Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV01367, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV01367 Hearing Date: March 12, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: March 12, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: JANE SM ROE,
individually, v. DEFENDANT DOE 1, POLICE AGENCY, DEFENDANT DOE 2, CITY; and
DOES 3 through 100, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 23AHCV01367
MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Doe 2, City, (“Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
SM Roe (“Plaintiff”)
SERVICE: Filed January 2, 2024
OPPOSITION: Filed February 28, 2024
REPLY: Filed March 5, 2024
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant moves for judgment on
the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s FAC.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff’s claim that
she was sexually assaulted by a public employee between 1982 and 1986.
Plaintiff filed this revival action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
340.1. On August 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint alleging
four causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligent hiring, supervision, or
retention, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) sexual
battery.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s motion for judgment on
the pleading is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the
“complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against that defendant.”¿ (Code Civ Proc sections 438(b)(1) and
(c)(1)(B)(ii).)¿ The grounds for motion provided for in this section
shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of
which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. section 438(d).)¿
Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.¿ (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.¿(1998)
67 Cal.App.4th¿ 995,¿999.) The
standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially
the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of
the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears
that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v.
O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v.
California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)
DISCUSSION
Defendant
moves for judgment on the pleading on the grounds that Plaintiff’s FAC fails as
a matter of law. Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s direct claims against
it fail based on immunity. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that she is not
making a claim for direct liability against Defendant.
“Except as otherwise provided by
statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is
liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private
person.” (Gov. Code section 820, subd. (a).) “Except as otherwise provided by
statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act
or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the
discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” (Gov. Code
section 820.2.)
“In other words, ‘the general rule
is that an employee of a public entity is liable for his torts to the same
extent as a private person (§ 820, subd. (a)) and
the public entity is vicariously liable for any injury which its employee
causes (§ 815.2, subd. (a)) to the same extent as a private
employer (§ 815, subd. (b)).’ ” (C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 868.)
It appears that the parties are in
accord that Plaintiff, in this current situation, cannot allege sufficient
basis to bring a direct claim against Defendant. Further, it seems the parties
do not contest that Defendant may be liable based on vicarious liability
pursuant to statute. In reply, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff argues
her claims are based on vicarious liability, “any claims based on direct
liability must be dismissed with prejudice.” (Reply at p. 1:19-20.) However,
Defendant fails to identify which claims it asserts is deficient as a direct
claim as opposed to vicarious liability claim. Thus, Defendant’s arguments here
are rejected.
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff
cannot allege a claim for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention against
a public entity. “Public entities are correspondingly liable for the negligent
acts or omissions of their employees acting within the scope of their
employment except where either the employee or the public entity is immunized
from liability by statute. (§ 815.2.)” (Collins
v. County of San Diego (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1048.) Defendant’s
arguments are based on an incorrect statement of law. Defendant’s arguments
here are similar to its previous arguments and an attempt to obfuscate the
facts contained in Plaintiff’s allegations. “[T]he allegations of the complaint
must be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and liberally construed
with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.” (Venice
Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547,
1557.)
The
court declines to follow Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff’s allegations
fail as a matter of law, especially in light of the fact that Defendant fails
to point to how or where the FAC fails on the face of the pleadings.
Defendant
lastly argues that Plaintiff’s claims, and section 340.1 as a whole, runs afoul
of the California Constitution as an unlawful gift of public fund.
“ ‘Section 6 of article XVI of the California Constitution provides
that the Legislature has no power “to make any gift or authorize the making of
any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or
other corporation ....” The term “gift” in the constitutional provision
“includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or
enforceable claim,” even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.’ ” (In
re William M.W. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 573, 594.)
“ ‘It is well
settled that the primary question to be considered in determining whether an
appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift is whether the funds
are to be used for a public or private purpose. If they are to be used for
a public purpose, they are not a gift within the meaning of this constitutional
prohibition. [Citation.]’ ”(Jordan v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450.)
Defendant fails
to demonstrate that section 340.1 is unlawful gift of public fund because it
fails to address the threshold question of whether the fund is used for private
or public purposes.
“ ‘The overall
goal of section 340.1 is to allow victims of childhood sexual abuse a longer
time period in which to bring suit against their abusers. [Citation.] The
legislative history makes this abundantly clear. The statute has been amended
numerous times since its enactment in 1986, to enlarge the period for filing
claims “ ‘to hold molesters accountable for their behavior so that they are not
“off the hook” as soon as their victims reach age 21,’ ” [citation] [and] to
extend the expanded limitations period to actions not just against molesters,
but against “any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff,
where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of
the childhood sexual abuse....” [Citations.] Each time, plaintiffs' access to
the courts was expanded.’ ” (Doe v.
City of Los Angeles (2007) 42
Cal.4th 531, 545.)
The case law discussion section 340.1 supports the finding that it is not an appropriation of funds used
for private purposes. Defendant cites to Bourn
v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal.321 to support its
claims that section 340.1 is unlawful. Defendant asserts that the “California
Supreme Court has long interpreted this provision against the gift of public
funds to mean the Legislature has no power to create liability against the
state for past acts of
negligence, because doing so would
constitute an unlawful gift.” (Motion at p. 7:20-21.) This is an incorrect
statement of the law.
In Bourn, supra, the petitioner had sought to enforce an act of legislation that
specifically stated he would personally be the recipient of funds. (93 Cal. At
p. 326.) The Court held “[a] legislative appropriation made to an individual in
payment of a claim for damages on account of personal injuries sustained by him
while in its service, and for which the state is not responsible, either upon
general principles of law or by reason of some previous statute creating such
liability, is a gift, within the meaning of the constitution.” (Id. at
p. 328.) Defendant’s arguments both misread and seek to enlarge the ruling in Bourn.
As previously stated, Defendant fails to demonstrate that section 340.1 is an
appropriate of funds for private purposes to constitute an unlawful
gift. Thus, Defendant’s arguments fail here as well.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion for judgment on
the pleading is DENIED.
Moving
Party to provide notice.
Dated: March 12, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an
email to the court indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org