Judge Joel L. Lofton, Case Number: 22AHCV01429, Date: 2023-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22AHCV01429, Date: 2023-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV01429 Hearing Date: August 16, 2023 Dept: X

Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE: August 16, 2023 TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE: R.B., an individual, v. DOE 1, a Missouri corporation; DOE 2 a California corporation; DOE 3, a California religious nonprofit corporation; DOE 4, a religious entity of unknown form; DOE 5, an individual; and DOE 6 through 100, inclusive.

CASE NO.: 22AHCV01429

DEMURRER

MOVING PARTY: Defendants The Pacific Southwest District of the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod (sued as Doe 2) and Emmaus Evangelical Lutheran Church of Alhambra (Sued as Does 3 and 4) (“Demurring Parties”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff R.B. (“Plaintiff”)

SERVICE: Filed April 25, 2023

OPPOSITION: Filed August 3, 2023

REPLY: Filed August 9, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

Demurring Parties demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision and fifth cause of action for negligent supervision of a minor.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiff R.B. revival sexual assault claims pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 340.1 (“section 340.1.”) Plaintiff alleges he was the victim of sexual assault from approximately 1957 to 1960. Plaintiff filed this complaint on December 30, 2022, alleging five causes of action for (1) sexual assault of a minor, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) negligent supervision, hiring, and retention, (4) negligent supervision of a minor, and (5) negligence.

TENTATIVE RULING

Demurring Parties’ demurrer is OVERRULED.

LEGAL STANDARD

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

DISCUSSION

Demurring Parties demurrer to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action. Demurring Parties first argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for negligent supervision, hiring, and retention and fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for negligent supervision of a minor.

“An employer may be liable to a third person for the employer's negligence in hiring or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit.” (Roman Catholic Bishop v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1564.) “Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it ‘knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.’ ” (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.)

“With respect to plaintiffs’ claim that the District negligently failed to supervise plaintiffs, plaintiffs must allege facts demonstrating that school personnel failed to exercise ‘ “ ‘ordinary prudence.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Either a total lack of supervision [citation] or ineffective supervision [citation] may constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision.” ’ ” (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 29.)

Demurring Parties argue that Plaintiff fail to plead the required allegations to sustain a claim. Demurring Parties rely on Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531.

In Doe v. City of Los Angeles, supra, the California Supreme Court affirmed judgment sustaining a demurrer and stated that the plaintiffs had failed to “allege that defendants had knowledge of [the alleged perpetrator’s] past unlawful sexual conduct with minors, which is the prerequisite for imposing upon these defendants liability for his subsequent sexual abuse of plaintiffs.” (42 Cal.4th at p. 553.) Demurring Parties’ reliance on Doe v. City of Los Angeles is unavailing for two primary reasons. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew or had reason to know that the alleged perpetrator had engaged in unlawful sexual-related conduct with minors in the past. (Complaint ¶ 60.)

Additionally, section 340.1, subdivision (c), provides: “An action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.” Two primary differences exist between the language cited in Doe v. City of Los Angeles and the current version of section 340.1. The current version of section 340.1 provides that Plaintiff may plead “any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault”, “or” – whereas the language cited in Doe v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 536, employed the word “and” – “failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards”.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew that the alleged perpetrator would spend extended periods of time alone with Plaintiff behind closed doors. (Complaint ¶ 53.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards. (Id. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff sufficiently pleads facts to satisfy the requirements of section 340.1.

Demurring Parties next argue that the doctrine of laches applies to bar Plaintiff’s claims. “ ‘Laches is an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable right, causing prejudice to an adverse party such as to render the granting of relief to the other party inequitable.’ ” (Nicolopulos v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 304, 312. “ ‘ “Generally speaking, the existence of laches is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in light of all of the applicable circumstances....” ' ” (Estate of Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971, 997.) Demurring Parties reliance on the doctrine of laches is unavailing. Plaintiff’s claim is a statutory claim. Further, Demurring Parties seek to invoke a defense based on a question of fact at the pleading stage.

Demurring Parties lastly argue that section 340.1 is unconstitutional. Demurring Parties argue that “[h]istorically, the California Legislature has used the revival of stale sexual assault claims to target particular entities.” (Demurrer at p. 9:12-13.) Demurring Parties cite no applicable legal authority for the proposition that section 340.1 is unconstitutional. “A brief must contain reasoned argument and legal authority to support its contentions, or the court may treat the argument as waived.” (Vo v. City of Garden Grove (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 425, 448.) The only case cited by Demurring Parties, Debbie Reynolds Prof. Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 222, 233, did not analyze whether section 340.1 was constitutional. Demurring Parties have failed to support their argument with relevant legal authority.

Rather, Demurring Parties argue a series of extrinsic circumstances evinces that section 340.1 is unconstitutional. Demurring Parties arguments are not based on the face of the complaint or any judicially noticeable matters. Demurring Parties arguments are inapplicable at the pleading stage.

CONCLUSION

Demurring Parties’ demurrer is OVERRULED.

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated: August 16, 2023 ___________________________________

Joel L. Lofton

Judge of the Superior Court