Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV01208, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV01208    Hearing Date: March 7, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:      March 7, 2024                                     TRIAL DATE: April 9, 2024

CASE:                         ADRIANNA TRUJILLO and GEORGE NARVAEZ, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.  

CASE NO.:                 22AHCV01208

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Ford Motor Company

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiffs Adrianna Trujillo and George Narvaez

SERVICE:                              Filed November 9, 2023

OPPOSITION:                       Filed February 22, 2024

REPLY:                                   Filed March 1, 2024

RELIEF REQUESTED

             Defendant moves for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises out of Plaintiffs Adrianna Trujillo and George Narvaez’s warranty claim for a 2022 Ford Bronco, Vehicle Identification Number 3FMCR9C6XNRD41786 (“Subject Vehicle” or “vehicle”). Plaintiffs filed this complaint on December 1, 2022, alleging three causes of action for (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty, (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty, and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “A party may move for summary judgement in an action or proceeding if it is contented that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code of Civil Procedure section 473c subd. (a)(1).) “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code of Civil Procedures section 473c subd. (c).)

A three-step analysis is employed in ruling on motions for summary judgment. First, the court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, the court determines, when the moving party is the defendant, whether it has produced evidence showing one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to that cause of action or defense. (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373.) The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”  (Ibid.; see also Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 384, 389 [Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”].) 

“A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. The defendant can satisfy its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the cause of action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to establish an essential element. (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC, (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 914.)

DISCUSSION

            Defendant moves for summary judgment as to each cause of aciton alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint. The facts of the case are largely undisputed.

            On April 19, 2022, Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle from Bob Wondries Ford in Alhambra. (SSUF No. 1.) On May 11, 2022, Plaintiffs presented the vehicle to Wondries for the first repair attempt, which included complaints regarding the dashboard lights, a squeaky brake, and the sunroof not fully opening. (SSUF No. 3, Exhibit 3 at pp. 46:16-47:5.) Wondries determined that the vehicle was operating as designed. (SSUF No. 3.) Plaintiffs presented the vehicle to Wondries again on August 22, 2022. (SSUF No. 4.) On the second visit, Plaintiffs complained the vehicle was shutting off and stalling. (Ibid.) Wondries performed repairs and returned the vehicle to Plaintiffs. (Ibid.)

            Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for breach of express warrant under the Song-Beverly Act fails as a matter of law because it was not presented multiple attempts to fix the same issue.

            “The Song–Beverly Act is a remedial statute designed to protect consumers who have purchased products covered by an express warranty.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.Ap.4th 785, 798.) “To that end, it regulates warranty terms and imposes service and repair obligations on the parties who issue the warranties.” (Rodriguez v. FAC US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 217.)

            Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(1) provides, in part: “[I]f the manufacturer or its representative in this state does not service or repair the goods to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either replace the goods or reimburse the buyer in an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer, less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the discovery of the nonconformity.”

            “A plaintiff pursuing an action under the Song–Beverly Act has the burden to prove the following elements: (1) the product had a defect or nonconformity covered by the express warranty; (2) the product was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer for repair; and (3) the manufacturer or its representative did not repair the defect or nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” (Robertson, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 798-99.)

            Defendant cites Silvio v. Ford Motor Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1205, for the proposition that Plaintiffs claim as a matter of law. In Silvio, the consumers presented the vehicle for repair only a single time. (Id. at p. 1207.) The Court held that the language of the statute contemplated a plural number of attempts and that one attempt was insufficient. (Id. at p. 1208.) Silvio, however, is not dispositive in the present case. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs presented the vehicle for repair twice. The issue is whether Plaintiffs needed to present the vehicle for the same issue more than once.

            In support of their respective positions, the parties cite unpublished federal district court cases. For the purposes of the present motion, the applicable case is the one cited by Defendants, Gamaty v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, CV 21-01063-RGK (AFMx) 2022 WL 1591701 (“Gamaty”). In Gamaty the issue of what constituted “reasonable number of attempts” arose in the context of a motion in limine to determine whether the plaintiff could aggregate unrelated vehicle repair attempts. (Id. at *1.) The Court held that related repairs could be aggregated while unrelated repairs could not. (Id. at *2.) Notably the Court cited Silvio, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1208-1209, which provides that “the reasonableness of the number of attempts is a question of fact for the trier of fact.”

            Here, Defendant argues and assumes without establishing that the repairs Plaintiffs sought in their first visit to Wondries is unrelated to the repairs sought in their subsequent visit. In the court’s estimation, this issue is for the trier of fact. Further, Defendant has not established, for the purposes of this motion, that the repairs sought were unrelated through any evidence or expert declaration. While it can be reasonably inferred that the sunroof issues are unrelated to the subsequent stalling issues, Defendant makes no attempt to demonstrate that the issues with the dashboard lights and breaks are unrelated to the stalling and stopping issues. Thus, Defendant has failed to meet its burden of showing that Plaintiffs are unable to show an element of their first cause of action. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is denied.

            Defendant also moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied warranty.  

            “Under the implied merchantability warranty, ‘every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer's and the retail seller's implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.’ (§ 1792.) The warranty ‘ “arises by operation of law” ’ and therefore applies despite its omission from a purchase contract.” (Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1545.)

            Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish timely revocation. However, revocation is not an element cited by Defendant. Defendants cite California Civil Jury Instruction 3210 which provides that the elements for a claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability are (1) that the plaintiff bought a consumer good from or manufactured by defendant, (2) at the time of purchase, defendant was in the business of selling or manufacturing consumer goods, (3) the consumer good was deficient, (4) plaintiff was harmed, and (5) causation. Noticably absent is a requirement that Plaintiffs revoke.

            As explained by the California Supreme Court in Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1263, additional theories of recovery exist because “section 1794 provides, in subdivision (b)(1): “Where the buyer has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance of the goods or has exercised any right to cancel the sale, Sections 2711, 2712, and 2713 of the Commercial Code shall apply.” This issue however, is not an essential element to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied warranty.

            “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subdivision (f)(1).) Thus, Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiffs failed to timely revoke their acceptance of the contract for the Subject Vehicle fail to meet Defendant’s initial burden of demonstrating Plaintiffs are unable to establish their claim for breach of implied warranty.

            Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate damages. However, Plaintiffs have provided that they have had to pay out of pocket for towing and rental expenses. (AMF Nos. 3-4.) Plaintiffs have also had to make payments under the contract for the vehicle, which they allege was faulty. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is denied.

            Defendant also moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s third. Defendant against argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate revocation and damages. Defendant’s arguments are predicated on their position that Plaintiff’s first cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1793.2, subdivision (d), fails. However, Defendant’s motion has been denied as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Thus, Defendant’s arguments amount to a position that Plaintiffs are precluded from a specific remedy rather than that their cause of action fails.

            Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action is denied.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

            Moving Party to provide notice.

Dated:   March 7, 2024                                               ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org