Judge Joel L. Lofton, Case Number: 23AHCV02598, Date: 2024-04-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV02598, Date: 2024-04-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV02598 Hearing Date: April 8, 2024 Dept: X

Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE: April 8, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE: STEPHANIE JOHNSON and WILLIAM POLLOCK, v. NANCY N. DALA, TRUSTEE OF THE NANCY N. DALA TRUST, and ELIZABETH MUNOZ

CASE NO.: 23AHCV02598

ANTI-SLAPP MOTION TO STRIKE

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Nancy N. Dala and Elizabeth Munoz

RESPONDING PARTY: No response filed.

SERVICE: Filed December 11, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ first and eighth causes of action.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiffs Stephanie Johnson and William Pollock (“Plaintiffs”) claim that they were unlawfully evicted from property located at 138 Oaks Avenue, Monrovia, CA 91016. Plaintiffs filed this complaint on November 7, 2023, alleging eight causes of action for (1) unlawful eviction under California Tenant Protection Act, (2) discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, (3) unlawful retaliation in violation of public policy, (4) fraud, (5) violation of Civil Code section 51, (6) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (7) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, and (8) abuse of process.

TENTATIVE RULING

Thus, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ first and eighth causes of action is tentatively GRANTED.

Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), is granted for a total of $1,800.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”

“As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc. section 425.16, subd. (e).)

“Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) requires the court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendant's burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]'s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,” as defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these determinations considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)

“In short, the statutory phrase ‘cause of action ... arising from’ means simply that the defendant's act underlying the plaintiff's cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78, internal citations omitted.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Civil Code section 425.16. Specifically, Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for unlawful eviction in its entirety and Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action for abuse of process in its entirety.

“The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)

“At this first step, courts are to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability. [citation] The defendant's burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.’” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)

“An unlawful detainer action and service of notices legally required to file an unlawful detainer action are protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16. [Citation.] ‘A cause of action arising from such filing or service is a cause of action arising from protected activity.’ ” (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 45.)

Here, both Plaintiffs’ first and eighth causes of action allege facts related to Defendants’ unlawful detainer case. Plaintiffs’ first cause of action alleges that Defendants unlawful detainer claim is a violation of the Tenant Protection Act. (Complaint ¶ 46.) Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action alleges that Defendants’ unlawful detainer action is an abuse of process. (Complaint ¶¶ 94-95.) Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiffs’ first and eighth causes of action arise from protected activity.

Ordinarily, an anti-SLAPP motion would proceed to the second step where “ ‘the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken.’ ” (Newport Harbor, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 49.) However, Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the present motion.

Thus, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ first and eighth causes of action is tentatively granted.

CONCLUSION

Thus, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ first and eighth causes of action is tentatively GRANTED.

Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), is granted for a total of $1,800.

Moving Party to give notice of ruling.

Dated: April 8, 2024 ___________________________________

Joel L. Lofton

Judge of the Superior Court