Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV02450, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV02450    Hearing Date: January 30, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

 

 

HEARING DATE:      January 30, 2024                                             TRIAL DATE: No date set.

                                                          

CASE:                         XIA LU, an individual, v. ATL USA INC. a California Corporation; D-GLOBAL, LLC, a California limited liability company; ANJUAN PAN, an individual; JINGHANG WANG, an individual; DIMITRI J. KACZMAREK, an individual; XIANSHENG DUAN, an individual; and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive.

 

CASE NO.:                 23AHCV02450

 

           

 

DEMURRER

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Xiansheng Duan (“Duan”)

 

RESPONDING PARTY:      Plaintiff Xia Lu

 

SERVICE:                              Filed December 18, 2023

 

OPPOSITION:                       Filed January 16, 2024

 

REPLY:                                   Filed January 23, 2024

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

 

             Duan demurrers to each cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint.

 

BACKGROUND

 

             This case arises out of Plaintiff Xia Lu (“Plaintiff”) claim that Defendants breached a lease agreement for property located at 10950 Freer St. Temple City, California (“Subject Property”) Plaintiff filed this complaint on October 23, 2023, alleging five causes of action for (1) nonpayment of rent, (2) breach of lease agreement, (3) fraud, (4) intentional misrepresentation, and (5) promissory estoppel.

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

Duan’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

            Demurrer

 

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

 

Additionally, a special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

 

DISCUSSION

 

            Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action

 

            Duan objects to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for nonpayment of rent and second cause of action for breach of contract. Duan argues that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to comply with the applicable statute and fails to allege that he was a party to the contract.

 

            Duan cites Civil Code section 1951.2, subdivision (a), which provides in part that “if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates.”

 

            Duan argues that Plaintiff’s allegations fail because she has failed to established abandonment pursuant to Civil Code section 1951.3. However, Duan’s arguments are unavailing. “Material facts alleged in the complaint are treated as true for the purpose ruling on the demurrer” (Kisesky v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 228.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants breached the agreement by failing to pay (Complaint ¶ 22) and abandoned the property (Complaint ¶ 16.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient.

 

            However, Plaintiff fails to allege that Duan is a party to the agreement. Plaintiff alleges she entered into a lease with ATL USA, Inc., and Defendant Anjuan Pan, the owner of ATL. (Complaint ¶ 11.) Plaintiff does not allege that Duan is a party to the contract or alter ego status. Plaintiff only alleges that Duan is the chief executive officer of ATL. (Id. ¶ 8.) “The legal fiction of the corporation as an independent entity is partly intended to insulate corporate officers from personal liability for corporate contracts.” (Michaelis v. Benavides (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 681, 688.)

 

            Plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of a contract to which Duan is a party for the purpose of this present action. Duan’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action is sustained.

 

            Demurrer to Third and Fourth Causes of Action

 

            Duan demurrers to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for fraud and fourth cause of action for intentional misrepresentation.

 

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060, citations omitted.

 

            The essential elements of a count for intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.” (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-31.)

 

            “Each element of a fraud claim must be pleaded with specificity. [Citation.] ‘The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.’ ” (Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 1008.)

 

            Plaintiff’s allegations in her third and fourth causes of action fail to state fraud claims with any specificity. Plaintiff’s third cause of action for fraud does not detail what misrepresentation is alleged. Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action only alleges that Jinhang Wang made a representation. Other than generally alleging that all “defendants” engaged in fraudulent conduct, Plaintiff fails to plead what misrepresentations are alleged, who made the representations, when the representations were made, or any other factual allegations supporting her claims. Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead her claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

 

            Duan’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action is sustained.

 

            Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action

 

            Duan demurrers to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for promissory estoppel.

 

            “ ‘The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” ’ ” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 934, 945.)

 

            Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action merely alleges that “Defendant made a promise to pay the rent on the first day of each month.” (Complaint ¶ 54.) Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is a clear attempt to restate her first two causes of action. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege who made this promise or that Duan is implicated in this alleged promise. Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for promissory estoppel against Duan.

 

            Duan’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is sustained.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Duan’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

 

            Moving party to give notice.

 

 

           

Dated:   January 30, 2024                                           ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court



Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org