Judge Joel L. Lofton, Case Number: 23AHCV01642, Date: 2024-07-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV01642, Date: 2024-07-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV01642 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: X

Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE: July 10, 2024 TRIAL DATE: September 10, 2024

CASE: MARTHA GONZALEZ CHAIDEZ AKA MARTHA GONZALEZ v. FCA US LLC; CHAMPION DODGE, LLC dba CHAMPION CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM FIAT; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive.

CASE NO.: 23AHCV01642

(1) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES FROM DEFENDANT FCA US LLC, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

(2) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES FROM DEFENDANT FCA US LLC, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidez

RESPONDING PARTY: FCA US LLC

SERVICE: Filed April 9, 2024

RELIEF REQUESTED

Compel Defendant FCA US LLC to provide code-compliant responses to Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidez’s First Set of Requests for Production, Nos. 45-46, and First Set of Special Interrogatories, Nos. 45-48.

In addition, impose total sanctions of $5,240 ($2,620 per motion) against the defendant and its counsel of record, Ongaro P.C.

BACKGROUND

This is a lemon law action. Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidez aka Martha Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA US LLC (“FCA”) for a vehicle (a 2020 RAM 1500). After defects and nonconformities manifested in the vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to an authorized FCA repair facility for repair. However, FCA was unable to conform the vehicle to the applicable warranties.

FCA breached its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act by failing to remedy the defects and nonconformities or give restitution.

On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motions to compel FCA’s further responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production (“RPD”) and Special Interrogatories (“SROG”).

On June 25, 2024, FCA filed its opposition to the RPD motion.

On June 26, 2024, FCA filed its opposition to the SROG motion.

On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed her reply to both oppositions.

A jury trial is set for September 10, 2024.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff’s motions to compel further responses are GRANTED. Defendant FCA US LLC is ordered to serve verified, further responses to Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez Chaidez’s First Set of Requests for Production, Nos. 45-46, and First Set of Special Interrogatories, Nos. 45-48, within 30 days of this ruling. The defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff total sanctions of $2,840.

LEGAL STANDARD

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: ¶ (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. ¶ (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. ¶ (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

Similarly, “[o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: ¶ (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. ¶ (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. ¶ (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

“Except as provided in subdivision (j) [which concerns electronically stored information] the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

Motions to compel further response to interrogatories and requests for production must be brought within 45 days of service of the verified response, supplemental verified response, or on a date to which the propounding and responding parties have agreed to in writing; otherwise, the propounding party waives the right to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c); 2031.310, subd. (c); but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to objections-only responses].)

“[T]he time within which to make a motion to compel production of documents is mandatory and jurisdictional just as it is for motions to compel further answers to interrogatories.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The 45-day deadline “is ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them.” (Ibid.)

The Court finds the instant motions timely. According to Plaintiff’s counsel declaration, FCA served its verifications to its responses on February 22, 2024. (Declarations of Armando Lopez, filed April 9, 2024 (“Lopez Decl.”), ¶ 4; Exhibits B – copies of the responses, Proof of Service pages [showing FCA served the responses electronically].) 45 days from February 22, 2024, was Sunday, April 7, 2024. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B) extends by two court days “any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document … by electronic means ….” Here, since service was made electronically, the deadline was extended by two court days to Tuesday, April 9, 2024. Plaintiff filed the motions on that date. Therefore, they are timely.

B. Meet and Confer

The instant motions to compel further responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer requirement for each motion. (Lopez Decl., ¶¶ 5-9.) FCA appears to argue in its oppositions that the meet and confer process was insufficient. However, that is not grounds for denying the motions. Accordingly, the Court will rule on the motions on their merits.

C. Separate Statement

The motions must be accompanied by a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(2), (3).) “A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)

Here, Plaintiff has satisfied the separate statement requirement of each motion.

D. RPDs at Issue

Plaintiff moves to compel FCA’s further responses to RPDs No. 45-46. Those RPDs asked FCA to produce the following, respectively.

· All DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by owners of the 2020 RAM 1500 vehicle regarding any of the complaints that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented to YOUR or YOUR authorized repair facilities for repair during the warranty period.

· All DOCUMENTS evidencing warranty repairs to 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles regarding any of the components that YOU or YOUR authorized repair facilities performed repairs on under warranty.

“The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: ¶ (1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities. ¶ (2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item. ¶ (3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).)

Here, FCA objected to the RPDs, arguing that the requests were vague, ambiguous, overly broad, sought irrelevant information, and sought information protected by the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine. (Separate Statement, pp. 1:6-18, 5:15-28.)

In its opposition to the RPD motion, FCA argues that the RPD motion is moot because, on June 25, 2024, it served further supplemental responses to the RPDs, with verifications to follow. (Opposition to RPD Motion, p. 1:14-18.)

However, the request to compel FCA’s further responses to RPD Nos. 45-46 is not moot because FCA failed to serve verifications. As Plaintiff argues in her reply, “[u]nsworn responses are tantamount to no responses at all.” (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.)

Given that FCA is not opposed to supplementing its initial response to RPD Nos. 45-46, the request to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 45-46 is GRANTED.

E. SROGs at Issue

Plaintiff also moves to compel FCA’s further responses to Plaintiff’s SROG Nos. 45-48, which asked FCA the following, respectively.

· At the time of release for the 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles, state your anticipated range for repairs per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000).

· State the repairs per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000) for 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles.

· Identify in order the five symptoms with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand.

· Identify in order the five components with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2020 RAM 1500 vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand.

“If an objection is made to an interrogatory or to a part of an interrogatory, the specific ground for the objection shall be set forth clearly in the response.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (b).)

Here, FCA objected to each of the SROGs above, arguing that they seek irrelevant information, are overly broad, and are not limited to any claim, defect, or nonconformity in this case.

In opposition to the SROG motion, FCA argues that the request to compel further responses to SROG Nos. 45-48 is moot because it served supplemental responses and is working to obtain verifications for those responses.

However, responses without verifications amount to no responses, as stated above.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to compel FCA’s further responses to SROG Nos. 45-48 is GRANTED.

F. Request for Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks total sanctions of $5,240 ($2,620 per motion) against the defendant and its counsel of record, Ongaro P.C.

The requested amount of $2,620 consists of 2.4 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent on the moving papers, 2 hours counsel anticipated spending reviewing the opposition and drafting a reply, 2 hours counsel anticipates spending preparing for and attending the hearing, a total of 6.4 hours at counsel’s billing rate of $400 per hour ($,2,560), plus a $60 filing fee. (Lopez Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.)

Under the relevant statutes, a court shall impose monetary sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand or interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310, subd. (h); 2030.300, subd. (d).)

Here, FCA argues that sanctions are not warranted because Plaintiff prematurely abandoned the meet and confer efforts, did not have legitimate grounds for bringing the motion, the defendant substantially complied with the discovery requests, and even though the defendant’s objections were valid, it willingly supplemented its responses.

However, FCA did not serve verifications. In addition, Plaintiff did not prematurely abandon the meet and confer process if she only had 45 days under the relevant statute to bring the motion or lose that right. Although FCA states it would have extended the motion to compel deadline, Plaintiff was not required to agree to an extension. Finally, FCA’s responses to the RPDs were not code-compliant. According to the relevant statute, “If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (b).) Here, FCA did not comply with subdivision (a) of that statute.

Therefore, the Court finds the imposition of sanctions proper.

However, the Court finds the requested sanctions of $2,620 per motion excessive because some papers were nearly identical to each other (specifically, the declarations filed in support of the moving papers, opposition papers, and reply papers), making it unlikely that Plaintiff’s counsel spent the same amount of time on each motion. It is also unlikely that Plaintiff’s counsel will spend 4 hours at the hearing (i.e., 2 hours per motion).

Accordingly, the Court will only impose sanctions of $1,420 (i.e., 3.4 hours at counsel’s billing rate of $400 per hour, plus a $60 filing fee) against FCA per motion (total of $2,840).

CONCLUSION

Moving party to give notice.

Dated: July 10, 2024 ___________________________________

Joel L. Lofton

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org