Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 22STCV15003, Date: 2023-12-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV15003 Hearing Date: December 7, 2023 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: December 7, 2023 TRIAL DATE: April 30, 2023
CASE: MARI MIURA, a
minor by and through her guardian ad litem CALVIN JOHN BLASCO, v. SOUTH
PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity, and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive.
CASE NO.: 22STCV15003
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant South Pasadena Unified
School District
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Mari Miura
SERVICE: Filed May 11, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed November 22, 2023
REPLY: Filed December 1, 2023
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant moves for summary
judgment.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mari Miura (“Plaintiff”)
brings this claim against Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District
(“Defendant”) alleging that Defendant failed to take reasonable steps or
implement reasonable safeguards to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually
assaulted. Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually molested, raped, assaulted,
fondled, groped, and battered by another student (“Assailant”) on October 2,
2021, while she was a student at South Pasadena High School. Plaintiff alleges
she informed Defendant, but Defendant failed to prevent Plaintiff from being
sexually assaulted on multiple occasions.
Plaintiff filed a first amended
complaint on December 22, 2022, alleging four causes of action for (1)
negligence, (2) negligence, negligent hiring, training, retention, and/or
supervision of unfit employees, (3) breach of mandatory statutory duties which
proximately caused Plaintiff s sexual assault and battery, and (4) breach of
mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff additional
damages separate and distinct from her sexual assault and battery.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, is
DENIED as to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action.
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action.
OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE
Plaintiff’s objections are
overruled.
Defendant’s objections are
overruled.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide
courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to
determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to
resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “A party may
move for summary judgement in an action or proceeding if it is contented that
the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or
proceeding.” (Code of Civil Procedure section 473c subd. (a)(1).) “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if
all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
(Code of Civil Procedures section 473c subd. (c).)
A three-step analysis is employed in
ruling on motions for summary judgment. First, the court identifies the issues
framed by the pleadings. Next, the court determines, when the moving party is
the defendant, whether it has produced evidence showing one or more of the
elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete
defense to that cause of action. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to
that cause of action or defense. (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
1369, 1373.) The court
must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and
accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Ibid.;
see also Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 384, 389 [Courts “liberally construe the evidence
in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.”].)
“A defendant moving for summary judgment
must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot
be established or that there is a complete defense. The defendant can satisfy
its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the cause of
action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot
reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to establish an essential element.
(Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC, (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 914.)
DISCUSSION
First Cause of Action for Negligence
Defendant moves for summary judgment,
or in the alternative for summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s first cause
of action for negligence. “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are
duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
521, 529.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish the elements
of breach or causation.
However, it appears to the court that the actual
pertinent issue is one of duty rather than breach of causation. Defendant’s
arguments, such as whether there were any reported behavioral issues with
Plaintiff’s alleged assailant and whether the harm was foreseeable, relate to
duty. “Once a court
determines a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff, ‘the remaining liability
questions—breach as well as factual and legal causation—are usually questions
for the jury.’ ” (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 113, 126.) Thus, because breach and causation are typically
questions of fact for the factfinder, and because Defendant’s arguments are
related to the scope of its duty, the court turns to the issue of whether
Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to prevent the harm alleged here.
Defendant, as a preliminary note, concedes it owed a special duty to
Plaintiff as a school district overseeing a student. “ ‘Even if an
organization has a special relationship with the tortfeasor or plaintiff,
“[t]he court may depart from the general rule of duty ... if other policy
considerations clearly require an exception.” ’ [Citations.] The factors
set forth in Rowland ‘may, on balance,
justify excusing or limiting a defendant's duty of care.’ ” (Doe v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 673.) “The Rowland factors are ‘ “the foreseeability of harm
to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence
of insurance for the risk involved.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 673-74.)
“ ‘The most
important factor to consider in determining whether to create an exception
to the general duty to exercise ordinary care ... is whether the injury in
question was foreseeable.’ ” (Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 629.)
Plaintiff
alleges that on October 2, 2021, she was assaulted in a locked restroom during
a physical education (“P.E.”) class. (FAC ¶ 20.) Defendant argues that the harm alleged was not foreseeable because
Plaintiff was friends with her alleged assailant, Stella, there were no reports
of Stella posing a risk to any other student, and Plaintiff did not report any
harassing behavior. (SSUF Nos. 1-3.) Defendant provides that the bathroom where
the alleged assault occurred is intended to be a single use bathroom. (SSUF No.
7.) Defendant argues that that Stella did not threaten or physically force
Plaintiff. (SSUF Nos. 9-10.)
Defendant’s
position appears to be that it is not foreseeable that a friend would sexually
assault another friend, without threat or violence, in a single occupant
bathroom. In opposition, Plaintiff points to various circumstances for her
position that the harm she faced was foreseeable. Plaintiff asserts there was
no lesson plan for the P.E. class on the day in question, two P.E. teachers had
combined their classes to create a total group of 100 students, and the other
P.E. teacher did not know Plaintiff. (PSSUF Nos. 1-3.) On the day of the
incident, Plaintiff had also ingested a THC gummy and was visibly under the
influence. (PSSUF Nos. 10-11.) Plaintiff provides that she and her alleged
assailant were missing from class for 20-30 minutes. (PSSUF No. 12.) One of the
P.E. teachers also testified that a class of 50 students was too big and that
some could “slip through the cracks”. (PSSUF Nos. 15-16.)
The most
pertinent Roland factor, whether the injury was foreseeable, weighs in
Plaintiff’s favor. The undisputed facts show that Plaintiff was able to take a
THC gummy at school and went unaccounted for periods of time during her P.E.
class, which had around 100 students present. Another relevant Roland
factor is the closeness of Defendant’s conduct, or in this case the alleged
lack of supervision, and Plaintiff’s injury. Defendant’s role was to provide
supervision in this circumstance because Plaintiff was a student during school
hours. Yet, Defendant allowed Plaintiff to be in a situation where 100 students
were being supervised in various places by two teachers, including one who did
not know Plaintiff. Lastly, the burden to Defendant in finding that a duty
exists to supervise its students during school hours is not so great to justify
creating an exception to the special duty Defendant owes to Plaintiff.
“Foreseeability is determined in
light of all the circumstances and does not require prior identical events or
injuries.” (M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 508, 519.) “ ‘It is not necessary to prove that the very injury
which occurred must have been foreseeable by the school authorities.... Their
negligence is established if a reasonably prudent person would foresee that
injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in the absence of
[adequate] safeguards.’ ” (Ibid.)
Defendant
owed Plaintiff a duty to supervise her during her P.E. class. Additionally,
Defendant failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff is unable
to establish breach or causation. The fact that Plaintiff was friends with her
alleged assailant and used to a single use bathroom does not address or pertain
to whether or not Defendant provided adequate supervision during a mandatory
class session. Defendant fails to meet its burden as to both the issues of
breach and causation.
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication as
to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is denied.
Second
Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision, Hiring, and Retention
Defendant moves for summary
judgment, or for summary adjudication, as to Plaintiff’s second cause of
action. Plaintiff’s allegations pertain to whether Defendant’s employees,
including John Eldridge, Linda Junge, Ed.D., David Speck, Jill Timothy,
were unfit to provide supervision of students. (FAC ¶¶ 43 and 52.)
“An
employer may be liable to a third person for the employer's negligence in
hiring or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit.” (Roman Catholic
Bishop v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1564.) “The Supreme
Court explained that a school district is liable for the negligence of
supervisory employees who ‘knew or should have known of [a school employee's]
dangerous propensities, but nevertheless hired, retained and failed to properly
supervise’ the employee.” (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 13, 25.)
Defendant
argues that its employees were properly hired, had adequate credentials, and
that it was not aware of any complaint regarding Ms. Timothy’s ability to
supervise students. (SSUF Nos. 13-18.) In opposition, Plaintiff focuses
primarily on her claim that Defendant provided negligent supervision of its
employees because its employees provided improper supervision of Plaintiff.
Neither
party fully addresses the issue of whether Defendant knew or should have known
that Defendant’s employees had a “dangerous propensity”, or in this case an
inability to properly supervise students. In many cases, the employee is the
perpetrator of the alleged conduct, so the “dangerous propensity” involves that
employee’s propensity to commit sexual or other assault. (See C.A. v.
Williams S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861.) However, the
issue here is whether Defendant’s employees had a propensity to fail to
supervise their students and whether Defendant knew or should have known about
that fact. Although Plaintiff does not adequately address this issue, neither
does Defendant.
Defendant’s
sole fact as to the issue of whether it knew or should have known that its
employees were prone to fail to supervise is its assertion that “[n]either
Principal Eldred nor Assistant Principal Speck received any complaints or
concerns about Ms. Timothy’s ability to supervise students nor have observed
her to neglect her supervisory responsibilities.” (SSUF No. 15.) This one fact
does not establish that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether it knew
or should have known that Ms. Timothy was unfit to supervise students. Further,
Defendant does not address this issue at all in regard to its other employees
that Plaintiff alleges were negligently hired, retained, or supervised.
Defendant fails to meet its initial
burden, and its motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s second cause of
action is denied.
Third and Fourth Causes of
Action for Breach of Mandatory Duties
Defendant
moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action
for breach of mandatory duties. In her third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant failed to report sexual abuse. (FAC ¶¶ 63-75.)
“Government
Code section 815.6 has three elements that must be satisfied to impose
public entity liability: (1) a mandatory duty was imposed on the public entity
by an enactment; (2) the enactment was designed to protect against the
particular kind of injury allegedly suffered; and (3) the breach of the
mandatory statutory duty proximately caused the injury.” (B.H. v. County of
San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 179.)
“CANRA requires a
‘mandated reporter,’ which includes teachers and certain other school
employees, ‘to make a report to a law enforcement agency or a county welfare
department “whenever the mandated reporter, in his or her professional capacity
or within the scope of his or her employment, has knowledge of or observes a
child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the
victim of child abuse or neglect.” ’ ” (Doe v. Landale Elementary School
Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 138.)
Defendant
argues it did not breach a mandatory duty because Plaintiff never reported the
incident or any concern regarding Stella to them. (SSUF Nos. 21-24.) Defendant
also provides that Plaintiff informed her therapist who informed law
enforcement, and Defendant did not learn about the incident until the police were
involved. (SSUF Nos. 25-27.) The court notes that Defendant does not provide
any authority for its position that it was relieved of its duties as a mandated
reported because the police were already involved or because Plaintiff’s
therapist made the initial report. Nonetheless, the record lacks any indication
that any breach by Defendant of its mandatory duties caused any injury to
Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not address this issue in opposition, nor does she
submit any evidence raising a triable issue of fact that she was harmed by Defendant’s
failure to report the incident after it learned about it from law enforcement
involvement.
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is granted as to
Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, is
DENIED as to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action.
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action.
Moving Party
to provide notice.
Dated: December 7,
2023 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court
indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org