Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV01745, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV01745 Hearing Date: March 12, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: March 12, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: JOSE SANTOYO, an
individual; ROSA SANTOYO, an individual; v. SONIA R. MACIAS, an individual;
SONIA R. MACIAS AS TRUSTEE OF THE SONIA R. MACIAS REVOKABLE TRUST; and DOES
1-15.
CASE NO.: 23AHCV01745
DEMURRER
WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Sonia R. Macias,
individually and as Trustee of the Sonia R. Macias Revokable Trust
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs
Jose Santoyo and Rosa Santoyo
SERVICE: Filed October 25 and 26, 2023.
OPPOSITION: Filed February 28, 2024
REPLY: Filed March 5, 2024
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiffs’
first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of
action.
Defendant moves to
strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief, punitive damages, and
attorney’s fees.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiffs Jose
Santoyo and Rosa Santoyo’s (“Plaintiffs”) claim that they leased property
located at 2149 Findlay Avenue, Monterey Park, California (“Subject Property”
or “property”). Plaintiffs filed this complaint on July 31, 2023, alleging nine
causes of action for (1) breach of warranty of habitability, (2) negligence,
(3) nuisance, (4) violation of the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act, (5) violation of
Civil Code section 789.3, (6) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, (7)
constructive eviction, (8) Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.,
and (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first, sixth, and eighth causes of action are
OVERRULED.
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, fifth,
seventh and ninth causes of action is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend.
Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for
injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees is GRANTED with 15
days leave to amend.
LEGAL STANDARD
A general
demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn
v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc. section
430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or
other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is
whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters,
states a cause of action. (Hahn v.
Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Additionally, a special
demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain,
ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code
Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford
Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180,
1191.) A demurrer based
on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the
pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if
the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably
respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)
DISCUSSION
First
Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Defendant
demurrers to Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Defendant argues that
Plaintiffs’ first cause of action fails to allege specific defects in the
property and fail to indicate how the defects state violations of pertinent
laws.
“ ‘[A] warranty of habitability is
implied by law in residential leases.’ [Citation.] The elements of a cause of
action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability ‘are the existence of
a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability,
notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the
tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time
to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.’ ” (Peviani v. Arbors at
California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891.)
As a
preliminary note, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs should be held to a
heightened level of pleading (without any legal authority cited in support)
than is applicable here. Further, Plaintiffs alleges that the property had mold,
plumbing, safety, and carpeting issues (Complaint ¶¶ 17-18; 21-22.) Additionally, Plaintiffs
allege that they provided Defendant with notice. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant failed to correct the conditions. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff
also alleges damages. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs have alleged facts
sufficient to state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs should be barred
from bringing this claim because they raised this claim in unlawful detainer
proceedings. First, Defendant does not submit any request for judicial notice
to establish the existence of the other proceedings. Additionally, “[b]ecause ‘[a]n
unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding ordinarily limited to
resolution of the question of possession[,] ... any judgment arising therefrom
generally is given limited res judicata effect.’ ” (Ayala
v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
1319, 1327.)
Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action is overruled.
Third Cause of Action For Nuisance
Defendant
demurrers to Plaintiffs’ third cause of aciton for nuisance. Defendant argues
that Plaintiff’s third cause of action is duplicative of their first cause of
action and fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim.
The elements of a claim for private
nuisance are as follows: “First, the plaintiff must prove an interference
with his use and enjoyment of its property. Second, the invasion of the
plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, i.e., it caused the plaintiff to suffer
substantial actual damage. Third, the interference with the protected interest
must not only be substantial, it must also be unreasonable,
i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Today’s
IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1176.)
Plaintiffs’ third cause of action does
not, even in general terms, state a claim for nuisance. Plaintiffs allege that
conditions on the property interfered with their use and enjoyment of the
property. (Complaint ¶¶ 46-47.) Plaintiffs allege
that the conditions of the property substantially interfered with Plaintiffs’
enjoyment of the property. (Id. ¶ 47.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege
that the interference was unreasonable. Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’
third cause of action is sustained.
Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of the
COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of
action. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient
to allege a claim for violation of the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act. In their
complaint, Plaintiffs cite SB91 sections (1) and (4) which prohibit landlords
from interrupting or terminating utility services with the intent to terminate
occupancy and prohibit landlords from bringing unlawful detainer actions based
on certain causes of action respectively. (Complaint ¶¶ 58-59.) However,
Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant terminated or interrupted utility
services with the intent to terminate occupancy or brought an unlawful detainer
claim on impermissible grounds. Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action fails to
state a claim. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is
sustained.
Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code
section 789.3
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action.
Civil Code section 789.3, subdivision (a), provides: “A landlord shall
not with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or other tenancy or
estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant as his residence
willfully cause, directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of any
utility service furnished the tenant, including, but not limited to, water,
heat, light, electricity, gas, telephone, elevator, or refrigeration, whether
or not the utility service is under the control of the landlord.” Subdivision
(b) prohibits landlords from other conducted made with the intent to terminate
the occupancy.
Like with
their allegations in their fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs do not allege
that Defendant interrupted or terminated utility services or engaged conduct
prohibited by Civil Code section 789.3, subdivision (b). In opposition,
Plaintiffs contend that the “substantial defects and the serious health an
safety hazards” are sufficient to bring a claim. (Opposition at p. 11:12.)
However, Plaintiffs arguments and allegations do not address the specific
language of the applicable statute and their cause of action fails to state a
claim.
Defendants’
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is sustained.
Sixth
Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 1942.4.
Defendant
demurrers to Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for violation of Civil Code
section 1942.4. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to allege
each requirement of section 1942.4.
Civil Code
section 1942.4 provides: “(a) A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent,
collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to
pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to
the landlord's demand or notice: [¶] (1)
The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard
characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health
and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared
substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and
Safety Code because conditions listed in
that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health,
property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.
[¶] (2) A public officer or
employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has
notified the landlord or the
landlord's agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the
nuisance or repair the substandard conditions. [¶] (3) The conditions have existed and have not
been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in
paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete
at the time of deposit in the United States mail. [¶] (4) The conditions were not
caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.”
Plaintiffs allege
that the property is deficient as required by Civil Code section 1942.4,
subdivision (a), (Complaint ¶ 70.) Plaintiffs allege that a
public officer or employee who is reasonable for the enforcement of any housing
law, after inspection, notified the landlord in writing of the obligation to
abate the nuisance. (Id. ¶ 71.) Plaintiffs allege that the conditions
have existed and not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service. (Id. ¶
72.) Plaintiffs allege that the conditions were not caused by their act or
omission. (Id. ¶ 73.) Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state
a claim for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4. Defendant’s demurrer to
Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is overruled.
Seventh
Cause of Action for Constructive Eviction
Defendant
demurrers to Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for constructive eviction. Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fail because they are duplicative of Plaintiffs’
fifth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 789.3.
Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action, although facially titled one
for “constructive eviction” cites to Civil Code section 789.3, subdivision (a).
(Complaint ¶ 78.) However, as previously
explained, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts that Defendants violated section
789.3 subdivisions (a) or (b). Additionally, although the notion of
constructive eviction is judicially recognized (see Nativi v. Detsche Bank
National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 292), Plaintiffs’ specific
allegations relying on Civil Code section 789.3 is misplaced. Plaintiffs fail
to allege sufficient grounds for their claim for constructive eviction.
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is sustained.
Eighth
Cause of Action for Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200
Defendant
demurrers to Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action for violation of the Unfair
Competition Law (“UCL”).
“Business
and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. prohibits unfair competition,
including unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts. The UCL covers a wide
range of conduct. It embraces anything that can be properly called a business
practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” (Korea Supply Co.
v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143, footnote and
internal citations omitted.)
“[A]n
act or practice is ‘unfair competition’ under the UCL if it is forbidden by law
or, even if not specifically prohibited by law, is deemed an unfair act or
practice.” (Durrel v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350,
1359.) “[A] private person has standing to bring a UCL action only if he or she
‘has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the
unfair competition.’ ” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant engaged in unlawful or unfair conduct by demanding and
collecting Plaintiffs’ rent despite the uninhabitable conditions at the
property that violated state laws and local ordinances. (Complaint ¶ 86.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant’s conduct was unfair.
(Id. ¶ 89.) Plaintiffs allege that they were harmed as a result of
Defendant’s actions. (Id. ¶ 90.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiffs’
allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation of the UCL and
standing. Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action is
overruled.
Ninth
Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s
ninth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff fails to plead that Defendant engaged in outrageous
conduct or that Defendant intended to cause Plaintiffs harm.
“ ‘ “[T]o state a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1)
outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the
plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous
conduct.” ’ ” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)
“To be
outrageous, the defendant's conduct must be either intentional or reckless, and
it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized
community. [Citation.] Furthermore, that conduct must be specifically
directed at the plaintiff.” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood
Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1045.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have pled facts
sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs
alleged that Defendant failed to remediate the mold growth and merely decided
to paint the bathroom. (Complaint ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant
demanded Plaintiffs remove a broken vehicle from the driveway and threatened
eviction. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to install
a handrail in the bathroom and failed to remedy the condition of the carpeting.
(Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiffs’ allegations, even when read together, fail
to allege that Defendant engaged in outrageous conduct with the intent or
reckless regard of the probability of causing emotional distress. Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is sustained.
Motion to Strike
Defendant moves to strike
Plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney’s
fees. Plaintiffs concede that their prayer for injunctive relief is no longer
applicable as they do not reside at the property anymore. Thus, Defendant’s
motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief is granted.
Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a). A plaintiff
seeking punitive damages “must include specific factual allegations showing that
defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim
for punitive damages. [Citation.] Punitive damages may not be pleaded
generally.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.)
Code of Civil Procedure section
3294, subdivision (c), provides definitions for each grounds to bring punitive
damages. “
‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Code Civ.
Proc. § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘Oppression’
means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “ ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the
intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
Plaintiffs again rely on the same allegations to support
their argument that they have alleged facts sufficient to state a relief for
punitive damages. However, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendant acted
with oppression, fraud, or malice sufficient to plead a prayer for punitive
damages. Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages
is granted.
Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for
attorney’s fees. “ ‘A party may not recover attorney fees unless expressly
authorized by statute or contract.’ ” (Hom v. Petrou (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 459, 464.) Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees in conjunction with
their first and fourth causes of action. However, Defendant’s demurrer to
Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action has been sustained. Plaintiffs also do not
allege any statutory or contractual basis for their prayer for attorneys’ fees
as it pertains to their first cause of action. In opposition, Plaintiffs cite
to Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (i) which provides in relevant part
that “In any action brought for damages for retaliatory eviction, the court
shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if either party
requests attorney’s fees upon the imitation of the action.” However, Plaintiffs
have not alleged a claim for retaliatory eviction nor has plaintiff made a
request for fees.
Defendant’s
motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for attorney’s fees is granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first, sixth, and eighth causes of action are
OVERRULED.
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, fifth,
seventh and ninth causes of action is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend.
Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for
injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees is GRANTED with 15
days leave to amend.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated: March 12, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an
email to the court indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org