Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV00004, Date: 2024-07-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV00004    Hearing Date: July 11, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:     July 11, 2024                                       TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         Victoria Lynet v. Jamie Lynn Raymond et al.

CASE NO.:                 23AHCV00004

DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendants:

                                                            (1)       Jamie Lynn Raymond a/k/a Jamie Lynn Mills

                                                            (2)       Paul Raymond

RESPONDING PARTY:     Plaintiff Victoria Lynet

SERVICE:                             OK / Unopposed

OPPOSITION:                      OK / Unopposed

REPLY:                                  OK / Unopposed

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

BACKGROUND

This is a tenant harassment and habitability case. Plaintiff Victoria Lynet sued defendants Jamie Lynn Raymond a/k/a Jamie Lynn Mills and Paul Raymond on January 3, 2023. Plaintiff filed her operative first amended complaint (FAC) as a matter of right on July 24, 2023, asserting causes of action for:

            1.         Unlawful Actions to Influence a Tenant to Vacate (Civ. Code, § 1940.2),

            2.         Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment,

            3.         Unfair Business Practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200),

            4.         Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,

            5.         Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability,

            6.         General Negligence,

            7.         Gross Negligence,

            8.         Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and

            9.         Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability [duplicative].

(The Court adopts the causes of action as they are labeled in the body of the FAC, rather than the caption; for the fourth and ninth causes of action, the two lists do not match.)

On September 14, 2023, Defendants each demurred separately to the FAC. On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff opposed. On May 7, 2024, Defendants replied.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ demurrers are sustained in their entirety, with leave to amend granted as to all except the seventh and ninth causes of action.

OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

N/A.

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

N/A.

LEGAL STANDARD

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.)

When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged – but only the facts alleged – in the complaint as true. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

DISCUSSION

            1. The FAC Fails to State Any Claim

Plaintiff’s FAC does not satisfy fact pleading standards. “A complaint, with certain exceptions, need only contain a ‘statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1)) ...’ .” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn.3.) Notwithstanding that forgiving standard, “[t]o survive demurrer, a plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. (See Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719.) 

Here, the only factual allegations in the FAC appear in paragraphs sixteen (16) and seventeen (17). These paragraphs state the address of Plaintiff’s unit and the date when Defendants’ tortious conduct allegedly began. Otherwise they only list several ways in which the unit is uninhabitable and accuse Defendants of “[m]aking a false report to an animal humane society” about Defendant’s dog, “[r]epeatedly surveilling and intimidating Plaintiff”, and “[p]ressuring Plaintiff to vacate and serving notices to vacate that do not satisfy legal requirements.” (FAC, ¶ 17.)

Without further specifics, Defendants cannot prepare a defense to these allegations. The FAC is fatally uncertain and fails to state any claim.

The FAC is sufficiently specific to persuade the Court that Plaintiff can supply more details upon amendment. The Court grants leave for Plaintiff to do so, as to all except her seventh and ninth causes of action, discussed below.

            2. Seventh Cause of Action for Gross Negligence

Although “gross negligence” commonly has relevance in tort actions where defendants raise assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, it is not a standalone cause of action under California law. (See id. at pp. 779-780, citing Continental Ins. Co. v. American Protection Industries (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 322; see also Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 546, 552, fn.3 [“California does not recognize a distinct common law cause of action for gross negligence apart from negligence.”].)

Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

            3. Ninth Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability

Plaintiff’s fifth and ninth causes of action are both described in the body of the FAC as claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. (The FAC’s caption describes them as claims under the Los Angeles Municipal Code and a cause of action for punitive damages, but the body of the complaint makes no reference to the Municipal Code under the relevant heading, and punitive damages is not a cause of action.) Because the claims are plainly duplicative, the demurrer to the latter is sustained without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendants’ demurrers are sustained in their entirety, with leave to amend granted as to all except the seventh and ninth causes of action.

Plaintiff is ordered to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of this order.

Moving party to give notice.

Dated:   July 11, 2024                                     ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org