Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV01241, Date: 2024-07-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV01241 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: July
31, 2024 TRIAL DATE: TBD
CASE: APRIL A. VERLATO, an
individual, v. CHRISTINA ARREOLA, aka CHRISTINA VELOZA, an individual; and DOES
1 through 20, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 23AHCV01241
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MOTION
TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF BUSINESS RECORDS
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Christina Arreola, aka
Christina Veloz
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
April A. Verlato
SERVICE: Filed May 3, 2024
OPPOSITION: Filed July 18, 2024
REPLY: Filed July 24, 2024
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant moves to quash
the deposition subpoena Plaintiff served on the Employment Development
Department.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of
Plaintiff April A. Verlato’s claim that the Defendant Christina Arreola (aka
Christina Veloz) (“Defendant”) embezzled money from Plaintiff’s law firm by manipulated
the law firm’s payroll system to receive a much higher pay that she was
entitled to.
On June 1, 2023,
Plaintiff filed the operative complaint against Defendant and Does 1 through
20, alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) conversion/embezzlement,
and (3) breach of fiduciary duty.
On October 4, 2023,
Defendant filed her answer to the complaint. On the same day, Defendant filed a
cross-complaint against the Law Office of April A. Verlato, Plaintiff and Roes
1-150, alleging fifteen causes of action for: (1) pregnancy discrimination, (2)
hostile work environment, (3) failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent
harassment, discrimination and retaliation, (4) retaliation, (5) wrongful
termination in violation of public policy, (6) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, (7) intentional misclassification as exempt employee, (8)
failure to pay overtime, (9) failure to reimburse necessary business expenses,
(10) failure to provide lawful meal periods, (11) failure to provide lawful
rest periods, (12) failure to pay earned wages, (13) failure to furnish
compliant wage statements, (14) waiting time penalties, and (15) unlawful
business practices.
On November 7, 2024,
Plaintiff filed her answer to the cross-complaint.
Now, Defendant moves to
quash the deposition subpoena for production of business records that Plaintiff
served on the Employment Development Department (“EDD”). Plaintiff opposed the
instant motion.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
motion to quash the deposition subpoena for production of business records is GRANTED.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of
Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a), provides: “If a subpoena
requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other
things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of
a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in
subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and
an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely,
modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as
the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court
may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from
unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the
right of privacy of the person.”
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to quash a subpoena Plaintiff
served on the EDD that sought “Any and all records, papers, charts, documents,
reports, statements, receipts, communications relating to or referring to
[Defendant]; telephone messages and all types of communications,
correspondence, income and wages information, disability application and
related documents or claims, business records and/or similar items of
documentation, relating to [Defendant]” from January 2022 to present. (Notice of Motion at pg. 2; Knez Decl. ¶ 2,
Exh. A.) Defendant argues that the subpoena should be quashed because the
records sought is protected by absolute privilege and the category under the
subpoena is overly board. (Motion at pp. 2-5.)
As to the
former argument, Unemployment Insurance Code § 1094 makes clear that
information obtained in the administration of the unemployment and disability
insurance laws is for the exclusive use and information of the Director of
Employment Development in the discharge of duties and must not be open to the
public. (Unemp. Ins. Code § 1094(a).) Also, this information is not admissible
in evidence in any action or special proceeding, “other than one arising out of
the provisions of [Section 1094] or one described in Section 1095.” (Id.
at subd. (b).)
The foregoing provisions manifest a
clear legislative purpose to preserve the confidentiality of information
submitted to the EDD. (Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 274.) EDD information may be used, to the extent
necessary, in certain limited scenarios. (Unemp. Ins. Code § 1095.) Such
purposes include presenting a claim for benefits, acquainting a worker with
rights to benefits, furnishing employers with information enabling it to
fulfill its obligations and safeguard its rights, etc. (Id.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the underlying
subpoena is improper because the information obtained by the EDD is presumed
confidential. Notably, Plaintiff’s opposition fails to address this issue of
absolute privilege. Rather, Plaintiff contends that the information sought by
the underlying subpoena is relevant to both parties’ claims and that any
privacy concerns are outweighed by Plaintiff’s interest in obtaining the
subject discovery. (Opposition at pp. 3-5.) While Plaintiff may claim that
Defendant filed a claim with the EDD while pretending to be Plaintiff, Plaintiff
has failed to show how this would fall under one of the exceptions prescribed
under Unemployment Insurance Code § 1095.
Accordingly, because the records
sought by the underlying deposition subpoena are protected by absolute
privilege per Unemployment Insurance Code § 1094, the instant motion is granted
on this ground. In the interest of judicial economy, the Court declines to
address Defendant’s second argument that the subpoena is overly broad.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
motion to quash the deposition subpoena is GRANTED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
Dated: July 31, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court