Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV02204, Date: 2024-02-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV02204    Hearing Date: February 20, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:     February 20, 2024                                           TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         FRANCESCA DE LA FLOR v. TATIANA VAN SAUTER  

CASE NO.:                 23AHCV02204

DEMURRER

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Tatiana Van Sauter

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiff Frances De La Flor

SERVICE:                              Filed November 1, 2023

OPPOSITION:                       Filed November 20, 2023

REPLY:                                   Filed January 3, 2024

RELIEF REQUESTED

             Defendant demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint.

BACKGROUND

             This case arises out of Plaintiff Francesca De La For’s (“Plaintiff”) dispute with Defendant Tatiana Van Sauter, her daughter, (“Defendant”) over property located at 630 Alameda St. Altadena, California 91001 (“Subject Property”). Plaintiff filed this complaint on September 21, 2023, alleging four causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud in the inducement, (3) promissory estoppel, and (4) unjust enrichment. 

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant’s requests for judicial notice are denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Additionally, a special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

DISCUSSION

            First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

            Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract.

            The essential elements of a breach of contract are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th. 425, 433.)

            As a preliminary note, many of Defendant’s arguments are based on improper evidentiary arguments inapplicable at the pleading stage. Defendant cites various documents sought under judicial notice to contest the facts purportedly underlying this case, such as whether the parties held title to the Subject Property or provided valid consideration. “The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114.)

While courts “may take judicial notice of the existence of judicial opinions, court documents, and verdicts reached, we cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in other decisions or court files [citation], or of the truth of factual findings made in another action.” (Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 767.)

Defendant’s arguments based on the asserted facts of the case are rejected as improper during the pleading stage. However, Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of frauds.

“The statute of frauds requires contracts and options for the sale of real property to be in writing. (Civ.Code, § 1624.) ‘To satisfy the statute of frauds, the memorandum affecting the sale of real property must so describe the land that it can be identified with reasonable certainty.’ ” (Alameda Belt Line v. City of Alameda (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 15, 20-21.)

Plaintiff alleges that an agreement existed where Defendant would quitclaim half of the interest in the Subject Property to Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached by failing to quitclaim half of the interest in the property to her. (Id. ¶ 34.) Thus, Plaintiff is alleging a contract for the sale of real property, which is required to be in writing pursuant to Civil Code section 1624. However, in her complaint, Plaintiff only includes a letter from Defendant that is not, on the face of the pleading or exhibits, a written agreement to transfer real property.

Thus, Plaintiff’s first cause of action is barred by the statute of frauds. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is sustained.

Second Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060, citations omitted.

            “Each element of a fraud claim must be pleaded with specificity. [Citation.] ‘The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.’ ” (Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 1008.)

            Plaintiff’s second cause of action for fraudulent inducement is based on the same allegations underlying her first cause of action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant suggested that she would buy the Subject Property for the outstanding mortgage debt instead of having her parents sell the property. (Complaint ¶¶ 9-11.) Plaintiff alleges that the partes agreed that Plaintiff would retain the rental income, Plaintiff would pay half the new mortgage payment, and Defendant agreed to quitclaim half the interest in the property to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff’s allegations fail to provide any specifics regarding when, where, or how Defendant made the false representations at issue.

            Because Plaintiff’s fails to allege her claims with the required specificity, her second cause of action or fraudulent inducement fails to state a claim. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is sustained.

            Third Cause of Action for Promissory Estoppel

            Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for promissory estoppel.

            “ ‘The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” ’ ” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 934, 945.)

            Plaintiff’s third cause of action for promissory estoppel, like her claim for breach of contract, fails because Plaintiff seeks to enforce the sale of interest in real property without a written agreement. (Civ. Code section 1624.) Thus, Plaintiff’s third cause of action fails to state a claim. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for promissory estoppel is sustained.

            Fourth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment

            Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for unjust enrichment. “ ‘[T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment.’ ” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370.) “California does not recognize unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action.” (Castillo v. Toll Bros., Inc. (2011)  197 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1210.) Because Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s other causes of action was sustained, Plaintiff lacks an independent basis for her claim for unjust enrichment. Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is sustained.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

            Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:   February 20, 2024                                         ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org