Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV01295, Date: 2023-09-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV01295    Hearing Date: September 13, 2023    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:      September 13, 2023                                        TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         ERIC VAN DUSEN, an individual, v. WARRANTECH AUTOMOTIVE, INC. and DOES 1 through 5, inclusive.  

CASE NO.:                 22AHCV01295

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Warrantech Automotive, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiff Eric Van Dusen

SERVICE:                              Filed August 8, 2023

OPPOSITION:                       Filed August 30, 2023

REPLY:                                   Filed September 6, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

            Defendant moves to compel Plaintiff to submit this claim to binding arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement contained in the “Campers Edge” coverage contract.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises out of Plaintiff Eric Van Dusen’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that Defendant Warrentech Automotive, Inc. (“Defendant”) failed to honor a service agreement covering a used 2004 Tropi-Cal Model MH396CD Recreational Vehicle (“RV”). Plaintiff alleges that the RV’s engine failed within two months of purchase, but Defendant refused to cover the $14,229.85 necessary to repair the product. Plaintiff filed this complaint on December 13, 2023, alleging five causes of cation for (1) financial abuse of an elder, (2) breach of service contract under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, (3) Penal Code section 496, (4) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and (5) unfair competition.

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.

            Defendant’s request to stay the proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4 is granted.

LEGAL STANDARD

“California and federal law both favor enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.” (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 889.) “A party who files a motion to compel arbitration ‘bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.’’ (Cisnero Alverez v. Altamed Health Services Corporation (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 572, 580.)

DISCUSSION

            Existence of a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate

            Defendant moves to compel Plaintiff to submit this claim to binding arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement contained in the “Campers Edge” coverage contract.

            “ ‘[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement ... that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.’ ” (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1057.)

            The arbitration agreement at issue provides, in part: “We and You agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims that arise with respect to the other. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted. It includes, but is not limited to: [¶] claims arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship, whether based in contract, tort, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; [¶] claims that arose before this or any prior contract (including, but not limited to, claims relating to marketing) . . . .” (Marti Decl.  ¶ 2, Exhibit 1 at p. 7.)

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing a valid arbitration agreement. Plaintiff argues that there are two version of the contract, one which Defendant produced in discovery and one Defendant submitted in support of its motion to compel. Further, Plaintiff asserts that neither contract bears his signature.

            “[T]he writing memorializing an arbitration agreement need not be signed by both parties in order to be upheld as a binding arbitration agreement. . . . ‘[I]t is not the presence or absence of a signature [on an agreement] which is dispositive; it is the presence or absence of evidence of an agreement to arbitrate which matters.” [Citation.] Evidence confirming the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, despite an unsigned agreement, can be based, for example, on ‘conduct from which one could imply either ratification or implied acceptance of such a provision.’ ” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 176.)

            As a preliminary note, Defendant does not address the discrepancy between the two copies of the purported agreement. However, the contract submitted in support of Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration details the contract holders as Barbara Van-Dusen and Eric Van-Dusen and identifies the RV at issue in this claim. (Marti Decl.  ¶ 2, Exhibit 1 at p. 1.) Additionally, the contract has a signature for the contract holder signature line, although the copy is mostly illegible. Plaintiff’s assertion that he did not sign the contract do not rebut the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.

            The parties and RV are identified in the contract and one of the card holders signed the agreement. The evidence supports the fact that the parties agreed to the contract. In fact, Plaintiff’s claims are based upon the Campers Edge agreement. (Complaint ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff’s own allegations support the inference that the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, is valid. Defendant has met its burden of establishing by preponderance of the evidence the existence of a valid agreement.

            Unconscionability

            Plaintiff next argues that the agreement is unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable.

“ ‘[U]nconscionability has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element,’ the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on “overly harsh” or “one-sided” results. [citation.] ‘The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.’ ” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)

“Procedural unconscionability ‘addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power.’ ” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 243.) “ ‘It is well settled that adhesion contracts in the employment context, that is, those contracts offered to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, typically contain some aspects of procedural unconscionability.’ ” (Id. at p. 243.) “When . . . there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, ‘the degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low, and the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high.’ ” (Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.)

Plaintiff argues that the contract is procedurally unconscionable because the arbitration agreement is on the seventh page while the signature page is the first page of the agreement. Plaintiff also argues that the contract is a contract of adhesion. Notably, Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence to support these contentions outside of the contract itself. Plaintiff speculates that the arbitration agreement may not have been presented to him or may have not been given with the first page with no evidentiary support. Additionally, Plaintiff’s arguments that the nature of the contract means it was given on a take-it-or-leave it basis is not supported by any evidence. Plaintiff has failed to establish any level of procedural unconscionability.

            Because establishing unconscionability requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability, and Plaintiff has failed to meet the first prong, the court does not assess Plaintiff’s claim regarding whether the agreement is substantively unconscionable. Plaintiff’s argument that the agreement is unconscionable fails.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.

            Defendant’s request to stay the proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4 is granted.

            Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:   September 13, 2023                          ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org