Judge Joel L. Lofton, Case Number: 22PDUD01758, Date: 2024-06-17 Tentative Ruling

CASE: ASIAN YOUTH CENTER, v. KRISTO HOLDINGS LLC, a California Limited Liability Company, HRANUSH MKRTCHYAN, and DOES 1 to 5.

This case arises out of Plaintiff Asian Youth Center’s (“Plaintiff”) unlawful detainer claim against Defendants Kristo Holdings, LLC and Hranush Mkrtchyan (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleged that Defendants agreed to a 5-year lease term for property located at 232 W. Clary Ave., City of San Gabriel, CA 91776. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants agreed to pay $7,364.00 per month. Plaintiff sued on August 1, 2022.

On January 11, 2024, following a trial, a jury reached a verdict in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. On January 25, 2024, judgment was entered.

Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees is tentatively GRANTED in the reduced amount of $93,494.00. The court further directs Defendants to submit a revised proposed judgment for the court’s review and signature to address the clerical error noted herein.

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

The court OVERRULES Defendants’ evidentiary objections, as the court does not rely on the portions objected to in reaching its decision herein.

On January 11, 2024, a jury reached a verdict in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. On January 25, 2024, judgment was entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on the Complaint.

Paragraph 31 of the agreement at issue in this case provides: “If any Party or Broker brings an action or proceeding involving the Premises whether founded in tort, contract or equity, or to declare rights hereunder, the Prevailing Party (as hereafter defined) in any such proceeding, action, or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. Such fees may be awarded in the same suit or recovered in a separate suit, whether or not such action or proceeding is pursued to decision or judgment. The term, ‘Prevailing Party’ shall include, without limitation, a Party or Broker who substantially obtains or defeats the relief sought, as the case may be, whether by compromise, settlement, judgment, or the abandonment by the other Party or Broker of its claim or defense.” (Compl., Ex. 1, ¶ 31.)

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Ibid.) Once the lodestar figure is calculated, a court may adjust the award based on factors such as “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.” (Ibid.)

Defendants seek fees at the following rates: $495.00 per hour for Kevin T. Kay, $610.00 per hour for Lawrence C. Ecoff, and $550.00 per hour for Alberto J. Campain. (Kay Decl., ¶ 13; Ecoff Decl., ¶ 3; Campain Decl., ¶ 4.)[1] Defendants claim to have spent 186.2 hours on this matter. (Kay Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendants also indicate having spent five hours preparing this motion, and estimated incurring three hours for reviewing the opposition and preparing a reply. (Kay Decl., ¶ 13.) The court will reduce this number of hours to 166.2 hours.

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom [citation], and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. [Citation.]” (569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437.)

The court finds the hourly rates of Defendants’ counsel to be reasonable here, particularly since Kevin Kay, who has the lowest rate of the three attorneys involved, did the majority of the work. While the court understands Plaintiff’s argument that the rates in the San Gabriel Valley might be lower on average than those in Beverly Hills where Defendants’ counsel is located, the rates they have claimed here are not unusual for this legal community either. Defendants were free to choose the counsel of their choice, and the fact their counsel was located in Beverly Hills versus the San Gabriel Valley is ultimately of no importance. The court also finds Plaintiff’s contention that the rates for Kevin Kay inexplicably increased in the middle of this action to be unavailing. It is not unusual for rates to increase overtime while a lawsuit is pending, particularly in a lawsuit like this that has been pending for almost two years at this point. Also, the amount of the increase, $45.00, is not unreasonable.

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

The court agrees with Plaintiff that the entry on July 26, 2023, regarding “Attention to Motion for Summary Judgment; trial preparation” is improperly lumped together, i.e., block billing. Trial preparation and summary judgment are two different matters, and it is impossible for the court to determine how much effort was devoted to each task with this entry. “Trial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not. [Citation.]” (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.) The court also finds the description “Attention to” to be unclear as to what that even means, and the description “trial preparation” to be vague. Accordingly, the court will strike this entry and reduce the amount of attorney’s fees sought by $891.00, i.e., 1.80 hours multiplied by $495.00 per hour. (See Kay Decl., Ex. B, p. 43.)

The court also agrees that it is not reasonable to recover for discovery demands served after the expiration of the discovery cutoff. (Sawkins Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. 3.) The court will reduce the fee request by $1,138.50, i.e., 2.3 hours multiplied by $495.00 per hour, for the entries on September 18, 2023 and October 5, 2023. (Kay Decl., Ex. B, p. 45.)

The court finds Plaintiff’s other arguments regarding unsuccessful motions or special jury instructions to be unavailing. Plaintiff cites no authority to support the contention that any of these fees should be stricken. (See Opp., pp. 4-5.) “Contentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority. [Citation.]” (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.) Moreover, just because a party does not prevail on a motion or an underlying matter does not mean it is unrecoverable for purposes of attorney’s fees. (See Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133, italics in original [“an attorney fee award should include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent…”].)

The court also finds Plaintiff’s argument regarding the sanctions previously awarded in connection with the discovery motions unavailing. Plaintiff neither cites any authority in support of this argument, (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215), nor does Plaintiff point to the specific items in the billing to be challenged, (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) The court declines to guess which portions of the billing Plaintiff attempts to challenge here.

As for the language in the judgment indicating that “Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees…”, (Judgment (1/25/24), the court agrees with Defendants that this was a clerical error. The judgment clearly states that it was entered in favor of Defendants, which necessarily renders them the prevailing party in this action. (See Id.; Civ. Code, §1717, subd. (a).) The court will therefore amend the judgment to correctly reflect that Defendants are in fact the parties entitled to attorney’s fees. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) The court will direct Defendants to submit a revised proposed judgment reflecting the correction.

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees in the reduced amount of $83,594.00.

Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees is tentatively GRANTED in the reduced amount of $83,594.00. The court further directs Defendants to submit a revised proposed judgment for the court’s review and signature to address the clerical error noted herein.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

[1] The court notes that the declaration of Alberto J. Campaign indicates an hourly rate of $525.00, (Campain Decl., ¶ 4), while the moving papers indicate a rate of $550.00 per hour, (Motion, 10). The court infers that Mr. Campain’s hourly rate was $550.00 based on some of the billing entries reflecting that rate. (Kay Decl., Ex. B, p. 43.)