Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV01130, Date: 2024-01-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV01130 Hearing Date: April 15, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: April 15, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: JANE DOE K.B., an
individual, v. DOE 1, a public entity; DOE 2, an individual; and DOE 3 THROUGH
60, INCLUSIVE.
CASE NO.: 22AHCV01130
DEMURRER
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Doe 1 (“Defendant” or
“PUSD”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Jane Doe K.B.
SERVICE: Filed January 19, 2024
OPPOSITION: Filed March 28, 2024
REPLY: Filed April 8, 2024
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s
complaint.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff Jane Doe
K.B.’s (“Plaintiff”) claim she was the victim of childhood sexual assault and
abuse between 1975 and 1977. Plaintiff filed this case on November 21, 2022
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is OVERRULED.
LEGAL STANDARD
A general
demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn
v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc. section
430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or
other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is
whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters,
states a cause of action. (Hahn v.
Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Additionally, a
special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is
uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of
San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based
on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the
pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if
the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably
respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)
DISCUSSION
Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Fail based the Government Claims Act
Defendant’s first ground for its
demurrer contends that Plaintiff’s claims fail because she failed to make a
claim as required by the Government Claims Act and any statutory exemption
violates the California Constitution’s prohibition on unlawful gifts.
“Under the Government Claims Act,
personal injury claims against public entities generally must be presented to
the entity within six months of accrual of the injury. [Citation.] Absent an
applicable exception, ‘failure to timely present a claim for money or damages
to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.’
” (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415,
420.)
At the time Plaintiff filed this
action, Code of Civil Procedure former section 340.1, subdivision (q),
provided: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages
described in paragraphs (1) through (3, inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has
not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January
1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation
deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may
be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020.” Further, Government Code
section 905, subdivision (m), provides an exception for the claim presentation
requirements for “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of
childhood sexual assault.”
Defendants,
citing a slew of cases from the 19th century and early 20th century, contend
that the statutory exception to the claim presentation requirement is an
unlawful gift because Plaintiff, having failed to make a claim at the
appropriate time, no longer has an enforceable claim. The issue then, is
whether section 340.1, in conjunction with Government Code section 905, is an
unlawful gift of public funds.
“ ‘Section 6 of article XVI of the California Constitution provides
that the Legislature has no power “to make any gift or authorize the making of
any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or
other corporation ....” The term “gift” in the constitutional provision
“includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or
enforceable claim,” even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.’ ” (In
re William M.W. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 573, 594.)
In Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal.321, 326, a case cited by Defendant, the petitioner had
sought to enforce an act of legislation that specifically stated he would
personally be the recipient of funds. The Court held “[a] legislative
appropriation made to an individual in payment of a claim for damages on
account of personal injuries sustained by him while in its service, and for
which the state is not responsible, either upon general principles of law or by
reason of some previous statute creating such liability, is a gift, within the
meaning of the constitution.” (Id. at p. 328.)
In Powell
v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, 273, the legislature had sought to
retroactively provide jurors who had served
on criminal trials access to payment. The Court held that such an act
was an unlawful gift. (Ibid.) “It is for the purpose of giving to
certain jurors who have served in criminal cases since March 28, 1895,
money to which they were not entitled under the law. They do not sustain any
contractual relation to the city and county. There is no legal liability in any
manner upon the part of the city and county to pay them.” (Id. at p.
273-74.)
Defendant
correctly notes that “a claim presentation requirement constitutes an element of
any cause of action subject to the act.” (California-American Water Co. v.
Marina Coast Water Dist.(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1287.) However,
Defendant’s argument that section 340.1 violates the California Constitution is
unavailing. In the cases cited by Defendant, the legislature had passed an act
requiring issuance of funds in circumstances where there had previously been no
grounds for enforceable claims. In Powell, supra, the Court noted that
the funds were a result of neither a contract nor legal liability. (138 Cal. At
pp. 273-74.)
However, here, there is a basis for
liability. Section 340.1 does not create a new basis for liability but rather
impacts parts of a preexisting basis for liability. Further, as stated by the
Court in Coats, supra, “the Legislature made clear its intent to revive
causes of action previously barred by government claims presentation
requirements.” (46 Cal.App.5th 415, 428.) “The present case, of course,
involves revival of a cause of action barred by a claim presentation
requirement, not a statute of limitations. But we are aware of no reason
the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it
expressly did in Assembly Bill 218[.]” (Ibid.)
Defendant’s arguments that section
340.1 constitute an unlawful gift are rejected, and Defendant’s demurrer on
those grounds are overruled.
Statutory Duty of Care
Defendant also argues that
Plaintiff’s third, fifth, and sixth are duplicative.
In Palm
Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
268, 290, the Court, citing Rodriguez v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87
Cal.App.3d 494, 501, stated that duplicative causes of action were grounds for
sustaining a demurrer. In Rodriguez, supra, the Court sustained a
demurrer for a cause of action that “combine[d] all the preceding causes, alleging they
are joint and concurrent causes of plaintiffs' damages.” (877 Cal.App.3d at p.
498.) The Rodriguez Court held that the deficient cause of action
“contain[ed], by necessary implication, all of the allegations of each of the
preceding four alleged causes and thus adds nothing to the complaint by way of
fact or theory of recovery.” (Id. at p. 501.)
As a preliminary note, Plaintiff’s
sixth cause of action, while containing similar allegations to the other
negligence claims, are alleged against Does 41 through 50 only. Thus, as it
stands, the cause of action is not applicable to Defendant and is not duplicative.
Plaintiff’s third and fifth causes of action invoke the same statutory basis,
Government Code sections 815.2 and 820. In opposition to the demurrer,
Plaintiff contends that her third cause of action is specific to Defendant’s
supervisory employees and their duty to supervise the alleged perpetrator while
the fifth cause of action alleges Defendant’s employee’s duty to supervise
Plaintiff. (Opposition at p. 12:22-28.) At the pleading stage, the court finds
that Plaintiff’s allegations, while similar, are not so identical to add
nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery.
Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendant ordered to file an ANSWER
within 10 days’ notice of this ruling.
Plaintiff to provide notice.
Dated: April 15, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an
email to the court indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org