Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV01264, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV01264    Hearing Date: February 1, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:      February 1, 2024                                             TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         KEVIN JON RITCHIE, an individual, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 

CASE NO.:                 22AHCV01264

DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant General Motors LLC

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiff Kevin Jon Ritchie

SERVICE:                              Filed December 13, 2023

OPPOSITION:                       Filed January 18, 2024

REPLY:                                   Filed January 25, 2024

RELIEF REQUESTED

             Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for fraudulent concealment and moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises out of Plaintiff Kevin Jon Ritchie’s (“Plaintiff’) lemon law claim against Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges he purchased a 2021 GMC Sierra, Vehicle Identification Number 3GTU9CEDXMG169786 (“Subject Vehicle”) on December 18, 2020. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) on November 13, 2023, alleging four causes of action for (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty, (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty, (3) violation of the Song Beverly Act section 1793.2, and (4) fraud – fraudulent inducement – concealment.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for fraudulent concealment is OVERRULED.

            Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is DENIED.

            Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to his requests for the production of documents is DENIED.

LEGAL STANDARD

            Demurrer

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Additionally, a special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

Motion to Strike

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike a pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)  The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)  An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., 431.10, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)   

DISCUSSION

            Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for fraudulent concealment. Defendant’s two previous demurrers to Plaintiffs’ fraudulent inducement cause of action were sustained with leave to amend on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to allege a direct transaction giving rise to a duty to disclose.

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060, citations omitted.

“[F]raud may consist of a suppression of a material fact in circumstances under which the defendant has a legal duty of disclosure.” (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1186, internal citations omitted.) “[W]here material facts are known to one party and not to the other, failure to disclose them is not actionable fraud unless there is some relationship between the parties which gives rise to a duty to disclose such known facts. A relationship between the parties is present if there is ‘some sort of transaction between the parties.’ ” (Id. at p. 1187.) “Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Ibid.)

            “There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]’ ” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

            “These [latter] three circumstances, however, ‘presuppose[ ] the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.’ ” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311.) “Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.” (Id. at p. 312.)

            Plaintiff has remedied the deficiencies in his allegations. He alleges that he purchased the Subject Vehicle from Thorson GMC Trk-Buick MTR on December 18, 2020. (SAC ¶ 4.) He alleges that the dealership is an authorized retailer dealership of Defendant, and that Defendant provided the dealership with a selling business associate code. (Id. ¶¶ 6-8.) Plaintiff alleges he communicated with Thorson GMC. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that Thorson GMC is an authorized agent and representative of Defendant. (Id. ¶ 14.)

“Material facts alleged in the complaint are treated as true for the purpose ruling on the demurrer. [Citation.] Also taken as true are facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. [Citation.] However, contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint are not considered in judging its sufficiency.” (Kisesky v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d, 228.)

Plaintiff’s allegations, at the pleading stage, are sufficient to allege the existence of a relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to allege fraud with specificity.

“The requirement that ‘[f]raud must be pleaded with specificity’ applies equally to a cause of action for fraud and deceit based on concealment.” (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472.) “Less specificity in pleading fraud is required ‘when “it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy....” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1469.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of and actively concealed information related to the defective transmissions in the Subject Vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 136-137.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant concealed the fact that the components were prone to premature wear and required repeated repairs. (Id. ¶ 138.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant and its agents knew of the issue but represented that it was able to fix it. (Id. ¶ 147.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for fraudulent concealment. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is overruled.

            Motion to Strike

            Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

            Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a). A plaintiff seeking punitive damages “must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages. [Citation.] Punitive damages my not be pleaded generally.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.)

            Here, because Plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim survives, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient grounds to plead a claim for punitive damages. Defendant’s motion to strike is denied.

            Motion to Compel Further Responses

            Plaintiff moves for an order compelling further responses to his requests for production. Plaintiff provides he served his discovery requests on September 21, 2023. (Jacobson Decl. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff provides that Defendant served deficient responses on October 25, 2023. (Id. ¶ 30.)

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345 requires a separate statement to include “[a] statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute”. While Plaintiff facially complies with this requirement by including a “statement of insufficiency” next to each discovery request, Plaintiff merely includes stock language claiming that Defendant’s objections are meritless and boilerplate. Much like Defendant’s boilerplate objections are unhelpful to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s boilerplate statements of insufficiency are not helpful to this court to determine whether further responses should be ordered as to the specific discovery requests.

Plaintiff has failed to submit a code complaint separate statement. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses is denied.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for fraudulent concealment is OVERRULED.

            Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is DENIED.

            Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to his requests for the production of documents is DENIED.

            Moving Party to provide notice.

Dated:   February 1, 2024                                           ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org