Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22GDCV01043, Date: 2024-04-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22GDCV01043 Hearing Date: April 23, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: April 23, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: JOHN DOE v. LA
CANADA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity; ANTOINE JANDEL f.k.a ANTOINE
HODGES, an individual, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 22GDCV01043
MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
MOVING PARTY: Defendant La Canada Unified School
District
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
John Doe
SERVICE: Filed January 29, 2024
OPPOSITION: Filed February 15, 2024
REPLY: No reply filed.
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant moves for judgment on
the pleadings.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff John Doe’s
(“Plaintiff”) claim that he was the victim of childhood sexual harassment while
attending La Canada High School in 2006. Plaintiff filed this case pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 on December 16, 2022, alleging four
causes of action for (1) negligent supervision, (2) negligent hiring, (3)
sexual battery, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the
“complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against that defendant.”¿ (Code Civ Proc sections 438(b)(1) and
(c)(1)(B)(ii).)¿ The grounds for motion provided for in this section
shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of
which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. section 438(d).)¿
Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.¿ (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.¿(1998)
67 Cal.App.4th¿ 995,¿999.) The
standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially
the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of
the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears
that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v.
O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v.
California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)
DISCUSSION
Claim Presentation and
Constitutional Challenge to Section 340.1
Defendant argues that Paintiff’s
claims fail because he has failed to make a claim as required by the Government
Claims Act and any statutory exemption violates the California Constitution’s
prohibition on unlawful gifts.
“Under the Government Claims Act,
personal injury claims against public entities generally must be presented to
the entity within six months of accrual of the injury. [Citation.] Absent an
applicable exception, ‘failure to timely present a claim for money or damages
to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.’
” (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415,
420.)
At the time Plaintiff filed this
action, Code of Civil Procedure former section 340.1, subdivision (q),
provided: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages
described in paragraphs (1) through (3, inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has
not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January
1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation
deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may
be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020.” Further, Government Code
section 905, subdivision (m), provides an exception for the claim presentation
requirements for “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of
childhood sexual assault.”
Defendant,
citing a slew of cases from the 19th century and early 20th century, contend
that the statutory exception to the claim presentation requirement is an
unlawful gift because Plaintiff, having failed to make a claim at the
appropriate time, no longer has an enforceable claim. The issue then, is
whether section 340.1, in conjunction with Government Code section 905, is an
unlawful gift of public funds.
“ ‘Section 6 of article XVI of the California Constitution provides
that the Legislature has no power “to make any gift or authorize the making of
any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or
other corporation ....” The term “gift” in the constitutional provision
“includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or
enforceable claim,” even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.’ ” (In
re William M.W. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 573, 594.)
In Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal.321, 326, a case cited by Defendant, the petitioner had
sought to enforce an act of legislation that specifically stated he would
personally be the recipient of funds. The Court held “[a] legislative
appropriation made to an individual in payment of a claim for damages on
account of personal injuries sustained by him while in its service, and for
which the state is not responsible, either upon general principles of law or by
reason of some previous statute creating such liability, is a gift, within the
meaning of the constitution.” (Id. at p. 328.)
In Powell
v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, 273, the legislature had sought to
retroactively provide jurors who had served
on criminal trials access to payment. The Court held that such an act
was an unlawful gift. (Ibid.) “It is for the purpose of giving to
certain jurors who have served in criminal cases since March 28, 1895,
money to which they were not entitled under the law. They do not sustain any
contractual relation to the city and county. There is no legal liability in any
manner upon the part of the city and county to pay them.” (Id. at p.
273-74.)
Defendant
correctly notes that “a claim presentation requirement constitutes an element of
any cause of action subject to the act.” (California-American Water Co. v.
Marina Coast Water Dist.(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1287.) However,
Defendant’s argument that section 340.1 violates the California Constitution is
unavailing. In the cases cited by Defendant, the legislature had passed an act
requiring issuance of funds in circumstances where there had previously been no
grounds for enforceable claims. In Powell, supra, the Court noted that
the funds were a result of neither a contract nor legal liability. (138 Cal. At
pp. 273-74.)
However, here, there is a basis for
liability. Section 340.1 does not create a new basis for liability but rather
impacts parts of a preexisting basis for liability. Further, as stated by the
Court in Coats, supra, “the Legislature made clear its intent to revive
causes of action previously barred by government claims presentation
requirements.” (46 Cal.App.5th 415, 428.) “The present case, of course,
involves revival of a cause of action barred by a claim presentation
requirement, not a statute of limitations. But we are aware of no reason
the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it
expressly did in Assembly Bill 218[.]” (Ibid.) Although the issue before
the court in Coats was a different constitutional challenge, the Court
upheld the legislature’s ability to revive claims barred by the claim
presentation requirement, which is applicable here.
Defendant’s arguments that section
340.1 constitute an unlawful gift are rejected, and Defendant’s motion is
denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
Dated: April 23, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court
indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org