Judge Joel L. Lofton, Case Number: 23STCP04453, Date: 2024-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Joel L. Lofton, Case: 23STCP04453, Date: 2024-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP04453 Hearing Date: April 11, 2024 Dept: X

Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE: April 11, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE: MARIYA WRIGHTSMAN v. THE CITY OF GARDENA

CASE NO.: 23STCP04453

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MOVING PARTY: Petitioner Mariya Wrightsman (“Petitioner”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Respondent The City of Gardena

SERVICE: Filed February 22, 2024

OPPOSITION: Filed April 8, 2024

REPLY: Filed April 9, 2024

RELIEF REQUESTED

Petitioner moves for a preliminary injunction prohibiting Respondent from enforcing Ordinances Numbers 1854 and 1856.

BACKGROUND

This claim arises out of Petitioner Mariya Wrightsman’s (“Petitioner”) claim that the City of Gardena’s (“Respondent” or “the City”) ordinance is unlawful. Petitioner filed this petition on December 11, 2023.

TENTATIVE RULING

Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

The hearing on the demurrer is ordered CONTINUED.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 526, subdivision (a), provides:

An injunction may be granted in the following cases: [¶] (1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. [¶] (2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action. [¶] (3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. [¶] (4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. [¶] (5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief. [¶] (6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. [¶] (7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.

DISCUSSION

Demurrer with Motion to strike

In opposition to the City’s demurrer with motion to strike, Petitioner filed five separate documents. Petitioner provides that the documents should be read sequentially. However, Petitioner’s filings violate California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113, subdivision (d), which provides in part that “[e]xcept in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages.” Petitioner’s filings, as sequentially listed, are twelve (12) pages, 229 pages for the requests for judicial notice, seventeen (17) pages, twenty-three (23) pages, and twenty (20) pages long.

Petitioner’s deficient opposition make it untenable for the court to attempt to follow Petitioner’s arguments. The hearing on the demurrer is ordered continued. Petitioner is ordered to file appropriate oppositions to the demurrer and motion to strike nine days prior to the continued hearing date. Petitioner is not allowed leave to file a longer memorandum. If Petitioner fails to submit an appropriate opposition, the court will disregard every page after the allowed 15th page.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Petitioner moves for a preliminary injunction prohibiting Respondent from enforcing Ordinance numbers 1854 and 1856. The City of Gardena Ordinance 1854 prohibit “[s]hort term rentals and home sharing rentals . . . in every Specific Plan zone in the city.” (Gardena Ordinance 1854 § 18.06.020.) Ordinance 1856 amends Gardena’s Municipal Code relating to accessory dwelling units.

“A trial court may grant a preliminary injunction upon a showing that (1) the party seeking the injunction is likely to prevail on the merits at trial, and (2) the ‘interim harm’ to that party if an injunction is denied is greater than ‘the [interim] harm the [opposing party] is likely to suffer if the ... injunction is issued.’ [citation.] These two showings operate on a sliding scale: ‘[T]he more likely it is that [the party seeking the injunction] will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction does not issue.’ [citation.] ” (Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1183.)

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

In support of her claim that she is likely to prevail on the merits, Petitioner contends that the subject ordinances are invalid because they are preempted by state laws. Petitioner specifically contend that the ordinances are preempted by Civil Code section 1947.

Pursuant to article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, “[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” “If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void. [Citations.] A conflict exists if the local legislation ‘ “duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.” ’ ” (Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 885.)

“Local legislation is ‘duplicative’ of general law when it is coextensive therewith.” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897.) “Similarly, local legislation is ‘contradictory’ to general law when it is inimical thereto.” (Id. at p. 898.) “Finally, local legislation enters an area that is ‘fully occupied’ by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to ‘fully occupy’ the area . . ..” (Ibid.)

Civil Code section 1947 provides: “When there is no usage or contract to the contrary, rents are payable at the termination of the holding, when it does not exceed one year. If the holding is by the day, week, month, quarter, or year, rent is payable at the termination of the respective periods, as it successively becomes due.”

Petitioner has failed to establish any reason that Civil Code section 1947 preempts the City of Gardena’s ordinances. The law neither evinces a legislative intent to fully occupy the issue of rental agreements nor is the law duplicative of the subject ordinances. Further, section 1947 does not provide Petitioner a statutory right to collect rent so as to be contradictory to Respondent’s ordinances. Petitioner’s argument in reply that because other sections in the same chapter as section 1947 contain express language excluding preemption, the court should read an implicit intent to preempt is not supported by any legal authority or statutory interpretations. “ ‘We presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we do not read statutes to omit expressed language or to include omitted language.’ ” (Citibank, N.A. v. Tabalon (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th Supp. 16, 20.) Stated another way, the fact that Civil Code section 1947.13, subdivision (e), includes an express intent not to preempt local law does not in any way, shape, or form, support Petitioner’s claim that preemption should be read into section 1947.

Petitioner’s reliance on Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 51 Cal.2d 1, is unavailing. In Agnew, the Court held that the state had “occupied the field of licensing electrical contractors”. (Id. at p. 6.) Unlike Agnew, here there is no indication that section 1947, or any other argument submitted by Petitioner, establishes statewide preemption of rental regulations. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims.

Irreparable Injury

In her short argument on the point, Petitioner contends that she would suffer irreparable injury based on the ordinances prohibiting her from issuing short-term rentals for her property. However, it appears that Petitioner’s claim is limited to monetary losses. “It would appear an irreparable injury is one for which either (1) its pecuniary value is not susceptible to monetary valuation, or (2) the item is so unique its loss deprives the possessor of intrinsic values not replaceable by money or in kind.” (Jessen v. Keystone Savings & Loan Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 457.) Petitioner fails to demonstrate any level of irreparable injury. Petitioner further fails to provide evidence or argument in support of even her claim that she is currently experiencing monetary losses.

Petitioner also fails to add any discussion regarding the balance of harm, namely the extent of harm Respondent may face if an order prohibiting its implantation of an ordinance is issued. Thus, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the balance of harm weighs in her favor.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

The hearing on the demurrer is ordered CONTINUED.

Dated: April 11, 2024 ___________________________________

Joel L. Lofton

Judge of the Superior Court