought within two years. Civil Code section 1657 provides: “If no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed. If the act is in its nature capable of being done instantly--as, for example, if it consists in the payment of money only--it must be performed immediately upon the thing to be done being exactly ascertained.”

            Defendant argues that a reasonable time for performance would be six months after the sale of the Dana Point Property. Therefore, Defendant argues, Plaintiff’s claims were required to have been brought two years and six months after the sale of the property. However, Defendant’s assertion is not supported by legal authority that six months after the sale is prescribed “reasonable time” nor does Defendant cite any evidence to support her position. Stated another way, Defendant’s arguments are based on an arbitrarily set date, and she has failed to meet her burden.

            Laches

            Defendant also argues that the doctrine of laches applies to bar Plaintiff’s equitable claims. “Laches is ‘an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable right, causing prejudice to an adverse party such as to render the granting of relief to the other party inequitable.’ ” (Estate of Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971, 998.) Defendant argues that laches applies because Plaintiff waited until after Alberto died to bring suit. Defendant argues that Plaintiff waiting “over six years to file suit after Alberto’s death substantially prejudices Defendant”. (Motion at p. 15:22-23.) However, Alberto died on June 24, 2022. (SSUF No. 34.) Plaintiff filed her complaint November 7, 2022. Although Defendant may have meant that Plaintiff unreasonably delayed by filing six years after Alberto’s agreement to pay $300,000 and after Alberto’s death, Defendant has not met her burden of demonstrating that laches applies to bar Plaintiff’s equitable claims.

            Immoral Consideration

            Defendant also half-heartedly argues that the contract is void because Plaintiff was married to another man at the time she moved in with Alberto, citing Updeck v. Samuel (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 264. However, Updeck relied on a penal code statute making adultery a criminal offense, which is no longer in effect. Defendant’s arguments based on immoral consideration are rejected.

            Interference With Expected Inheritance

            Defendant also moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for interference with inheritance.

“The tort of intentional interference with expected inheritance was first recognized in California in 2012. [Citation.] To establish a defendant committed the tort, a plaintiff must prove six elements. ‘First, the plaintiff must p[rove] he [or she] had an expectancy of an inheritance. It is not necessary to [prove] that “one is in fact named as a beneficiary in the will or that one has been devised the particular property at issue. [Citation.] That requirement would defeat the purpose of an expectancy claim.... It is only the expectation that one will receive some interest that gives rise to a cause of action. [Citations.]” [Citation.] Second, as in other interference torts, the [plaintiff] must [prove] causation. “This means that, as in other cases involving recovery for loss of expectancies ... there must be proof amounting to a reasonable degree of certainty that the bequest or devise would have been in effect at the time of the death of the testator ... if there had been no such interference.” [Citation.] Third, the plaintiff must p[rove] intent, i.e., that the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's expectancy of inheritance and took deliberate action to interfere with it. [Citation.] Fourth, the [plaintiff] must [prove] that the interference was conducted by independently tortious means, i.e., the underlying conduct must be wrong for some reason other than the fact of the interference. [Citation.] Fi[fth], the plaintiff must p[rove] he [or she] was damaged by the defendant's interference. [Citation.] [¶] [And, sixth], [the] defendant must direct the independently tortious conduct at someone other than the plaintiff.’ ” (Gomez v. Smith (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1025.)

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish her claim for interference with inheritance because Plaintiff had no expected inheritance. Plaintiff was named the beneficiary of the Dana Point Property. (SSUF No. 19.) However, the Dana Point Property was sold in 2016. (SSUF No. 26.) Further, Plaintiff does not assert that the $300,000 was a part of her expected inheritance. Other than the Dana Point Property, Plaintiff does not assert she expected to inherit any of the Trust’s assets. Thus, because it is undisputed that the Dana Point Property was sold in 2016, Defendant has met her burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff is unable to establish an element for her claim for interference with expected inheritance. Plaintiff does not address this issue at all in her opposition and has thus failed to raise a triable issue of material fact.

            Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action is granted.

            Punitive Damages

            Defendant also moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

            “Punitive damages may be recovered under section 3294 ‘where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.’ ” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158.) “Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, ‘it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to ‘prove’ a case for punitive damages at summary judgment [or summary adjudication].’ ” (Ibid.) Even so, ‘where the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard of proof must be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is to prevail on a claim for punitive damages, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet the higher evidentiary standard.’ ”

            Plaintiff’s complaint does not expressly state her basis for punitive damages. However, “[t]ort liability is a necessary predicate for punitive damages. Punitive damages may not be awarded as relief in a breach of contract claim.” (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 896.) Thus, because Plaintiff’s tort cause of action for interference with expected inheritance fails, so does Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. Plaintiff does not address this issue in her opposition and has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action is DENIED.

            Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action and Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is GRANTED.

            Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:   October 5, 2023                                             ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org