Judge Joel L. Lofton, Case Number: 23AHCV02693, Date: 2024-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV02693, Date: 2024-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV02693 Hearing Date: January 18, 2024 Dept: X

Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE: January 18, 2024 TRIAL DATE: February 6, 2024

CASE: GOLDEN ABACUS GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company, v. OMAR PENEGOS LOZADA, an individual and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.

CASE NO.: 23AHCV02693

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Golden Abacus Group, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY: No response filed.

SERVICE: Filed December 27, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to its claim for possession of the Subject Property pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161b, subdivision (b)(3).

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiff Golden Abacus Group, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) unlawful detainer claim for property located at 605 East Calaveras Street, Altadena, California (“Subject Property”). Plaintiff filed this complaint on November 15, 2023.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice for Exhibits 1-5 is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c).

LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “A party may move for summary judgement in an action or proceeding if it is contented that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code of Civil Procedure section 473c subd. (a)(1).) “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code of Civil Procedures section 473c subd. (c).)

A three-step analysis is employed in ruling on motions for summary judgment. First, the court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, the court determines, when the moving party is the defendant, whether it has produced evidence showing one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to that cause of action or defense. (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373.) The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Ibid.; see also Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 384, 389 [Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”].)

“A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. The defendant can satisfy its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the cause of action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to establish an essential element. (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC, (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 914.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment to recover possession of the Subject Property.

“Section 1161a(b) authorizes a summary proceeding to remove the possessor of real property in specified circumstances. It is structured to enumerate five ‘cases’ in which its substantive provision applies. Specifically, section 1161a(b) opens with the phrase ‘[i]n any of the following cases,’ then it sets forth its substantive provision (authorizing an unlawful detainer action to remove ‘a person who holds over and continues in possession of ... real property after a three-day written notice to quit the property has been served’), and then it enumerates five separate situations in which its substantive provision comes into play.” (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 479.)

Plaintiff asserts that Section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3), applies to the present case.

“In any of the following cases, a person who holds over and continues in possession of . . . real property after a three-day written notice to quit the property has been served upon the person . . . may be removed therefrom as prescribed in this chapter: [¶] (3) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.” (Code Civ. Proc § 1161a, subd. (b)(3).)

Thus, under section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3), Plaintiff must demonstrate sale of the Subject Property in accordance with section 2924, (2) under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust, and (3) title has been duly perfected.

Plaintiff provides that declaration of Yubin Tao, who provides he attended a Trustee’s sale for the Subject Property on September 7, 2023. (Tao Decl. ¶ 2.) He provides he was the only bidder and paid using two cashier’s checks. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) On October 24, 2023, a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded. (RJN Exhibit 1.) The deed contains the following language: “All requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of Notices for which Requests had been recorded, and otherwise, and regarding public, recordation, and posting of copies of a Notice of Trustee’s Sale, have been complied with. (Ibid.)

“A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale of compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default or the posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of a copy thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with these requirements and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.” (Civil Code § 2924, subd. (c).)

Plaintiff had demonstrated the sale was in accordance with Civil Code section 2924. Additionally on January 20, 2022, a Deed of Trust was recorded for the Subject Property. Paragraph 34 on Page 18 of the Deed of Trust provides, in part: “If an Event of Default occurs, Lender . . . may declare all sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately due and payable by delivering to Trustee a written affidavit or declaration of default and demand for sale, executed by Lender and reciting facts demonstrating such default by Borrower, together with a written notice of default and electron to sell the Mortgage Property.” Plaintiff had demonstrated that the power of sale was contained in the Deed of Trust.

“Title is duly perfected when all steps have been taken to make it perfect, i.e., to convey to the purchaser that which he has purchased, valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt[,] [citation], which includes good record [citation], but is not limited to good record title, as between the parties to the transaction.” (Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp 837, 841.)

Plaintiff demonstrates that Tao was the purchaser of the Subject Property at a Trustee’s Sale. (Tao Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) Further, a Trustee Deed was recorded on October 24, 2023. (Id. ¶ 6; RJN Exhibit 1.) Additionally, Plaintiff served a three-day notice to quiet on November 1, 2023. (Exhibit 6.)

Plaintiff had demonstrated it is entitled to possession of the property pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161b, subdivision (b)(3).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Dated: January 18, 2024 ___________________________________

Joel L. Lofton

Judge of the Superior Court