Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV00346, Date: 2023-09-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV00346 Hearing Date: September 7, 2023 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: September
7, 2023 TRIAL
DATE: No date set.
CASE: REEM ESTRADA, an
individual, v. JOSE ANGEL MALDONADO, JR., an individual; and DOES 1 to 5,
inclusive.
CASE NO.: 23AHCV00346
DEMURRER
WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Jose Angel Maldonado, Jr.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Reem Estrada
SERVICE: Filed April 3, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed April 25, 2023
REPLY: Filed August 31, 2023
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s
first, second, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Defendant also moves to
strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff Reem
Estrada’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that Defendant Jose Angels Maldonado, Jr.
(“Defendant”) threatened, manipulated, and physically assaulted her. Plaintiff
filed this complaint on February 15, 2023, alleging six causes of action for
(1) gender violence in violation of Civil Code section 52.4, (2) Ralphs Civil
Rights Act – violation of Civil Code section 51.7, (3) battery, (4) assault,
(5) interference with exercise of civil rights – violation of Civil Code
section 52.1, and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s first, second, and sixth causes of action is OVERRULED.
Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
Defendant’s
motion to strike is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
Demurrer
A general
demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn
v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc. section
430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or
other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is
whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters,
states a cause of action. (Hahn v.
Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Additionally, a
special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is
uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of
San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based
on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the
pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if
the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably
respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)
Motion to Strike
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading
may serve and file a notice of motion to strike a pleading or any part
thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The
court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms
it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in
any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may
also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity
with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one
that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither
pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a
demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the
complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for
moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
DISCUSSION
First
Cause of Action for Gender Violence
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for
gender violence – violation of Civil Code section 52.4.
“Any person who has been subjected to gender violence may
bring a civil action for damages against any responsible party.” (Civ. Code § 52.4,
subdivision (a).) “For
purposes of this section, ‘gender violence’ is a form of sex discrimination and
means either of the following: [¶] (1) One or more acts that would constitute a
criminal offense under state law that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,
committed at least in part based on the gender of the victim, whether or not
those acts have resulted in criminal complaints, charges, prosecution, or
conviction. [¶] (2) A
physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive
conditions, whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal complaints,
charges, prosecution, or conviction.” (Civ. Code §
52.4, subd. (c).)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
allegations are too conclusory to state a cause of action. However, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant threatened to physically harm her, prevented her from
escaping, and physically assaulted her. (Complaint ¶ 13.) Further, Plaintiff
alleges Defendant committed those actions at least in part based on Plaintiff’s
gender. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant told her that
he hates her and is going to murder her because she was leaving him. (Id. ¶
15.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to
allege a cause of aciton. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s
first cause of action is overruled.
Second Cause of Action for
Violation of Civil Code section 51.7.
Defendant also demurrers to
Plaintiff’s allegations that he violated the Ralph Civil Rights Act (“Ralph
Act”). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are too conclusory.
“Under the Ralph
Act, a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened or committed violent
acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing
so was a prohibited discriminatory motive, or that the defendant aided,
incited, or conspired in the denial of a protected right.” (Gabrielle A. v.
County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated
the Ralph Act by threating her and a committing violent act against her based
on her sex. (Complaint ¶ 30.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of
action is overruled.
Fifth Cause
of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 52.1.
Defendant
demurrers to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for violation of Civil Code
section 52.1, known as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act.
“ ‘The essence of
a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., “threats,
intimidation or coercion”), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing
something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff
to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.’ ” (Shoyoye
v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 955-56.)
“ ‘[The Bane Act] was
intended to address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights,
not just any tort. The act of interference with a constitutional right must
itself be deliberate or spiteful.’ [Citation.] Thus, where the plaintiff
alleges wrongful detention, the statute requires a showing of threatening
conduct independent from the alleged wrongful detention.” (Julian v. Mission
Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395.)
Here, Plaintiff does not clearly
identify the constitutional or legal right she argues was infringed. Plaintiff
states a litany of rights but fails to establish her allegations state anything
more than tortious conduct. Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim.
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for violation of
Civil Code section 52.1 is sustained.
Sixth Cause of Action for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant
demurrers to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
“ ‘ “[T]o state a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff
must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's
intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing
emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional
distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by
the defendant's outrageous conduct.” ’ ” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management
Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)
Here,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in outrageous conduct by threating
her, holding her against her will, threatening to kill her, and battering her.
(Complaint ¶¶ 66-67.) Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant acted with reckless disregard. (Id. ¶ 67.) She alleges
she suffered severe emotional distress and causation. (Id. ¶ 68.)
Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim. Defendant’s demurrer
to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of aciton is overruled.
Motion
to Strike
Defendant
moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.
Punitive
damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (a). A plaintiff seeking punitive damages “must include
specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive,
fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages. [Citation.]
Punitive damages my not be pleaded generally.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
1137, 1193.) “Malice” is conduct intended by
the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is
carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety
of others. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
Here,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant assaulted her, physically attacked her, prevented
her from leaving, and made threats that he would kill her. (Complaint ¶¶ 13-15.) Plaintiff has sufficiently plead a basis for a prayer
for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s first, second, and sixth causes of action is OVERRULED.
Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 DAYS leave
to amend.
Defendant’s
motion to strike is DENIED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
Dated: September 7,
2023 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an
email to the court indicating their
intention to submit.
Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely. alhdeptx@lacourt.org