Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23GDCV00820, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23GDCV00820 Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 Dept: X
Tentative Ruling
Judge Joel L. Lofton,
Department X
HEARING DATE: June 18, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set.
CASE: CARRIE J. JUNISCO,
et al. v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al.
CASE NO.: 23GDCV00820
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Carrie J. Junisco and Lateef J.
Cameron
SERVICE: Filed April 12, 2024
OPPOSITION: Filed May 14, 2024
REPLY: None as of June 13, 2024
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Defendant Ford Motor Company requests summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication.
BACKGROUND
Carrie J. Junisco and Lateef J. Cameron (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) commenced this action on April 25, 2023 by filing their Complaint
against Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), Long Beach Lincoln Mercury, Inc., dba
Caruso Ford Lincoln (“Caruso Ford Lincoln”), and Does 1 through 10, inclusive,
for (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty; (2)
violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of
Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (4) negligent repair. The first, second,
and third causes of action are against Ford while the fourth cause of action is
against Caruso Ford Lincoln.
The Complaint arises from Plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2018
Ford EcoSport within VIN No.: MAJ3P1TE4JC175668 (the “Subject Vehicle”) on July
18, 2021. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) The Complaint
alleges Ford warranted the Subject Vehicle and agreed to preserve
or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiffs’ vehicle or to provide
compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. In
connection with the purchase, Plaintiffs received various warranties including
a 3-year/36,000 mile express bumper to bumper warranty, a 5-year/60,000 mile
powertrain warranty which, inter alia, covers the engine and the transmission,
as well as various emissions warranties that exceed the time and mileage
limitations of the bumper to bumper and powertrain warranties. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The
Subject Vehicle was delivered to Plaintiffs with serious defects and
nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and
nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to, emission, engine,
transmission, and electrical system defects. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
Ford
and Caruso Ford Lincoln each filed their Answer on June 2, 2023, and July 6,
2023, respectively.
On
April 12, 2024, Ford filed the instant motion for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication.
On
May 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition.
As of
June 13, 2024, Ford has not filed its reply.
TENTATIVE RULING
Ford’s motion for summary
judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is DENIED.
OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE
The Court may decline to rule on objections that are not
material to its disposition of the motion. (Code of Civ. Proc. 437c(q).)
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
None.
LEGAL STANDARD
The function of a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot
show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of
summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(c)
“requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As to each claim, defendant must satisfy the initial burden
of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a
defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to plaintiff to show a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
DISCUSSION
Ford seeks summary
judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, in its favor on the
causes of action asserted against it: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act –
breach of express warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of
implied warranty; (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2. Ford argues
its motion should be granted because Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle
used without a full new manufacturer’s warranty; the Subject Vehicle is not a
“new motor vehicle” for purposes of the Song-Beverly Act.
As discussed below,
the Court finds the Subject vehicle does fall under the definition of a “new
motor vehicle” per Jensen v. BMW North America, Inc. (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 112 (“Jensen”), so summary judgment is
denied.
Ford argues the Subject Vehicle does not qualify as a “new
motor vehicle” under the Song-Beverly Act. In addition to a new motor vehicle
being a vehicle purchased for personal purposes, the Song-Beverly Act defines a
“new motor vehicle” as: “ ‘New motor vehicle’ includes the chassis, chassis
cab, and that portion of a motor home devoted to its propulsion, but does not
include any portion designed, used, or maintained primarily for human habitation,
a dealer-owned vehicle and a “demonstrator” or other motor vehicle sold with a
manufacturer’s new car warranty…” (Civ. Code, § 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).)
Ford argues a used vehicle accompanied by a balance of the
original warranty is not covered under the Song-Beverly Act as a new vehicle,
citing Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905 (“Dagher”)
and Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 (“Rodriguez”).
However, that reliance is misplaced.
The plaintiff in Dagher purchased a used vehicle from
a private party, and when issues arose with the vehicle, attempted to seek
recourse under the Song-Beverly Act. The court granted summary judgment in
favor of the manufacturer. Dagher held plaintiff could not avail
themselves to protection of the Song-Beverly Act because the definition of
“buyer” within the Song-Beverly Act was construed to apply to only vehicles
purchased in California. (Dagher, supra at 919.) Plaintiffs herein
purchased the vehicle in California.
The facts in Rodriguez are similar facts to this case.
In Rodriguez, plaintiff purchased a used truck from a dealership. The
truck retained a balance on the warranty, so when plaintiff began experiencing
issues, they took it for repairs under the warranty. (Rodriguez, supra,
215-216.) When issues continued, plaintiff sued under the Song-Beverly Act. The
Rodriguez Court ruled plaintiff could not avail themselves of the
Song-Beverly Act because the truck was not a “new vehicle.” Rodriguez
parsed the grammatical structure of section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) and
ruled the phrase “or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car
warranty…” was a catchall provision intended to cover a narrow class of
vehicles that were previously driven, but not previously sold. (Rodriguez,
supra, 220).
In the case, the Court declines to follow Rodriguez based on the
following.
First, Rodriguez is not binding. Our Supreme Court has granted
petition for review, and although the case may be cited for its persuasive
value, it also establishes the existence of a conflict in authority, and
pursuant to Auto Equity Sales, Inc., v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d
450, 456 trial courts have discretion to choose between sides of any such
conflict. (See Rodriguez v. FCA US (2022) 512 P.3d 654.) Therefore, when
there is a conflict between Jensen and Rodriguez, the Court has
the discretion to choose which side to follow per the Supreme Court. The Court
finds the reasoning and holding of Jensen more persuasive and more
consistent with the plain language and legislative history of the
statute.
Second, Ford fails to sufficiently distinguish the instant case from Jensen.
Ford argues that in Jensen the plaintiff who leased the “new vehicle”
received a full new car warranty along with the lease, while as here, Plaintiffs
did not receive a new warranty, but simply retained the balance left on the
warranty after the purchase. This alone, is not enough to combat Jensen’s
explicit holding that “…the words of section 1793.22 are reasonably free from ambiguity and cars sold
with a balance remaining on the manufacturer's new motor vehicle warranty are
included within its definition of ‘new motor vehicle’” because “[t]he use
of the word ‘or’ in the statute indicates ‘demonstrator’ and ‘other motor
vehicle’ are intended as alternative or separate categories of ‘new motor
vehicle’ if they are ‘sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.’” (Jensen, supra, at 123.) The court
also considered the legislative history of the statute due to the “peculiar
grammatical structure” of the section. (Id.) After reviewing
the amendments to former section 1793.2, documents relating to those
legislative proceedings, and the statutory scheme as a whole, the court
“conclude[d] the plain meaning and the legislative intent are one and the
same.” (Id.)
Therefore, the Court finds that Ford has not met its burden. Further, Plaintiffs
provide that Ford issued a new extended warranty of 36-month/36,000 mile under
the “Ford ESP Program,” as part of the sale of the Subject Vehicle to
Plaintiffs, which Ford did not issue to the Subject Vehicle during the
ownership of the prior owner. (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Genuine Material Facts
in Dispute Nos. 3-7, 15.) As such, Plaintiffs provide that they were provided
new and actionable warranties as part of their purchase of the Subject Vehicle
in addition to the balance left on the warranty after their purchase. Whether
Ford issued new and actionable warranties through its “Ford ESP Program” to
Plaintiffs creates a triable issue of material fact.
Therefore, Ford’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative,
summary adjudication as to the first three causes of action based in the Song-Beverly
Act, is denied.
Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions under section 128.5, subdivision (a) is
denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Ford Motor
Company’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative, summary
adjudication, is DENIED.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated: June 18, 2024 ___________________________________
Joel
L. Lofton
Judge
of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an
email to the court indicating their
intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org