Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23AHCV02842, Date: 2023-12-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV02842 Hearing Date: December 14, 2023 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: December 14, 2023 TRIAL
DATE: No date set.
CASE: LAKELI PHARMACY
GROUP, INC., DBA GOLDEN HEALTH PHARMACY, a California corporation, v. CAREMARK,
L.L.C., a California limited liability company, CAREMARKPCS, HEALTH, L.L.C, a
Delaware limited liability company; CENTENE PHARMACY SERVICES, INC. a Delware
corporation; WELLCARE OF CALIFORNIA, INC., a California corporation, and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive.
CASE NO.: 23AHCV02842
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EX
PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Lakeli Pharmacy Group,
Inc.
SERVICE: Filed December 12, 2023
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Plaintiff files an ex parte application seeking a temporary restraining
order prohibiting Defendants from terminating Plaintiff from the network.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff Lakeli
Pharmacy Group, Inc. DBA Golden Health Pharmacy’s (“Plaintiff”) claim that
Defendants improperly terminated its relationship with the Pharmacy Benefit
Manager network. Plaintiff filed this complaint on December 8, 2023 alleging
three causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) unfair business practices.
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order
is DENIED.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff files an ex parte application seeking a temporary restraining
order prohibiting Defendants from terminating Plaintiff from the network.
A temporary
restraining order may not be granted without notice to the opposing party
unless it appears from the facts shown by affidavit or verified complaint that
great or irreparable injury will result to the application before the matter
can be heard on notice. (Code Civ. Proc. section 527, subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘In determining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, the trial court considers: (1) the likelihood that the moving party
will prevail on the merits and (2) the interim harm to the respective parties
if an injunction is granted or denied.’ ” (City of Vallejo v. NCORP4, Inc. (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1085.)
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1202, subdivision (c), provides: “An applicant must
make an affirmative factual showing in a declaration containing competent
testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or
any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.”
The first issue is whether
Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood it will prevail on the merits.
The essential elements of a breach
of contract are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to
the plaintiff. (Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th. 425, 433.) “Under California law, every contract includes an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Prager University v.
Google LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1039.) The covenant “exists merely
to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party’s
right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made.” (Guz v.
Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendants
breached a contractual obligation by improperly terminating it from the
network. Plaintiff contends that Defendant terminated its relationship with the
network without further review or appeal, without reference to specific policy,
and without providing more detail about evidence of Plaintiff’s improper
action. However, Plaintiff does not demonstrate how any of those actions, even
if true, form the basis for a breach of contract claim. At this time, the court
does not rule that such conduct does not form the basis for a breach of
contract claim but rather that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood
of success for purposes of a preliminary injunction. Similarly, Plaintiff does
not demonstrate a likelihood of success on its UCL claim because it does not
demonstrate how Defendant’s conduct and decision to terminate Plaintiff’s
relationship in a particular manner violates any applicable law.
Additionally, although it is clear
that Plaintiff would suffer harm, potentially even great harm, Plaintiff has
not demonstrated that a preliminary injunction is warranted. Plaintiff alleges
that it has been “terminated” from the network. (Complaint ¶ 45.) If Plaintiff has already been
terminated, any injunction would be a mandatory injunction compelling
Defendants to reinstate Plaintiff into the network. This would
change the balance of harm to each party.
At the current stage, Plaintiff’s
application for a temporary restraining order lacks sufficient basis.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order
is DENIED.
Dated: December 14,
2023 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court