Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHC02680, Date: 2024-05-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHC02680 Hearing Date: May 30, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: May 30, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: Garcia v. Church
of the Foothill Methodist, et al.
CASE NO.: 23AHCV02680
Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings
MOVING PARTY: Defendant First Iemelif
Church in Duarte
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Adriel Garcia, a minor through his Guardian ad Litem, Saul E. Garcia
OPPOSITION: Filed
on May 16, 2024
REPLY: N/A
RELIEF
REQUESTED: Defendant requests that the Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings be
granted without Leave to Amend.
______________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant
First Iemelif Church in Duarte’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2023, Adriel Garcia,
a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem Saul Garcia (Plaintiff),
filed a Complaint against three separate entities: (1) Church of the Foothill
Methodist; (2) Foothills United Methodist Church; and (3) First Iemelif Church
in Duarte (Iemelif). The Complaint contains two causes of action both alleged
against all three defendants: (a) negligence and (b) premises liability.
The Complaint stems from allegations
that an unnamed Pastor who was employed by Iemelif, sexually abused Plaintiff
in or around 2015 and 2016. (Complaint, ¶9.) The Complaint goes on to allege
that Iemelif knew or should have known that the Pastor was acting
inappropriately with minor attendees of Iemelif. (Id. at ¶14.)
The motion now before the Court is Defendant
First Iemelif Church in Duarte’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the
Motion). Plaintiff files an opposition.
DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
“The grounds for a motion for
judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the complaint or from a
matter of which the court may take judicial notice.” (Richardson-Tunnell v.
School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App. 4th 1056,
1061, disapproved on other grounds by Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot.
Dist. (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 798, 815 n.8. Accord Bufil
v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202, disapproved on other grounds by Noel
v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 955, 986; Saltarelli &
Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
A motion for judgment on the
pleadings involves the same type of procedures that apply to a general
demurrer. (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees
(2007) 157 Cal.App. 4th 1056, 1061,
disapproved on other grounds by
Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot. Dist. (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 798,
815 n.8; Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1064.)
In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether
properly pled factual allegations, assumed to be true and liberally construed,
are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Stone Street Capital, LLC
v. Cal. State Lottery Com'n (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 116; Fire Ins.
Exchange v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 446, 452-53.) A motion for
judgment on the pleadings does not lie as to only part of a cause of
action. (Fire Ins. Exch. v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)
“[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the office of a general, not
a special, demurrer...” Fabbro v. Dardi & Co. (1949) 93 Cal. App. 2d
247, 252.)
Analysis
Both causes of action alleged
require the same elements: Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1)
“the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3)
“proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre
v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) “Premises
liability is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right
to control and manage the premises.” (Kesner
v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158, quotation marks omitted.)
Plaintiff alleges both negligence and premises liability against Iemelif. However,
as explained below there are not sufficient facts to allege a duty between
Iemelif and Plaintiff, nor are there facts supporting the contention that
Iemelif knew or should have known that the Pastor was committing sexual abuse
sufficient to maintain the element of breach. Accordingly, the Motion is
granted but Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend.
Duty
When
analyzing duty in the context of third-party acts, courts distinguish between
“misfeasance” and “nonfeasance.” “Misfeasance exists when the defendant is
responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse, i.e., defendant has
created a risk. Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed
to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention. (Citation.)” (Melton v.
Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 532.) A legal duty may
arise from affirmative acts “where the defendant, through his or her own action
(misfeasance) has made the plaintiff's position worse and has created a
foreseeable risk of harm from the third person. In such cases the question of
duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care…By contrast, nonfeasance
generally does not give rise to a legal duty.” (Id.)
However,
there is an exception to the general rule nonfeasance gives rise to no duty,
and that is the special relationship doctrine. Plaintiff contends in their
opposition papers that a special relationship existed between Plaintiff and
Iemelif.
California courts have recognized
several examples of where the special relationship doctrine applies:
“Relationships between parents and children, colleges and students, employers
and employees, common carriers and passengers, and innkeepers and guests, are
all examples of special relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty to
protect.” (Golick v. State of California (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
1127, 1140.) Under the special-relationship doctrine, whereby a duty of care to
protect a victim from third party harm may arise when the defendant has a
special relationship with either the victim or the third party, a “special
relationship” between the defendant and the victim is one that gives the victim
a right to expect protection from the defendant, while a special relationship
between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that entails an
ability to control the third party's conduct. (Id. Also see generally,
REST 2D TORTS § 315.) Plaintiff is alleging the former, that Iemelif as the
defendant had a duty to protect Plaintiff.
Plaintiff analogizes the instant
case to Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 657 (Doe). There, the Court of Appeal found that
a special relationship did exist between the defendant Roman Catholic
Archdiocese and the plaintiff a former catechism student. The Court noted that
the features of a special relationship were satisfied, specifically, that while
in catechism classes, plaintiff and his parents relied on the Archdiocese for
plaintiff’s protection and that the Archdiocese had “superior control over the
means of protection.” (Doe, 671-672.) However, the Complaint here is
lacking any detail regarding such a feature. Although the Complaint notes that
Plaintiff “was an attendee parishioner” of Iemelif, it is unclear whether this
was a service attended by Plaintiff with his family, or whether this was a
class attended only by Plaintiff and children of similar age, with the Pastor
expected to provide protection. The latter scenario may trigger an affirmative
duty to protect students. (See Roman Catholic Bishop v. Superior Court
(1996) 42 Cal.App. 4th 1556, 1567. Although the Complaint points out
that the sexual abuse occurred on Iemelif’s property, the Complaint provides no
facts as to how Iemelif maintained superior control over the means of
protection while Plaintiff was a parishioner. Without these details, duty
cannot be properly alleged.
Breach
Similarly, breach of that duty
fails. As specific to premises liability, a dangerous condition needs to be
established in order to successfully allege such a cause of action. Upon
opposition, Plaintiff argues that the specific layout of Iemelif’s church was
the dangerous condition because it created opportunities for the Pastor to
seclude victims and commit the abuse. (Opposition Papers, 10:9-12.) However,
those allegations are nowhere in the Complaint. Moreover, there is no
information on how Iemelif knew or should have known about a problematic
layout, or about the sexual abuse committed by the Pastor. There are no facts
that detail prior complaints, prior reports, or prior criminal allegations
against the Pastor or any other employee at Iemelif. Accordingly, the Motion is
granted.
Leave to Amend
Leave to
amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful
amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to
amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment”]. Also see Code Civ. Proc. §438(h)(1) and People v. $20,000 U.S.
Currency (1991) 235 Cal.3d 682, 692.)
As there is
reasonable possibility of successful amendment. Plaintiff is given 20 days
leave to amend the Complaint.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
Defendant First Iemelif Church in Duarte’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend.
Moving
Party to give notice.
Dated: May 30, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court
indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org