Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV02835, Date: 2024-07-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV02835    Hearing Date: July 17, 2024    Dept: X

   Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE:     July 17, 2024                                       TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE:                         Aida Hernandez, et al. v. Stephen S. Young, et al.

CASE NO.:                 23AHCV02835

DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:              Defendants Stephen S. Young and Betty Young, individually and as trustees of the Stephen S. Young and Betty Young Trust

RESPONDING PARTY:     Plaintiffs Aida Hernandez and Ruben Hernandez

SERVICE:                             OK / Unopposed

OPPOSITION:                      OK / Unopposed

REPLY:                                  OK / Unopposed

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendants demur to four of Plaintiffs’ seven causes of action and move to strike Plaintiffs’ prayers for punitive damages.

BACKGROUND

This is a habitability case. Plaintiffs Aida Hernandez and Ruben Hernandez sued defendants Stephen S. Young and Betty Young, individually and as trustees of the Stephen S. Young and Betty Young Trust, on December 7, 2023, asserting causes of action for:

            1.         Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability,

            2.         Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment,

            3.         Nuisance (Negligence),

            4.         Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress,

            5.         Negligent Maintenance of the Premises,

            6.         Nuisance (Intentional Tort), and

            7.         Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

As alleged in the complaint and accepted as true for a demurrer and motion to strike: Defendants own the property located at 2190 S. Oak Knoll Ave., San Marino 91108 (“the Property”). (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs have rented the Property from Defendants since around October 2015. (Id., ¶¶ 12-13.) Throughout Plaintiffs’ tenancy, the Property has suffered from uninhabitable conditions including severe vermin infestations, faulty plumbing and electrical systems, deteriorating structural integrity, and lack of maintenance of landscaping and foliage. (Id., ¶ 14.)

On March 27, 2024, Defendants demurred to and moved to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On July 7, 2024, Defendants replied.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ demurrers to the first and seventh causes of action are SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendants’ demurrers to the second and sixth causes of action are OVERRULED.

Defendants’ motion to strike is denied as MOOT.

LEGAL STANDARD

            Demurrer

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.)

When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged – but only the facts alleged – in the complaint as true. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

            Motion to Strike

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Id. § 436 (a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (Id., § 431.10.) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Id. § 436 (b).) Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 436, and 437.)

DISCUSSION (Demurrer)

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ first, second, sixth, and seventh causes of action, on the grounds that none states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

            1. First Cause of Action for Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability

Breach of the implied warranty of habitability, as any breach of contract, may be regarded as a tortious breach where an injured party demonstrates the defendant’s intentional, malicious, and outrageous conduct. (Smith v. David (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, 112, fn.3; Jones v. Kelly (1929) 208 Cal. 251, 255-256.) California law defines malice as “either (1) conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or (2) ‘despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ ” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 330.)

Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of warranty, but they have not stated a claim for tortious breach. The complaint refers solely to the conditions on the Property. It alleges no facts that suggest Defendants possessed any state of mind, malicious or otherwise. Plaintiffs rely on the assertion that (1) Defendants had actual and constructive notice of the poor conditions on the Property and (2) the poor conditions caused Plaintiffs substantial distress. The former allegation is insufficient to show malice, and the latter is irrelevant.

The demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

            2. Second Cause of Action for Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

A tenant suffering breach of quiet enjoyment may remain in place and sue their landlord for breach of the implied covenant, which is a breach of a promise contained in their lease. (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588-590) The elements track with a breach of contract or covenant case: (1) a lease; (2) the tenant’s performance or excuse; (3) the landlord’s substantial interference with the tenant’s beneficial use and enjoyment; and (4) some injury to the tenant’s rights under the lease – generally, the failure to obtain the full value bargained for when the tenant paid rent to occupy the premises without disturbance. (Ibid.)

“ ‘[T]he implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is similar to, and sometimes overlapping with, the warranty of habitability.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he “line between” the landlord's interference with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment and the landlord’s failure to maintain the leased premises in a “tenantable” condition can be “blurred.” ’ [Citation.]” (Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 919, 923, fn. 1.) A claim can be stated for one or the other on the same basic facts. (See Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1165 [“bedbug infestation and/or raw sewage on the property may violate the warranty of habitability or the covenant of quiet enjoyment”].)

Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability. They have also alleged the violations were severe and their landlords had notice of the poor conditions, which is sufficient to allege Defendants affirmatively substantially interfered with Plaintiffs’ use of the Property. These allegations state a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

            3. Sixth Cause of Action for Nuisance (Intentional Tort)

Although Defendants included Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for nuisance in their Notice of Demurrer, they did not discuss the nuisance claim in their moving papers. The Court disregards this portion of their demurrer because they failed to argue the point.

            4. Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) defendant’s outrageous conduct; (2) defendant's intent to cause distress or reckless disregard for its likelihood; (3) plaintiff's severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) causation. (See Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)

 “ ‘Conduct, to be “ ‘outrageous’ ” must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Similarly, “[s]evere emotional distress means ‘ “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” ’ ” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.)

The facts in Plaintiffs’ complaint do not describe conduct that exceeds all bounds of what might ordinarily be tolerated. In fact, the sorts of wrongs Plaintiffs allege are (regrettably) relatively commonplace. A tenant may recover against her landlord for intentional infliction of emotional distress in extreme cases, such as direct threats of violence against tenants (Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288) or knowing permission for severe habitability problems to persist across many buildings and units (McNairy v. C.K. Realty (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504). But no facts of that sort are alleged here. Plaintiffs have not stated a claim.

DISCUSSION (Motion to Strike)

Because the Court sustains Defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend, the motion to strike is denied as moot. But in the interest of avoiding unnecessary motion practice, the Court offers the following observation:

A motion to strike is the procedure to attack a purportedly improper remedy such as unjustified punitive damages. (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.) But a complaint including a request for punitive damages must also include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such an award. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted “with oppression, fraud and malice” toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages. (Ibid.)

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendants’ demurrers to the first and seventh causes of action are SUSTAINED WITH  20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendants’ demurrers to the second and sixth causes of action are OVERRULED.

Defendants’ motion to strike is denied as MOOT.

Moving party to give notice.

Dated:   July 17, 2024                                     ___________________________________

                                                                                    Joel L. Lofton

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit.  alhdeptx@lacourt.org