Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV02147, Date: 2024-05-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV02147 Hearing Date: May 7, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: May
7, 2024 TRIAL DATE: N/A
CASE: ANITA RUBY
VENTIMIGLIA and DAVID ANTHONY VENTIMIGLIA, v. ARTHUR CARLISLE and HARRIET
CARLISLE and DOES 1-10
CASE NO.: 23AHCV02147
DEMURRER
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Arthur Carlisle
and Harriet Carlisle (“Defendants”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Anita Ruby Ventimiglia and David
Anthony Ventimiglia (“Plaintiffs”)
SERVICE: Filed
December 7, 2023
OPPOSITION: Filed
April 22, 2024
REPLY: Filed
April 30, 2024
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendants demur to the
fourth cause of action for Quiet Title and the ninth cause of action for
Negligence of the Complaint. Defendants
request the Court (1) sustain the demurrer without leave to amend; (2) enter an
order dismissing the action; and (3) award Defendants costs.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an action
filed by Plaintiffs Anita and David Ventimiglia (collectively “Plaintiffs”),
claiming Defendants Arthur and Harriet Carlisle (“Defendants”) breached their
written rent-to-own agreement (“RTO Agreement”) with Plaintiffs for the real
property located at 2320 South Garfield Avenue Monterey Park, California, a
multi-function business/residence building (“the Property”). In June of 2020, Defendants were the legal
owners of the Property but were experiencing financial hardship due to divorce
and the slowdown of Arthur Carlisle’s (“Arthur”) chiropractic business. Plaintiffs allege that on June 30, 2020,
Defendants entered into the written RTO with Plaintiffs whereby Plaintiffs
agreed to pay $1,000,000.00 over ten years in monthly installment payments of
$8,000.00. Plaintiffs were granted the
right of occupying the upstairs residential property, while allowing Defendant
Arthur to retain full control of the commercial property downstairs where he
ran his chiropractic business.
Defendant Arthur further communicated to
Plaintiffs that due to financial hardship, he had become unable to make the
necessary repairs and maintenance to render the property safe. Thus, Defendants orally represented to
Plaintiffs that if Plaintiffs invested the money and labor to make the
necessary repairs to render the property safe for occupancy, the Property would
belong solely to Plaintiffs based on the RTO agreement.
On July 7, 2023, while Plaintiff David
Ventimiglia (“David”) was performing necessary repairs in Defendants’
downstairs area, Plaintiff David suffered injuries to his leg, foot, and body,
requiring medical treatments and surgery.
On December 14, 2022, Defendants
subsequently breached the Agreement with Plaintiffs by the listing the subject Property
for sale.
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint (the
“Complaint”) on September 15, 2023, alleging ten causes of action for (1)
breach of purchase agreement; (2) breach of express oral trust; (3) promissory
estoppel; (4) quiet title; (5) promissory fraud; (6) equitable estoppel; (7)
quantum meruit; (8) declaratory relief; (9) negligence; and (10) preliminary
and permanent injunction, enjoining Defendants from continuing to market the
Property for sale and from continuing to represent to prospective buyers that
Defendants are the rightful owners, without cloud on the title.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants
demurrer is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part with leave to amend.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants’
request for judicial notice for Exhibit 1, the Complaint filed on September 15,
2023 is unnecessary because the Court need not take judicial notice of the
operative Complaint of Defendants’ instant demurrer herein.
LEGAL STANDARD
A party may
object to a complaint on grounds that “[t]he court has no jurisdiction of the
subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc.
section 430.10(a).)
A general
demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007)
147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a
demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading
or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ.
Proc. section 430.30(a).)
DISCUSSION
Meet
and Confer
Defendants
submit the declaration of their attorney of record, Christopher Lauria, who
declares that he attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiffs’ counsel, Gabor
Szabo first via email on November 2, 2023 and then via four telephone calls on.
December 5, 2023. (Demurrer at p. 8:
10-19, Declaration of Christopher Lauria.)
Lauria did not subsequently receive a response. (Id.)
Thus, Defendants have
fulfilled their requirement to Meet and Confer.
Whether Plaintiffs May Bring a Quiet Title Cause of
Action Based on Equitable Title
Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’
fourth cause of action for Quiet Title, alleging Plaintiffs fail to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action because Plaintiffs are suing to
quiet title based on their alleged “equitable title.” (Demurrer at p. 3.) Defendants assert that a holder of only
equitable title to property, cannot, as a matter of law, bring a quiet title
cause of action against the holder of legal title. (Id.)
In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that although the general
prevailing rule is that a holder of equitable title cannot maintain a quiet
title action against a legal owner, Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for
promissory fraud avails Plaintiffs to an exception to this general rule. (Opposition at p. 5.)
“The limited except in permitting the holder
of an equitable interest to maintain a quiet title action against a legal owner
is relatively narrow and has been recognized primarily in cases involving fraud
or breach of fiduciary duty by the holder of legal title.” (See, e.g., Strong
v. Strong (1943) 22 Cal.2d 540, 545–546 [equitable rights
could not be established in quiet title action absent finding of fraud.]) Banks
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 23, 2020, No. A156501)
2020 WL 1950785, at *8, vacated.)
Plaintiffs
cite to their fifth cause of action in the Complaint, noting in pertinent part:
“Defendants made these promises with the intent
to deceive Plaintiffs and with the intent to induce Plaintiffs to pay
Defendants significant sums of money so that Defendants could safe the Garfield
Property from foreclosure and Arthur cold continue his chiropractic business on the
premises while Plaintiffs were paying for all the expenditures and mortgages
while Defendants were keeping the Garfield property in their own names . . . In
reliance on Defendants’ promises Plaintiffs have: (1) allowed Defendants to
retain title to the Garfield property in their own names; (2) paid Defendants
monthly significant sums of money towards the mortgage and the purchase price .
. .” (Complaint at p. 8.)
In Reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have proffered no
facts reflecting any fraudulent action on the part of Defendants, nor any facts
reflecting Defendant was holding the property in trust for Plaintiffs. (Reply at p. 2.)
The Court finds that Plaintiffs
need not assert facts reflecting Defendant was holding property in trust for
Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs have proffered facts sufficient to allege an
action of fraud in connection with their claim for quiet title. The fraud allegations in Plaintiffs’ fifth
cause of action relate directly to the nature of Plaintiffs’ current status as
holder of equitable title. Such facts are sufficient to overcome the general rule
that equitable title holders cannot maintain a quiet title action against a
legal owner.
Thus, Defendants demurrer is overruled as to
Plaintiffs’ fourth action to quiet title.
Whether
Plaintiffs State Facts Sufficient to Establish Proximate Cause for Negligence
Defendants demur to Plaintiffs ninth cause of action for
Negligence, alleging Plaintiffs have failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for negligence because Plaintiffs have not
provided facts to demonstrate proximate cause which is a required element of
negligence. (Demurrer at p. 3.) Defendants further claim that because
Plaintiff David alleges his injury occurred in the scope of his employment with
Defendants, Plaintiff David’s exclusive remedy for compensation is found in the
Labor Code. (Demurrer at p. 6.)
"Where, at the time of the injury, the
employee is performing service growing out of and incidental to his or her
employment and is acting within the course of his or her employment" and
"where the injury is proximately caused by the employment," the
injured worker's exclusive remedy for compensation is found in the Labor Code
and "the employee's industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or
her dependents to bring an action at law for damages against the
employer." (Cal. Labor Code
sections. 3600(a) and 3602(a).)
In
opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged facts sufficient to allege
a cause of action for negligence arising out of an employer-employee
relationship, or in the alternative, a premises liability action. (Opposition at pp. 6-7.). Plaintiffs further state that the nature of
the relationship between the parties is presently disputed and could be
seller-buyer, landlord-tenant, employer-employee, or an independent contractor
relationship. (Id.)
In support of a premises liability action, Plaintiffs
reference paragraph 64 of the Complaint:
““Defendants were in possession and
control of the ground floor, and [...] breached their duty owed to Plaintiff as
they: a) Failed to properly maintain and clean the ground floor in the Garfield
Property, created an unsafe condition which was reasonably foreseeable that the
unsafe condition would result in injury to David; b) Failed to properly
maintain, timely inspect, and clean the floor to discovery any debris or
dangerous nails and/or staples which is reasonably foreseeable to be present
during demolition and could result in injury; c) Knew, or with the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known, to maintain the floor to prevent any
dangerous condition, such as sharp objects on the floor, which created an
unreasonable risk of harm to invitees, day laborers, or others. d) Failed to
warn Plaintiff of the danger presented by the presence of the dangerous
conditions; e) Failed to otherwise exercise due care with respect to the
matters alleged in this complaint.”
(¶64, Complaint 12:20-13:10).
In Reply, Defendants maintain that
Plaintiffs fail to plead any facts reflecting how the alleged injury occurred,
where on the property it occurred, and how such injury was caused by
Defendant’s negligence. (Reply at p.
2.). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs offer only conclusory allegations. (Id.).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are claiming to not yet have enough
information to determine the nature of the relationship between Plaintiff David
and Defendants or whether facts exist to assert negligence through a worker’s
compensation claim or a premises liability claim. (Reply at p. 3.) Defendants assert this argument fails at this
stage in the pleading process, as such doubts should have been resolved prior
to filing suit.
Here, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ alternate pleading theories are not supported by the facts as they
appear on the face of the pleadings.
Given Plaintiffs have not alleged facts regarding the specific
circumstances of Plaintiff David’s injury, the fact that the injury occurred on
Defendants’ premises alone is not sufficient to demonstrate Defendants being
the proximate cause. Given the
Property’s ownership is currently in dispute, the nature of the relationship
and legal theory of the claim must be supported by sufficient facts.
Thus, Defendants demurrer with
respect to the ninth action for negligence is sustained.
Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs request leave to amend, arguing
that it can cure defects by alleging facts to cure any insufficiencies. (Opposition at p. 8.) The Court finds that there exists reasonable
possibility that Plaintiffs may cure the pleadings to allege facts to demonstrate
proximate cause, and thus, plead a cause of action for negligence. Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to
amend.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ demurrer is overruled
as to the fourth cause of action for quiet title and sustained as to the ninth
cause of action for negligence, with the Court granting Plaintiffs 20 days
leave to amend.
Defendants
are ordered to give notice.
Dated: May 7, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an
email to the court indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org