Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV01885, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV01885    Hearing Date: March 14, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:      March 14, 2024                                               TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         PAUL VANGELISTI, MALGORZATA VANGELISTI v. CITY OF PASADENA, a municipal entity; DANIEL KOES, an individual, and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive.  

CASE NO.:                 23AHCV01885

MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Daniel Koes (“Koes”)

RESPONDING PARTY:      Defendant City of Pasadena (the “City”)

SERVICE:                              Filed February 21, 2024

OPPOSITION:                       Filed March 1, 2024

REPLY:                                   Filed March 6, 2024

RELIEF REQUESTED

             Koes moves for determination of good faith settlement based on his settlement for $80,000 with Plaintiffs.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises out of Plaintiffs Paul Vangelisti and Malgorzata Vangelisti (“Plaintiffs”) claims that Paul tripped and fell on an improperly maintained sidewalk. Plaintiffs filed this complaint on August 18, 2023.

TENTATIVE RULING

            Koes’ motion for determination of good faith settlement is GRANTED.

OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

            The City’s objections to the declaration of Daniel Koes are overruled.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors”. (Code Civ. Proc. section 877.6, subd. (a)(1).) “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 877.6, subd. (c).)

            “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 877.6, subd. (c).) “Accordingly, a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury. Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.” (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)

DISCUSSION

            Koes moves for determination of the good faith of the settlement he entered into with Plaintiffs. Koes provides that he has agreed to settle with Plaintiffs in the amount of $80,000. (Walshok Decl. ¶ 4.) Koes provides that Plaintiff’s medical costs were calculated at $22,843.51. The court notes that while Koes provides that the information was disclosed during discovery, Koes has not submitted any evidence establishing the figure for purposes of this motion. Koes also provides his policy limit is $1,000,000.00. (Motion at p. 2:15.) The City argues that the settlement was not made in good faith.

“If the good faith settlement is contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the non-settlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. (Fisher v. Superior Court (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 47; § 877.6, subd. (d).) If contested, declarations by the non-settlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party to file responsive counter declarations to negate the lack of good faith asserted by the non-settling contesting party.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.)       

One consideration for whether a settlement was made in good faith is “whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The California Supreme Court, in Tech-Bilt, also stated that relevant factors include “a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.” (Ibid.)

            “Accordingly, a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury. Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.” (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.) “The Tech–Bilt factors are nonexhaustive and ‘may not apply in all cases.’ [Citation.] Further, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 894, 909.)

            The City argues that Koes’ settlement with Plaintiff was not in good faith because Koes’ proportionate liability is greater than the City’s liability. The City argues that Koes is the party responsible for the sidewalk and bears greater liability in this case. The City provides its understanding is that fee title of the sidewalk and parkway at issue are vested in the abutting property owner, Koes. (Wu-Bowman Decl. ¶ 5.) The City also provides that it does not water the trees planted at the property at issue in this case and that it is Koes’ duty to water the trees in front. (Graham Decl. ¶ 4.) The City also briefly argues that Koes’ estimation of total recovery is unsupported and Koes’ policy limit is relevant.

            In opposition, Koes argues that he does not bear a great amount of liability because it was the City’s duty to maintain the tree. Pasadena Municipal Code section 8.52.030 provides that the city manage shall “[b]y use of city employees, private contractors or authorized volunteers, plant, maintain and otherwise care for, or if necessary, remove public trees”. Koes provides that he informed the City of the dangerous condition of the sidewalk in 2018. (Koes Decl. ¶ 4.) He also provides that the City constructed the sidewalk in 2019. (Id. ¶ 7.) Koes also opines that the tree was the cause of the sidewalk’s condition. (Id. ¶¶ 3-7.) Koes also argues that his policy limit is not applicable here.

            The parties primarily argue the factual basis for liability but provide little evidentiary support. The court first analyzes other relevant Tech-bilt factors. The parties have failed to provide an estimate of plaintiff’s total recovery. Although Koes provides Plaintiff’s medical costs total $22,843.51, the evidence underpinning that assertion is not before this court. Additionally, neither party provides any other approximation. The court next notes that Koes’ attempt to settle this case weighs in his favor. Lastly, Koes’ policy limit is relevant. However, since the parties are unable to assert any other approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery, the policy limit is only marginally relevant.

            The dispositive issue is whether the City has demonstrated the settlement was made in bad faith based on Koes’ proportionate liability. The City has failed to meet its burden of proof. The City’s evidence fails to establish that Koes bears greater or sole liability. The City’s evidence provides that its employees believe the title to the sidewalk is vested in Koes but does not support it with any additional evidence. Further, the City’s citations to the Graham declaration only goes to the vested duty of watering trees planted on Koes’ property. The City does not demonstrate that Koes had a legal duty to maintain the tree or that the tree was even on Koes’ property.

            Koes’ motion for determination of good faith settlement is granted.

CONCLUSION

            Koes’ motion for determination of good faith settlement is GRANTED.

            Moving party to give notice .

Dated:   March 14, 2024                                             ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court